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This research looks at how the shift in the status of Egyptian bloggers from 
underground dissident voices to mainstream political and media players 
affected the plurality they add to the public space for discourse in Egypt’s 
authoritarian settings. The role of the internet – and more recently social media 
and bloggers – in democratic transition has been studied by various media 
scholars since the introduction of the worldwide web and especially after the 
Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings of 2011. But no work has been done to study 
how bringing those once-underground bloggers into the public and media 
spotlight affected the nature of the blogosphere and the bloggers themselves. 
Star bloggers were not only covered by the media after January 25th, 2011, they 
also started joining the media as column writers; a move that had various 
effects on them and the blogosphere but was never examined in media studies. 
The plurality the blogosphere adds to the Egyptian public space for discourse 
in light of those changes as well as in light of the financial and practical 
sustainability of blogging was hence never looked at in a context similar to 
Egypt’s. Guided by modified theories of the public sphere and theories of 
hegemony and manufacturing consent, I look at whether bloggers have been 
co-opted into the historical bloc in the process of renewing the social order and 
how this affects them and the online sphere. Also, guided by theories of power 
and media elites, I look at bloggers’ backgrounds to assess whether they come 
from power elites and are transforming into media elites, thus limiting the 
plurality of the online sphere. Finally, guided by theoretical works on 
institutionalizing and commercializing the internet, I look at how those shifts 
into mainstream affect the independence and freedom of the blogs and micro-
blogs. The research uses a comparative study to assess how those changes 
affect prominent versus less prominent bloggers and compare their 
backgrounds. The study uses quantitative content analysis and framing analysis 
of chosen media outlets and interviews with bloggers, marketeers and media 
professionals. The findings trace an increase in media coverage of bloggers 
post January 25th, 2011, especially in the prominent bloggers category, and an 
overall positive framing of bloggers post the uprising. This led to the 
mainstreaming of bloggers into the media as well as public work, which had 
various implications on the freedom they had over their content and voice, both 
online and offline. It also points to a dramatic decrease in bloggers’ activity on 
their blogs in favour of mainstream and social media and due to star bloggers 
becoming more career-oriented and their failure to make blogs financially 
sustainable. The findings also indicate that more prominent bloggers seem to 
come from more elite backgrounds than others and enjoy luxuries that allow 
them the time, technology and security to post online. This research concludes 
that the shifts in bloggers’ status post-January 25th have limited the plurality 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
The Egyptian uprising of 2011 marked a turning point in online activism in 
Egypt in general and social media and the blogosphere in particular because of 
the perceived importance of these platforms during the uprising. Satellite 
channels, social media and blogs became trusted news and opinion sources on 
current affairs after state media lost their credibility for their biased reporting 
during the earlier days of the uprising. With the rising popularity of social 
media platforms since 2011, bloggers’ status shifted from operating in 
underground media platforms to being mainstreamed as the faces behind the 
calls for the uprising and movers and shakers of the political scene in the 
months following January 25th, 2011.   
1.1. Theoretical Positioning  
With the perceived role social media and bloggers played in the Egyptian and 
Tunisian uprisings — and before that in the 2009 Iranian protests dubbed the 
Twitter Revolution — came a body of literature discussing the role of social 
media in public mobilization, political and civil advocacy and the 
democratization process. Four years before the Egyptian and Tunisian 
uprisings, namely around 2006, various scholars also discussed what blogs add 
to the discourse in the Arab world and how much freer they are than the 
mainstream media. A recent example of these works is Ghazal Saif’s research 
on “Keyboards Fight Tanks,” where she studies the anti-authoritarian discourse 
in Egyptian blogs (2013). Rasha Abdullah has also written about the role the 
media, including online media, played during Egypt’s democratic transition 
(2011) followed by a research paper mapping the digital media in Egypt in 
2013. Mark Lynch (2006 and 2007), Courtney Radsch (2007 and 2008) and 
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Etling et al (2010) have looked at the emergence and mapping of the Arab 
blogosphere. There has also been a limited number of studies looking at the 
quality of discourse in the Egyptian blogosphere; El-Nawawy and Khamis 
have analyzed the quality of discourse on the blogosphere in 2011 and 2014. 
This literature came as the blogosphere started discussing issues that were not 
covered by the media, including sexual harassment and police violence. Earlier 
works on online platforms came with the introduction of the World Wide Web 
in the 1990s and mainly argued the merits of the internet in providing a 
platform for expression that is free from state or economic control and 
available to everyone. Utopian theorists of the internet included Beacham 
(1995, cited in McChesney, 1995), Jones (1997), Grossman (1995) and Rash 
(1997) (cited in Papacharissi, 2004) while one of the most dystopian theorists 
is Morozov who argues against cyber-utopianism, predicting online activism 
can never lead to on the ground change (2011). There had also been ongoing 
works on business models available for new media platforms, including 
Forrester and Powell (2008) and Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010). 
There has been limited bridging, however, between the business area of 
researching online platforms and that studying the democratic merit of the 
internet, especially when it came to blogs. Little work has been done looking at 
blogs in light of organizational theory to look at the financial aspect of 
blogging in terms of its sustainability. There is also a research gap when it 
comes to looking at just how inclusive the Egyptian blogosphere really is, both 
in terms of who gets heard and promoted both online and offline as well as the 
backgrounds of bloggers in light of elite theories. This not only means that 
little has been done on just who these bloggers are, but also whether there is a 
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growing gap between star bloggers and other bloggers and micro-bloggers that 
is leading to an online sphere where, increasingly, only a handful of voices are 
getting heard as others struggle for followership. No research looked at the 
relationship between backgrounds of bloggers in relation to their prominence 
and the nature of issues they prioritize. When it comes to post-January 25th, 
2011 literature concerning blogs, there is also a research gap in looking at how 
the shifting status of bloggers is affecting them and the blogosphere. No 
research has been done to assess how the media changed its attitude towards 
and relationship with prominent versus less-prominent bloggers and the 
impacts of such changes. There has also been no work done to assess the 
effects of mainstreaming the once underground bloggers. This is why the 
overarching question of this research is how much plurality the blogosphere (a 
supposedly inclusive space for dissidence) adds to the public space for 
discourse after the changes it has undergone during the uprising in Egypt’s 
authoritarian setting.   
Instead of looking at bloggers and micro-bloggers romantically as 
drivers of democratic change or at the internet as an exclusive sphere, I look at 
social media makers and bloggers as micro-organizations that need certain 
conditions granted to achieve sustainability, including financial sustainability. I 
am hence looking at the blogosphere as a formerly counterpublic of 
counterhegemonic elements that is potentially becoming part of the historical 
bloc to achieve sustainability (both financial as well as career) and in turn, how 
this affects the plurality the online sphere adds to the public space for 
discourse.  
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This research does not look at the role social media played in the 
uprisings, nor does it aim to assess its potentials in the democratization 
process. It does not take a deterministic stand in the utopian and dystopian 
internet studies. Instead, I take a circumstantial approach to studying the 
blogosphere and micro-blogs; I study the blogosphere like any other media 
platform that can theoretically drive change given the appropriate 
circumstances. This means taking the stand that, like many other media 
platforms, the blogosphere and social media are not free from state or 
economic control, but the key to an inclusive online sphere lies in how the 
makers of that sphere respond to those pressures. I look at the blogosphere in 
the historical context of the media; much like any other media platform, its 
emergence held hopes of change and when this change occurred, it began 
resembling mainstream media in the pressures it undergoes, be it political or 
financial, hence losing its core differences that set it apart from mainstream 
media. I also look at prominent bloggers as media elite who set the agenda but 
are of drastically different making than the majority of the population they 
communicate with. And much like other media platforms, I take the stand that 
although internet is in theory inclusive, the blogosphere and social media can 
be, in practice, just as exclusive as newspapers or channels, despite the lower 
barriers to entry.  
When studying elites, I had to adapt Mills’ concept of elites (1956) to 
the Egyptian context where access to high-speed broadband that allows for 
shooting and uploading videos on the go is considered elite given a poverty 
rate of 40%, according to the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights 
(2013). The Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), 
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claims illiteracy rates in those above 10 years of age to be at 30% (2013). The 
real rate, however, is believed to be far higher; illiteracy rates are measured by 
primary school education and it is common to find primary school graduates 
who cannot read or write but have succeeded through cheating in end of term 
exams; the only determinants of success in Egypt’s public education system. 
CAPMAS estimates illiteracy rate among those above the age of 60 to be at 
65%. Basic English is also spoken among 35%, according to a report by 
Euromonitor International (2012), and that includes English speakers who do 
not have the necessary language grasp to blog or read in English and only 
know the basics. This means that not only do elite definitions need to be 
tweaked to the Egyptian context, but also the concept of proprietorship and 
inclusivity as stipulated by Habermas, Mouffe (2000) and Fraser (1992). 
Inclusivity of the online sphere in Egypt needs to factor in the cost of accessing 
high-speed internet and smart phones as well as education levels and language 
proficiency. The public sphere’s freedom from state and economic control is 
also at strong play in Egypt’s authoritarian given media ownership and 
censorship over state and private media. We also need to look at what the 
historical bloc, as described by Gramsci (1971), is formed of in Egypt, and 
how mainstream media, given the media ownership and how it marries 
politicians and businessmen, is considered a strong element of that bloc. These 
elements come into play strongly when looking at theories of manufacturing 
consent, (Herman and Chomsky, 1988) and how consent is renewed in Egypt 
after January 25th; namely by coercing counterhegemonic elements, bloggers, 
into the historical bloc; political organizations and the mainstream media.  
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These issues are especially important to answer at a time when Egypt is 
undergoing drastic changes under an authoritarian regime. The state media 
have also lost credibility, alternative or community media are limited and 
social media’s popularity and importance are on the rise. Additionally, 
platforms like blogs used to represent room for dissident voices without the 
pressures mainstream media are subjected to, like legal, financial, editorial or 
trying to cater for mass audience. This is why it was important to look at 
whether this freedom from mass media pressures is still relevant, even after 
star bloggers and social media makers became mainstreamed and were put 
under the spotlight of the media, the private sector and ultimately the state. 
1.2. Background to the research question  
Before January 25th, bloggers remained largely alternative media sources that 
did not often intertwine with mainstream media. They represented dissident 
voices that discussed issues mainstream media did not necessarily pick up on 
because they did not want to or could not due to censorship. Bloggers were the 
ones to break stories like mass sexual harassment in 2007 and police brutality.  
But at large, they remained on the dissident margins, read by the educated 
elites who had access to the internet and kept largely separated from 
mainstream media. The sole relationship existent between mainstream media 
and bloggers was that, on occasion, mainstream media used bloggers’ videos 
without crediting them.  
The media’s relationship and coverage of bloggers saw a drastic change 
after January 25th. Bloggers, who often live-Tweeted events, became sources 
for the media to quote on current affairs and hot topics in politics. They 
became faces of the revolution and the center of news and events and so were 
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taken into the spotlights of mainstream media. Bloggers turned from 
underground writers into public figures whose roles in the uprising were often 
celebrated. Asmaa Mahfouz, for instance, was named one of the most 
influential Arab women by Arabian Business and received the Sakharov Prize 
for Freedom of Thought. Similarly, three prominent bloggers were nominated 
for the Nobel Peace Prize. Even their arrests became the center of media 
attention and moved to the front pages whereas they had passed unnoticed or 
covered in the crime section a few months earlier. For instance, star blogger 
Alaa Abdel Fattah became the face of military trials of civilians in 2011 
although there were 1,200 civilians undergoing military trials. Blogger Mina 
Daniel’s death also became the face of the Maspero violence where clashes 
occurred in protests in front of Maspero building, the headquarters of state 
television’s main channels, leading to the death of 28. Newspapers, including 
Al-Masry Al-Youm, even started dedicating sections to cover the pulse of social 
media. 
Along with bloggers’ rising popularity, social media also started 
gaining popularity after January 25th. On February 2nd, the first day the internet 
was available after being cut off on January 28th, 100,000 new users from 
Egypt registered to Facebook, increasing its penetration rate in Egypt from 
12% in April 2010 to 29% in April 2011, (Arab Social Media Report, 2011). 
Facebook users grew from 4.8 million in December 2010 to over 9 million in 
January 2012. Twitter marked over 35,000 Tweets on February 11, 2011, the 
day former president Hosni Mubarak stepped down, up from an average of 
under 15,000 Tweets before the uprising. The internet penetration rate grew 
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from 24% in 2009, according to the Ministry of Information and 
Communication Technology, to 43% in 2013, marking 36 million users.  
This increasing popularity of social media makers made the private 
sector and the mainstream media seek bloggers for more credibility and 
validation. Mainstream media started seeking them to write columns because 
they became voices of the revolution and the movers and shakers of the 
political arena in 2011, hence providing newspapers with revolutionary 
credentials. The private sector also started inviting them to their product 
launches to gain prominence and validation on platforms where those bloggers 
and social media makers are popular. Nokia even held a product launch event 
in April, 2011 where they invited bloggers only instead of their usual press list 
to create an online buzz about their new product. Similarly, star blogger Gigi 
Ibrahim, who comes from elite backgrounds and blogs largely in English, 
started getting invited, alongside other online media makers and journalists, to 
events of products targeting an upper or middle class customer. Bloggers 
represent a goldmine for marketeers because they are able to reach a young 
audience of middle and upper classes; a key segment for marketeers and an 
important segment of the audience for the mainstream media. In fact, according 
to the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology, 85% of 
internet users in Egypt are between ages 16 and 34 and out of the 24 million 
internet users in 2011, 23 million are broadband users. Given prices of 
broadband services in Egypt and 40% of the population being below poverty 
line, one can assume that those 23 million come from upper or middle classes. 
Similarly, in 2011, 75% of Facebook users in the Arab region were between 15 
and 29 (Arab Social Media Report, 2011). This interest from the private sector, 
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however, does not necessarily translate into advertising revenue for bloggers, 
putting the financial sustainability of blogging into question. 
It is important to note, however, that these changes did not necessarily 
happen for all bloggers. While some bloggers became household names, others 
remained largely unrecognizable to the general, non-virtual audience. A 
handful of star bloggers gathered more fame and credibility and stood more 
chances to be defended, covered and recruited by mainstream media when they 
faced any oppression. These star bloggers also stood a chance to generate 
revenue through posting advertisements on their now-sought-after blogs or 
transferring their skills and their now-trusted by-lines and joining mainstream 
press. Their blogs became more well-read as the media hosted them and they 
became familiar to a mainstream audience. Others who were less famous, 
however, remained largely underground and struggling to find enough time to 
keep the frequency of their posts. My research indicated that it was important 
for me to differentiate between prominent bloggers and others who do not 
receive the same attention and followership.  
Blogging and tweeting throughout the day is a rather time-consuming 
activity and several bloggers gave up their jobs for the causes of January 25th, 
including Abdel Fattah, Sandmonkey and Asmaa Mahfouz who then joined a 
documentary-making company. But this is not something all bloggers and 
activists afford. An interview with a less-prominent blogger going by the name 
Sherine shows she expressed concern over not having the time she would like 
to post frequently, given a full-time job, and so has resorted instead to much-
shorter Twitter posts. Meanwhile, star blogger Alaa Abdel Fattah told What 
Women Want magazine in December 2012 that although his wife and him are 
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both breadwinners in the family, they were both jobless as he had gone to 
prison after their move back from South Africa and his wife had just given 
birth and could not work. “We haven’t thought much about that but we’re quite 
privileged, in terms of education, having a supportive family, and having some 
savings,” he said in the interview. “So we’re not personally threatened or 
worried about that whereas the majority of Egypt is really feeling the crunch.” 
Therefore, revenue streams might not be equally available to less-
prominent bloggers and the need for revenue is also unequal between bloggers, 
putting the sustainability of blogging in question. If bloggers, be it prominent 
or less-prominent ones, opt against finding a revenue stream or are not 
presented with the opportunity to generate one, they might not be able to 
maintain frequent posts. And if they do maintain frequent posts, it is then 
relevant to see whether they come from a financial elite that affords them more 
time than others who do not enjoy the same luxuries. Dedicating one’s time to 
a cause without finding financial sustainability can be a question of political 
activism only. But putting it in that context alone would be failing to 
acknowledge that blogs are a media platform that could be possibly profitable. 
It would also be failing to acknowledge that the skills of bloggers could be 
transferrable to mainstream media, much like Abdel Fatttah and Sandmonkey 
have, contributing columns to mainstream newspapers.  
Additionally, any revenue stream adopted, be it through advertising or 
joining mainstream media, poses several questions about joining the historical 
bloc and possibly altering or neutralizing content to fit mainstream needs or 
answer advertorial, editorial or legal pressures. 
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There is also the question of whether bloggers are turning into media 
elite as they come from more elite backgrounds, run in the same social circles 
and link to one another. Posting links to one another as well as promoting each 
other and getting promoted by the media makes blogs appear higher up on 
search engines. This then increases the one-way communication of the 
blogosphere and its domination by a select few as prominent bloggers support 
and promote one another and gain more fame from the media while others 
struggle to find followership. In a possible indication that elite bloggers do run 
in the same circles, English-language blogger Gigi Ibrahim married prominent 
leftist blogger Hossam El Hamalawy. 
It is then relevant to assess whether the most prominent bloggers in 
Egypt who were celebrated by the media are, in fact, of elite backgrounds and 
becoming part of the media elite, leading to the lack of plurality on the 
blogosphere. This means looking at whether a relatively small number of 
prominent bloggers might be enjoying a growing visibility and means to 
generate revenue, as an increasingly large number of less-prominent bloggers 
are faced with limited visibility and resources. 
It is also important to look at how their changing status and 
mainstreaming is affecting their online and offline content generation. This 
means looking at how aware they are of being under the spotlight and whether 
this spotlight makes them alter their voices to fit a more mainstream audience 
or to stay safe from oppression now that they are more visible. It also requires 
looking at how the frequency of their online posts changed post January 25th.  
1.3. Identifying the research questions 
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This research is a comparative study between prominent and less prominent 
bloggers as well as blogs before and after January 25th. It aims to determine 
whether the blogosphere is limited in the plurality it contributes to the public 
discourse in Egypt post-January 25th. Plurality is assessed through a 
comparative study of prominent versus less prominent bloggers and blogs to 
determine whether the only voices heard online are those of elite, prominent 
bloggers. It is also assessed based on whether bloggers’ new status affects the 
quantity and nature of their content. 	
This rests on several sub-questions: 
- How did the media’s coverage, portrayal of bloggers and 
relationship with bloggers change post January 25th? Guided by 
media framing and propaganda model approaches, I use quantitative 
and qualitative content analysis and framing analysis, as well as semi-
structured, in depth interviews with bloggers and media professionals to 
assess how the quantity and nature of coverage differed between the 
two periods studied as well as between prominent and less prominent 
bloggers.  
- Who are the bloggers most quoted and covered by the media and 
are they of elite backgrounds? Guided by a power elite theoretical 
framework, I use the offline content analysis to determine the bloggers 
most covered by the media as well as in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews with bloggers to determine their backgrounds. 
-  How are less popular bloggers featured in the media in 
comparison to more prominent ones? This is determined through 
applying media framing in the offline media content analysis. 
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- How do issues discussed in prominent blogs compare to those 
discussed in less prominent ones—in terms of whether topics 
prioritized in some blogs are of elite nature? This question is guided 
by theories of power elites as well using quantitative web content 
analysis. 
- How are bloggers’ inclusion in mainstream media and changing 
status affecting their status as counterhegemonic elements? Are 
they joining the historical bloc through collaborations with 
mainstream media or their private sector? And how does this 
compare between prominent and less prominent bloggers? Guided 
by theories of hegemony and manufacturing consent, organizational 
theories, revised theories of the public sphere and theoretical works on 
blogging, this question is answered through interviews with bloggers, 
media professionals and marketeers.  
- Are bloggers seeking revenue streams to make their blogging 
financially sustainable? Using organizational theories, I look to 
answer this question through the interviews with bloggers, media 
professionals and marketeers as well as quantitative web content 
analysis to determine the lack or existence of revenue streams on the 
chosen blogs and how prominent and less prominent blogs compare. 
- If they are seeking revenue streams (advertisements or joining 
mainstream media), how is this affecting their content?  
- If they are not seeking revenue streams, how is this affecting the 
frequency of their posts? And if it does not, are they of elite 
backgrounds who can afford time and cost of blogging? This 
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question and the previous one are guided by theories of the public 
sphere, hegemony and manufacturing consent as well as power and 
media elites and theoretical work on blogs and answered through 
interviews with bloggers as well as analysis of their blogs. 
- Given the private and the media sectors are now more interested in 
online advertisements, are they targeting elite or otherwise 
bloggers? This is answered through interviews with bloggers, 
marketeers and the media professionals. 
- Are prominent bloggers becoming media elites and making the 
blogosphere less inclusive and blogging unsustainable? This 
question is of conclusive nature and should be based on the answers to 
all of the above questions.  
1.4. Methodological Orientation 
 
The methodology used in this research was four-fold in the aspects it looked at 
and hence the elements under study. The media themselves needed to be 
studied to assess the shift in attitudes before and after the uprising and that also 
required interviewing the people behind the media studied to give insight on 
the findings from the media analysis. So to study the media, I needed to 
conduct both quantitative and qualitative research in the forms of quantitative 
content analysis of select platforms, qualitative framing analysis of those 
platforms and qualitative, in-depth interviews with media people. The second 
element of the research required looking at bloggers’ backgrounds and 
assessing the shift they underwent in the three years post the uprising, which 
required in-depth interviews with selected bloggers. Thirdly, I needed to look 
at the medium at hand and the core of this study, and that is the blogosphere 
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itself through studying the relevant blogs of bloggers interviewed. Lastly, to 
gain insight into potential revenue streams, I also needed to interview 
marketeers. Combining the interviews with findings from media and blogs 
analysis gave the quantitative data deeper insight and allowed for more 
analysis of the trends spotted. Triangulation also ensured most of the 
shortcomings of the three methods used (interviews, quantitative content 
analysis and framing analysis) were rectified as the data derived from all three 
methods seemed complimentary and consistent.   
Most research work on Egyptian and Arab bloggers has been 
quantitative or exploratory in nature. Qualitative work done on bloggers in the 
region seldom included open-ended, face-to-face interviewing methods or 
triangulated between qualitative and quantitative methods like this research has 
done. Many scholars studied blogs and interviewed the relevant bloggers, like 
Taki (2010) and El-Nawawy and Khamis (2011 and 2014). The research 
conducted, however, either focused on the bloggers themselves in relation to 
politics and their blogs, or mainstream media, but rarely studied both the 
bloggers and the media to merge the online and the offline spheres in an 
attempt to study their incorporation into the offline sphere. 
Using framing analysis in studying how the media portrayed bloggers 
started off as a challenge because there was not a large body of similar 
literature done to guide this study. One particular research conducted by 
Kensicki in 2001 was helpful to this research and it looked at how the media 
framed a social movement in a hegemonic setting. But it still did not provide 
operational guidance as to how to apply frames to the content analysis of the 
media platforms at hand, a common issue with framing analysis. But once the 
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quantitative content analysis started, it seemed more relevant to the research 
for me to construct my own frames that will guide my study, based on repeated 
patterns seen in the quantitative analysis. It was the quantitative analysis phase 
of the research, therefore, that made it possible to come up with the frames 
against which the media portrayal of bloggers was studied.   
The fieldwork started out aiming to interview prominent bloggers as 
determined by the media analysis conducted. As the fieldwork started, 
however, it became apparent that a comparative study between prominent and 
less-prominent bloggers needed to be carried out to truly understand the shift in 
the overall blogosphere, and not changes that happened to only a select few, 
and so get a wider picture of the plurality of the blogosphere. It was also 
apparent that I needed to modify my definition of prominence from those 
covered by the media to those popular online, as determined by their Twitter 
and Facebook activity, to be able to compare prominence to activity and then 
compare both to media coverage they received. This definition served the 
purpose of the study better but posed a few issues when star bloggers were not 
mentioned in the media during the period studied and non-prominent bloggers 
were mentioned over twice in the media in the periods studied. This, however, 
was considered limitations of the research, given the limited time periods 
studied, that were rectified for through the qualitative methods adopted. But 
while prominent bloggers were more difficult to access for interviews, they 
were easier to identify because they were those hosted by the media in my 
findings. The less prominent bloggers, however, posed a problem; how do I 
identify bloggers who are, by definition, not known to the general public. 
Through my interviews with bloggers, and my general knowledge of the 
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blogosphere, however, I was able to identify and get access to six less-
prominent bloggers who have been active since before the uprising. 
Bloggers also did not seem to grasp the concept of my looking at 
revenue streams or financial sustainability of blogging, having been used to 
being interviewed about their writings, activism and the likes. But once the 
interviews started and we started talking about whether they are sustaining 
their online activity, all of them expressed that they have gone older and more 
concerned with their careers and so seem to blog and micro-blog far less. It 
was only then that bloggers started grasping the financial angle of my research 
and began speaking about it.  
The problems faced during the fieldwork reflect the problems the 
blogosphere itself faces. Access to state media, for instance, proved impossible 
with broadcast although easier in print because the state newspaper studied was 
accessible online and I was able to buy back issues from the newspapers’ 
archives and newsstands. This reflects the general information barrier the 
media and the public are subjected to when it comes to authorities. Some 
bloggers were also reluctant to speak, in fear of their security, while others 
were in jail during the time of the interview. Therefore, because four out of the 
21 possible prominent bloggers to interview were in prison during fieldwork, 
bloggers interviews were conducted earlier than planned to ensure access. In 
fact, after our interview, Esraa Abdel Fattah was put on a travel ban and is now 
fighting charges against her and so is Mostafa El Naggar. This reflects the 





Chapter II: Conceptual Framework 
  
To answer the research questions, this research will be guided by a conceptual 
framework that includes power and media elites, modified public sphere 
theories of Habermas, Mouffe and Fraser, theories of hegemony and the 
historical bloc, theoretical literature on social media, blogs and the Arab 
blogosphere, as well as theoretical work on the possible commercialization of 
the blogosphere. 
2.1.The blogosphere.  
 
2.1.1.Emergence and Definition of ‘blogs’ 
 
Before discussing what blogs add to the public space for discourse, we must 
first define and track what blogs are. Although there had been platforms for 
online users to share opinions and news through mail groups and weblogs in 
the 1990s, they required a level of computer coding skills so they were mainly 
used by IT specialists (Taki, 2010, p.108). The early ‘blogs’ were “primarily 
based on links to websites and news sources [bloggers] deemed interesting. 
Their sites were called filters at the time and were seen as maps and networks 
of the internet,” (Taki, 2010, p.109). In 1999, a more user-friendly software 
called Blogger was introduced to the market, allowing users without previous 
technical knowledge to own and manage a blog, which lowered the barriers to 
entry and caused a boom in the bloggers community. Blood, an early blogger 
herself, argues that the introduction of Blogger software marked the shift of 
bloggers’ role from simply filtering news to commenting, contextualizing, 
comparing and analyzing mainstream-media articles they post (2000). She 
argues that it was also in 1999 that bloggers started inter-communicating with 
other bloggers in the “tribe they wish to belong to.” But Taki (2010, p.110) 
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argues other formats of blogs existed before those introduced in 1999. She adds 
that as early as 1994, there had been a few bloggers writing personal thoughts 
and diaries rather than linking to websites. 
The definition of what exactly constituted a blog, and hence the 
blogosphere, evolved with the development of blogs throughout the 1990s. 
Early blogger and creator of the popular blog Camworld49, Cameron Barrett, 
suggested an early definition of weblogs when he was questioning whether his 
own website should be considered a weblog or a microportal, “It’s got all the 
aspects associated with weblogs. It’s updated regularly [daily]. It’s got a nice, 
clean easy-to-use design and user interface. It does not patronize the end user, 
dumbing things down too much. It has a theme [Random Thoughts + Web 
Design + New Media]. It has a way for the users to interact with each other [a 
mailing list]. It even has somewhat of a community, maintained by repeat 
visitors and list members who contribute many of the links often found in 
Camworld,” (1999). This definition was updated later in 2000, after the 
introduction of tools like Bloggers, to include its function as a platform for 
commentary. Blood (2000) then defined a blog as a “website that is updated 
frequently, with new material posted at the top of the page.” The academic 
world mostly defines a blog similarly as a website with frequently updated 
posts in reverse chronological order. 
Early blogger David Winer (2003) believes a blog is primarily the 
unedited voice of a person and represents an amalgam of many voices. This 
definition is primarily interesting to this study because Winer stressed on the 
fact that nobody can edit his voice on his blog, which is the key feature that 
makes out a blog. This component of a blog gave it an edge over other 
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platforms where people express opinions, such as news columns or readers’ 
columns. This key feature, relative freedom of expression, may be hindered if 
blogs become subjected to advertorial or editorial pressures.  
Bloggers are significantly different than journalists although they might 
bear similar characteristics. Graves argues that while blogging and journalism 
are different from one another and cannot replace each other, they do not exist 
in mutually exclusive spheres and are now complementing one another (2007). 
He argues that blogs serve as raw materials for the media to build their stories 
on in crisis coverage and news and political bloggers build their writings on the 
media’s coverage of events in daily news (2007). He adds that news-related 
blogs provide a forum for opinions as well as an open, collaborative “version 
of the detailed, factual analysis that normally takes place in closed editorial 
meetings,” (2007). Although bloggers may be citizen journalists, they go 
beyond citizen journalism in that they not only consistently report on certain 
events, but they also often write their opinions. As Dean argues, they also do 
not abide by the same editorial and journalistic guidelines journalists are 
expected to abide by  (2010) and so do not have to provide unbiased, balanced 
and well-rounded reporting. Rettberg adds that unlike journalists, bloggers are 
also responsible for how the article is laid out and the aesthetic side of 
publishing (2008). They also do not answer to editors or the same financial 
pressures mainstream media is subjected to. Most bloggers are both, bloggers 
and social media makers, but not all social media makers are bloggers. 
Bloggers now are often active on social media and are of the most prominent 
players on platforms like Facebook and Twitter. But social media makers, or 
micro-bloggers, do not necessarily have blogs. The difference between 
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discourse on social media platforms, blogs and mainstream media is further 
discussed in chapter 7. 
2.1.2.The Death of the Blogosphere? 
More recent work on blogs has included debating whether blogs are a dying 
publishing platform that was replaced by others like social media.  
As early as 2010, Lenarcic and Sarkar have predicted a trend in the 
blogosphere they called “Tragedy of the Virtual Commons,” which is 
“analogous to that of the flood of information associated with the spam 
problem,” that is created due to inactive blogs that remain in the virtual sphere 
(2010, p. 144), taking up unnecessary space and opportunity from more active 
blogs. “The paradox of choice afforded by the unchecked generation of blogs 
could lead to a situation where readers are faced with a myriad of information 
sources, with varying degrees of activity levels, but without the personal time 
to assess the authenticity in a selection,” (ibid, p. 144). In December 2014, 
Neiman Lab predicted the death of bogs when veteran blogger Jason Kottke 
wrote an article in their Predictions for Journalism 2014 series arguing that 
“The function of the blog, the nebulous informational task we all agreed the 
blog was fulfilling for the past decade, is increasingly being handheld by a 
growing number of disparate media forms that are blog-like but also decidedly 
not blogs.” He goes on to argue that people are now Tweeting and posting on 
Facebook and other social media platforms instead of blogging. “Blogs are for 
40-somethings with kids,” (Kottke, 2013). Similarly, Gangadharbatla et al’s 
study on 5000 university students in the US indicate that they rely primarily on 
social media to get the news, but still find mainstream media more credible 
(2014). 
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But this view is not necessarily shared with all the bloggers or media 
scholars, however. Dean argues that although as early as 2010 there were 
“ghost blogs,” inactive blogs floating about the cyberspace, as well as 
corporate blogs, blogs sponsored and created by brands to hire bloggers to 
promote their products, blogs were still well and alive and social networks 
traversed, extended and included blogs rather than replaced them, (2010). 
Leading blogger Andrew Sullivan also argued that blogs are not dead but that 
have rather evolved (2013).  
2.1.3. The public discourse in Egypt’s authoritarian setting 
The importance of blogs and micro-blogs in news coverage and opinion 
making has been growing post-January 25th. In fact, research (Semetko and 
Krasnoboka, 2003, cited in Papacharissi, 2008) has shown that access to 
alternative online media and blogs becomes more important to get information 
that is not covered in mainstream media in countries undergoing political 
change, such as Russia and Ukraine where virtual newspapers are more 
popular than online versions of physical newspapers. McChesney predicted 
this change as he speculated in 1995 that the broadcasters and newspaper 
chains that were market leaders for generations will not necessarily rule the 
digital age.  
Media scholars have argued the importance of political blogs in the 
democratic process in general, but more importantly, in authoritarian regimes. 
Mohammed El-Nawawy and Sahar Khamis argue that political blogs can 
vitalize some of the crucial functions of civil society, including checking and 
limiting the state influence and widely disseminating information and 
empowering citizens, which can then pave the way for democratic reform in 
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Egypt (2011, p.50 and 2011, p.250). In a later research by the same authors 
where they study posts from five prominent Egyptian blogs posted between 
2009 and September 2011, they conclude that the posts indicate that cyber-
activism aids in the process of mobilization of the public both online and on 
the ground, and that blogs provide platforms to document and raise awareness 
against violations of human rights locally and globally (2014). They also 
conclude that blogs allow for “electronic debate and virtual democracy” 
through engaging in fruitful discussions (2014). Similarly, Elizabeth Iskander 
argues, “In an autocratic and stagnant political system such as Egypt where 
politics is exclusive and traditional media have limited freedom of speech, 
there is a severe democratic deficit. The result is that the majority must choose 
to remain passive […] or it must create parallel spaces for participation,” 
(2011, p.1226).   
Under an authoritarian regime, the media had been under the grip of the 
government, which loosens or tightens according to the era, since the reign of 
the Free Officers in 1952. Under Mubarak’s regime the media had been given 
superficial freedom in the past decade; so while they could speak of previously 
taboo issues, other issues like criticizing the president or his sons had to be 
avoided. Other public spaces were also kept under the government’s close 
watch, including the blogosphere where many bloggers were subjected to 
prosecution by the state. The blogosphere had not been subjected to the same 
pressures as the offline sphere, however, despite several crackdown on certain 
bloggers. The internet became an alternative platform for dissidence, with 
much more markings of a Habermasian public sphere that operates free of state 
and economy than the offline world. The blogosphere had been somehow 
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devoid of commercialization as well as state’s grip due to it being largely off 
the mainstream radar, allowing it the opportunity to become more plural and 
vibrant than the offline public space. Robert Springborg argued in 2009 that 
hybrid political regimes deemed the word “meaningless and politically 
irrelevant,” (p.15) even though they might be the key to change in Egypt, and 
so allowed it so long as it was separate from action. He argued that the state 
wasn’t paying attention to the blogosphere but started cracking down on it once 
“the most directly political counter-culture has emerged” on it, blurring the line 
between the word and action, (p.17). The question of the plurality the 
blogosphere presents to the Egyptians is hence an important one, given the 
state of the media and the state’s dominance over other public domains. 
Plurality here is not studied in terms of the political theories of pluralism or 
media theories of ownership, but rather in Mouffe’s sense of a plural public 
sphere with diverse voices. 




Although there were mail groups and weblogs in Egypt in 1999, Radsch (2008, 
p.4-7) explains that blogging, in its current form, started in Egypt in 2003 but it 
was not until 2005 that activists started exploiting its potential, eventually 
growing wider and more fragmented in 2006 as users’ base grew.  
Taki (2010, p.117-123) traces back the emergence of a strong Egyptian 
blogosphere to 2004 when the Kefaya (Enough) movement, which called for 
an end to the presidency of Hosni Mubarak, established cyberspace platforms 
for opposition voices.  
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Blogs, which remained underground in Egypt and were only followed 
by a certain segment of society until the January 25th events, were largely in 
English (as there had not been blog hosts that supported Arabic language until 
2007) and spoke to the educated few who had internet access, and knew about 
blogs. It was not until January 25 that bloggers were mainstreamed, and that 
the blogosphere ceased to be underground and the bloggers became active 
journalists quoted in the mainstream newspapers and channels.  
Theoretical Work on Egyptian and Arab Blogosphere 
Although the body of theoretical literature in the field of Arab bloggers is thin, 
there had been scholarly research on the subject of mainly political bloggers, 
including Maha Taki (2010), Courtney Radsch (2007 and 2008), Ghazal Saif 
(2013), Ali Mohamed (2011) and Mark Lynch (2006 and 2007). Most theorists 
studying the Egyptian blogosphere focus on political blogs. Albrecht Hofheinz 
argues, however, that although “the politically active bloggers have gained 
more political attention and weight than in many other Arab countries,” there 
are other non-politically active bloggers the body of literature and research on 
Egyptian bloggers failed to look at (2011, p.1423). Shehta (2008) estimates 
political bloggers to constitute only 20% of blogs in Egypt (cited in Saif, 
2013).  
In studying bloggers, one cannot bundle them all into one bundle. We 
need to differentiate between different types of bloggers in any study of blogs 
and look more specifically at the map of the Arab blogosphere to accurately 
study revenue streams available and backgrounds. Some scholars have referred 
to blogs that discuss current events as political blogs (Wallsten, 2005) or news-
related blogs (Graves, 2007). Herring et al (2005) and Adamic and Glance 
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(2005) divide blogs into A-list blogs, which are the popular and publicized 
blogs, interconnected blogs and then the sparsely socially connected and less 
conversational blogs. More specific to Egypt, Etling et al (2010) map the 
Egyptian blogosphere into several categories; April 6th movement bloggers, 
Muslim Brotherhood bloggers, professional journalists, online activists, 
politically oriented bloggers, citizen journalists, religiously oriented bloggers 
and a small segment of personal blogs. Similarly, Radsch (2008, p.7) explains 
that after 2006, the Egyptian blogosphere was fragmented into citizen 
journalists, non-denominational activists, leftists, Muslim Brotherhood, 
Islamists, culture and art enthusiasts, open source technology activists, English 
language political commentary and personal activists. Lynch divides bloggers 
into activists, bridge-bloggers and public sphere bloggers (2007, p.10-21). He 
defines activist bloggers as bloggers who are engaged in a certain political 
movement offline and use the blogs for that purpose, like the Muslim 
Brotherhood bloggers. Bridge-bloggers are those who blog in English and 
serve as a bridge with the Western audience and media. Public-sphere bloggers 
are bloggers who do not participate in certain political parties or movements 
but are actively engaged in discussing domestic issues.  
 Bloggers are often a mixture of those categories. The intertwining 
nature of bloggers in Egypt posed several issues concerning the accurate term 
this research should adopt to describe the bloggers this research is interested in. 
Those bloggers I study are politically engaged but they are not affiliated with a 
certain political party, and accordingly are not necessarily online activists. 
Even though they do take videos and material from the field and post it onto 
their blogs, they do not fit the definition of citizen journalists as they do more 
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than reporting what they have witnessed. They comment on news and write 
editorials, and they post their material on their own websites, as opposed to 
other media channels. They are also not adhering to journalism teachings, such 
as fact-checking or unbiased reporting, and so cannot be described as freelance 
journalists. They are a cross between activists, bridge bloggers and public 
sphere bloggers and often cross back and forth between one or two categories. 
For instance, they might blog in both Arabic and English or they might be 
public sphere bloggers who were not engaged in political movements but 
started participating in them after the uprising.  But for the purpose of this 
research, the bloggers that will be studied will be termed political bloggers to 
address their interest without failing to identify them for who they are; 
bloggers engaged in political discourse but not primarily activists from certain 
political groups.  
2.2. Public Sphere and the Blogosphere 
2.2.1. Public Sphere and Habermas 
 
In his influential work, Jurgen Habermas discussed the emergence of the public 
sphere in 18th century Europe. He argued that the coming of the capitalist 
economy gave way to the public sphere. The representational culture was 
replaced by a public sphere culture that was facilitated by newspapers and 
clubs. He defined the public sphere as “a realm of our social life, in which 
something approaching public opinion can be formed” (Habermas, 1989, 
p.103).  The public sphere, according to Habermas, is outside the control of the 
state, and is not subjected to single voices, but rather a liberal exchange of 
views that facilitates rational discourse of public affairs towards the common 
good and operates autonomously from the state and the economy. To achieve a 
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true public sphere, Habermas argued, discourse has to be conducive to public 
accord and decision-making and facilitates uninhibited and diverse discussion 
of public affairs in an inclusive public sphere that disregards status of 
individuals (Habermas, 1989).  Habermas described a bourgeois public sphere 
to which the entry requirements included education and property ownership. 
This particular condition has often been criticized, however. According to 
scholars like Mouffe (2000), these conditions limit the inclusivity and plurality 
of voices in the public sphere. 
The Habermasian view of what constitutes a public sphere has been the 
subject of study of many researchers. Habermas’ views of the public sphere 
have been criticized and accused of being highly romantic, overestimating 
civic engagement in societies and putting unattainable conditions for a public 
sphere to be achieved as Lyotard (1984, cited in Papacharissi 2008) and many 
others argue. Many also believe Habermas overemphasized the necessity of 
rational accord in achieving a democratic public sphere, Lyotard (1984, cited in 
Papacharissi 2008) argues that on the contrary, it is individuality and 
disagreement that would lead to genuine democracies. Similarly, Mouffe 
(2000) argues in favor of a plurality to achieve a true democracy. She argues 
for the inclusion of minority groups, women and the propertied and non-
propertied alike. She emphasizes the role the internet plays in promoting 
political expression and fierce arguments amongst different and diversified 
opinions.  Fraser (1992) has also criticized Habermas’ model of the public 
sphere, which historically excluded women and non-propertied classes. She 
proposes a post-industrial model of counterpublics that form through their 
exclusion from the public sphere. She proposes multiple public spheres that are 
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not equally powerful, articulated or privileged as the dominant sphere of debate 
but exist to give voice to those excluded (Fraser, 1992, p.109-142). Much like 
Fraser, Geoff Eley proposes multiple public spheres that are more inclusive 
than a single one, and contends that these counterpublics are not always 
necessarily virtuous (Eley, 1992, p.289-339).  “Some of them, alas, are 
explicitly antidemocratic and antiegalitarian, and even those with democratic 
and egalitarian intentions are not always above practicing their own modes of 
informal exclusion and marginalization,” (Fraser, 1992, p.124).  
It is crucial to remember, however, that even though Habermas does not 
develop a post-bourgeois model of the public sphere, as Fraser (1992, p.58) 
points out, his theory could not be taken out of the context it was written in; a 
study of the development of the bourgeois public sphere during a specific 
period. One cannot hope to replicate this bourgeois public sphere in modern 
society without critically analyzing what constitutes the public sphere now.  
Habermas himself contends that even though he had argued in 1989 that 
inclusion of non-propertied men led to the degeneration of the quality of 
discourse, we cannot achieve democracy today through going back to an elitist 
public sphere (Calhoun, 1992, p.3).  
Ferjani argues that we cannot reduce the public sphere to that Habermas 
described over 40 years ago, a theory he acknowledged in 1992 had several 
flaws in, including the notion that there could exist a public sphere under an 
authoritarian regime like those in the Arab world (Ferjani, 2010, p.95). This is 
why it is important to adapt Habermas’ theory, not only to the context of 
Egypt’s authoritarian setting, but also to account for the changes in media and 
technology that the blogosphere and social media brought about since their 
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emergence.  
2.2.2. Adapting modified theories of the public sphere to the online sphere 
Habermas describes a space independent of authority and commercial interests 
where the participants could oppose society and social norms. Scholars drew 
parallels between Habermas’ definition of what constitutes a public sphere and 
the blogosphere and social media. But the notion of a possible alternative 
public sphere, or a medium adding to the plurality of a public space, becomes 
more important in an authoritarian setting like Egypt. For instance, whereas the 
mainstream media failed to discuss issues like police brutality and sexual 
harassment, bloggers, journalists and activists found a platform for opposition 
in the blogosphere.  
Calhoun (1992, p.9) explains that, based on Habermas, “A certain 
educated elite came to think of itself as constituting the public […]. The 
members of this elite public began to see themselves through this category not 
just as the object of state actions but as the opponent of public authority.” This 
view of the formation of a public sphere can be adapted to the blogosphere 
where a certain educated class broke from the mainstream to discuss issues of 
common interest and oppose the state in ways that media did not. They then 
collaborated to move the masses.  
The three key elements of the Habermasian public sphere this study is 
concerned with and those most prone to change post January 25th are: Its 
inclusivity, its disregard of status and its operating independently of the state 
and the economy. As some bloggers become more involved in mainstream 
media and as they start getting invited to cooperate with the private sector, 
their independence of the economy and the state starts getting affected. The 
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“disregard to status” factor was provided by the relative anonymity the internet 
gives bloggers, which made their content alone matter, without regard to the 
identity behind it. But post-January 25th, star bloggers gained prominence and 
their identities and growing status came to be known to more of the general 
public. The favorable media coverage gave prominent bloggers’ content more 
credibility, and their status more weight, which then caused their followership 
to grow, as opposed to other less-prominent bloggers. This, accompanied by 
whether those prominent bloggers are of certain elite status who can afford the 
time and cost of blogging and have access to smart phones and fast 
connections, possibly hinders the disregard to status factor. As bloggers’ fame 
develops due to mainstream media shedding light on them, the inclusivity of 
the blogosphere is prone to dwindling down as star bloggers gain more and 
more followership. Therefore, a relatively small number of prominent bloggers 
enjoying a growing visibility and means to generate revenue, as an increasingly 
large number of less-prominent bloggers are faced with limited visibility and 
resources. Much like cultural salons in the past, the virtual public sphere might 
become dominated by people who possess means of communication online and 
become inclusive in principle but not in practice 
In addition, Mouffe’s theory of plurality is also key to this research, 
when looking at the concept of a plural public sphere and how it’s affected by 
the change in bloggers’ relation with other elements of the historical bloc. This 
will also be guided by Fraser’s theory of counterpublics to look at changes in 
the virtual public space — a counterpublic in itself forming as a result of the 
bloggers’ exclusion and marginalization from the mainstream public space. As 
the counterpublic intertwines with the exclusive public sphere through 
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collaborations with mainstream media or the private sector and joins the 
historical bloc, it is important to assess how this affects the element of plurality 
and inclusion of different societal strata and backgrounds of bloggers. This 
means assessing whether the blogosphere may be becoming an exclusive 
counterpublic for elitist voices, rather than a pluralistic sphere of its own.   
2.2.3.  Utopian views of the internet and blogs 
A significant body of literature appeared arguing the merits of the internet in 
general, and blogosphere in specific in creating a plural, inclusive space for 
debates. Since the Iranian protests in 2009, dubbed the Twitter Revolution, 
several scholars have been interested in the merits of cyberactivism, with 
influential books such as Blogistan: The Internet and Politics in Iran (2010) 
discussing how blogs provide a space for the oppressed where equal 
opportunity is given to even the marginalized segments of society, like women 
in Iran, to express themselves. The theoretical body available on social media 
and blogospheres’ effects on mainstream media, democracy and society has 
been predominantly divided into utopian and dystopian camps similar to those 
studying the effects of the internet at large.  
Utopian theories especially arose with the development of the internet in 
the 1990s, although less romantic views of the internet began developing later 
on. Beacham (1995) argues that the internet represents the real information 
revolution that sets mass media free from governmental and corporate 
constraints, (cited in McChesney, 1995). Jones (1997), Grossman (1995) and 
Rash (1997) share similar views of the internet being a place for anyone, even 
the lesser known individuals, to express their opinions and influence the public 
opinion (cited in Papacharissi, 2004). Designer of Lotus software Mitchell 
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Kapor and the co-founder of Electronic Frontier Foundation, an NGO to 
develop policies to protect democracy and civil liberties on the internet, 
commented on the information superhighway in an interview saying, “Instead 
of a small number of groups having privileged positions as speakers-broadcast 
networks and powerful newspapers-we are entering an era of communication 
of the many to the many […] the nature of the technology itself has opened up 
a space of much greater democratic possibility,” (1994).  
We can assume similar utopian views of the blogospheres in the past 
few years, especially with the Arab Spring, to those associated with the birth of 
the internet in the 1990s. Coleman believes that blogs’ ability to transform 
media consumers into media producers gives them democratizing potentials 
(2005). In his study of the “new Arab public,” Marc Lynch (2006) explains that 
the recent emergence of a vibrant media scene in the Arab world has led to a 
new public sphere that is not made by the media in and of itself, but by 
arguments entertained on the media in an increasingly open, participatory and 
interactive media context. Saif’s research findings (2013) on Egyptian bloggers 
concluded that they presented counterhegemonic elements that discussed issues 
that are considered taboo in the mainstream media, like the military and Islam, 
and defended human rights and freedom of expression. 
2.2.4.  Dystopian views of the internet and blogs 
As some argue the utopian possibilities the internet has to achieve democracy, 
others stand on the total opposite of that view, with much more skeptical views 
of the internet and its possible divides and commercialization.  
Morozov argues that “The idea that the internet favors the oppressed 
rather than the oppressor is marred by what I call cyber-utopianism: a naïve 
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belief in the emancipatory nature of online community that rests on a stubborn 
refusal to acknowledge its downside,” (2011, p.xiii). Additionally, some 
scholars are wary of the bloggers’ tendency to “regress to self-confessional 
posts that resemble diaries, with few exceptions that engage in journalistically 
informed punditry,” (Papacharissi, 2008, p.237). Scholars like Papacharissi 
argue that while bloggers may occasionally influence mainstream media and 
public opinion, even news-oriented A-list bloggers are mostly subjective and 
narcissistically motivated and need to be differentiated from journalism. “On 
blogs, the expression of public opinion on private forums (or the expression of 
private opinion on a public forum)…becomes a carefully orchestrated 
performance with the Other in mind,” (Papacharissi, 2008, p.238). Similarly, 
Boyd (2006) argues that bloggers write in relation to a conceptualized audience 
of like-minded strangers and Lenhart argues that they are apprehensive of their 
audience (2006, cited in Brake 2012). On the other hand, Brake (2012) 
interviewed 23 bloggers and concluded that bloggers are mostly unaware of 
who their audience and argues against theorists like Papacharissi (2008) and 
Boyd (2006) and Lenhart (2006, cited in Brake 2012). 
Habermas believes that in the public sphere’s liberal model, the mass 
media have a critical role in informing and directing public opinion. On the 
other hand, many media scholars, including Habermas, Putnam (1996) and 
Hart (1994) believe that the media have the potential to feed readers large 
amounts of political information that create an illusion of civic engagement in 
the readers when in fact it promotes rather passive involvement in the political 
and civic scene. Similar issues that Hart and Putnam raise can be viewed in the 
blogosphere, hence raising the question of whether it is truly a medium for 
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discussing public affairs or if it is rather a one-way conversation from elite 
bloggers to readers. Readers might be receiving the information and not 
contributing to the discussion themselves, hence getting a false sense of civic 
engagement. Hart’s argument means that the blogosphere and social media 
may be rendering people more politically inactive than they believe; they might 
like a photo on Facebook or re-tweet something on Twitter and get a false 
sense of political participation, failing to actually engage in deeper discussion 
or offline activity. 
 This false sense of civic engagement and detachment from the ground 
had been noticed in both constitutional amendment referendum that took place 
in Egypt in 2011 and the two constitutional referendums of 2012 and 2014. 
After the referendum of 2012, it was clear that not all blogosphere activity 
leads to actual action on the ground. As the blogosphere buzzed with objection 
against the constitutional referendum of 2011, the blogosphere was shocked 
with unfavorable results in both events, making several bloggers report feeling 
disengaged from the general public. In her research on social media activism in 
Egypt, Elizabeth Iskander comments on the results of the first referendum 
saying, “The views and discourses that dominate Egyptian Facebook spaces do 
not necessarily represent the political voice of the majority of Egyptians,” 
(2011, p.1235). This does not only signify a possible eliteness of the presumed 
online public sphere, it also resonates with Hart’s theory. McChesney (1995) 
explains that virtually all theories of political democracy suggest that a 
concentration of media and communication in a handful of mostly 
unaccountable interests is a dangerous situation.  
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Lynch warns against the possible pitfalls of the online public sphere he 
speaks of. He argues that even though the rise of satellite channels and the 
internet in the Arab world gave way to a public sphere away from authoritarian 
regimes’ control, it is still rife with paradoxes. “Its politics of identity could all 
too easily slide into a tyranny from below, excommunicating those who 
disagree and demonizing outsides to enforce internal unity,” (2006: 3-4). 
In Mohamed El-Naway and Sahar Khamis’ analysis of two prominent 
Egyptian bloggers, Nawara Negm and Wael Abbas, the two scholars have 
concluded that while there was a genuine Habermasian public sphere reflected 
in some of the threads of the two blogs, “there was a general lack of rational 
critical debates, reciprocal deliberations, and communicative action as 
envisioned by Habermas,” (2011, p.234). Similarly, Ali Sayed Mohamed 
concludes that the very language used in blogs undermines the possibility of 
achieving the rational-critical discourse necessary to achieve the Habermasian 
public sphere (2010).  
 But even those who criticize aspects of the blogosphere in the Arab 
world, do concede that it represents a space for dissidents and an outlet for 
opposition that did not exist before, hence, serving a great role in the public 
discourse in Egypt. Even though in their study, El-Nawawy and Khamis found 
the blogosphere to fall short of a Habermasian public sphere, they conclude 
that the bloggers are “effectively contributing to widening the base of popular 
participation in Egyptian political life through encouraging a more active and 
dynamic civil society, as well as bringing to life the concept of citizen 
journalism […] in every case, what is evident here is an attempt to move 
beyond official, governmental authority and mainstream media in an effort to 
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broaden and (re)envision the existing public sphere(s),” (2011, p.248). 
Similarly, Mohamed concludes that despite the quality of discourse, the 
internet has created a different type of public sphere that facilitates a dialogue 
about democracy. (2010)  
Researchers such as Malina (1999), Papacharissi (2008 and 2002) and 
Sassi (2000) lay out three aspects of online communication that they believe 
directly affect social and political benefits that can be generated from online 
media. Those aspects “are access to information, reciprocity of information, 
and commercialization of online space,” (Papacharissi, 2008). 
Commercialization of the internet is discussed in section 2.5.2 on 
institutionalizing blogs. 
Access 
The second widely discussed element in the limitations the internet has in 
democratization is access. In 2008, Papacharissi argued that dystopian rhetoric 
conversely cautions against enthusiasm regarding the democratizing potential 
of medium that was then operating on a 17% global penetration rate (p. 231). 
Although this rate increased to 40% in 2015, it’s important to remember that 
this number can be misleading as it is skewed by higher penetration rates in 
more developed countries. Similarly, McChesney has set qualifications that 
need to be fulfilled for the internet to provide a boon for democracy; universal 
access and computer literacy, and quality journalism (1995). In fact, Dean 
choses the term “blogipelago” over blogosphere because she argues that sphere 
“suggests a space accessible to any and all,” (2010). Those elements are 
especially relevant in Egypt where access to internet is only available to 43% 
El	Sayed,					47	
of the population, according to official statistics. The divides in the offline 
public space may as well be reproduced online, and elites might dominate the 
online discourse as they do offline, albeit the nature of online and offline elites 
may differ. Papacharissi argues that the internet reproduces class, gender and 
race inequalities that are similar to those in the offline public sphere (2008, 
p.234).  Beer, similarly, studies the power play online and how class divisions 
and power elites offline are recreated online (2009).  
Reciprocity  
Scholars have also noted that even though there is diversity in views online, it 
does not ensure communication between those diverse views. The diversity 
may also lead to fragmented spheres where similar-minded bloggers, and users 
in general, cluster together to form fragmented sub-spheres in the online sphere 
that do not interconnect or communicate amongst one another. Similarly, 
Papacharissi argues that despite the anonymity given online, “special interest 
groups attract users who want to focus the discussion on certain topics […] as 
the virtual mass becomes subdivided into smaller and smaller discussion 
groups, the ideal of a public sphere that connects many people online eludes 
us,” (2002, p.17). Coleman (2004) poses similar views, contending that the 
phenomenon of social herding, where people cluster around sources of 
information and channel of communication supporting their own values and 
prejudices, leads to polarization of the blogosphere. This also means that one is 
likely to follow Tweeps or bloggers with similar views, who express subjective 
views that resonate with those of their followers, hence, constantly getting only 
a singular voice. A study has shown that blogs are interconnected by bloggers’ 
interests (Kumar et al., 2004) and similarly, another showed that political blogs 
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of similar interest proved most heavily linked with one another, (Adamic and 
Glance, 2005). Professional bloggers Duane Forrester and Gavil Powell (2008) 
argue one of the main tips to become successful is to link to other blogs, 
indicating the importance of a tight network in the blogosphere. This was 
especially relevant when studying the most prominent bloggers hosted by the 
media and analyzing their backgrounds and connections with one another to 
assess whether they only communicate with like-minded popular bloggers in 
mutually exclusive, fragmented online sphere. It was also relevant in studying 
whether those star bloggers are getting more and more popular due to the 
unified network they share which makes them link to one another and so 
become more prominent on search engines whereas other less prominent 
bloggers do not enjoy the same advantage. 
2.3. Hegemony and Manufacturing Consent 
 
2.3.1. Hegemony 
Antonio Gramsci’s views on hegemony and social order are useful in assessing 
how social orders, consensus and coercion continue to factor into relationship 
dynamics of business and media with political bloggers; and thus what this 
implies for the nature of those bloggers.  
 Stuart Hall explains in Mass Communication and Society that hegemony 
exists when a ruling class or alliance of class fractions, ‘historical bloc,’ is able 
not only to coerce a subordinate class to conform to its interests, but exerts a 
‘total social authority’ over those classes and the social formation as a whole,” 
(1977, p.332). Gramsci believes hegemony and consent need to be renewed 
and cannot be assumed or guaranteed as failure to renew it would cause 
elements of the historical bloc to peel off (Gramsci, 1971). Gramsci argued 
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capitalist states relied on political and civil societies that the hegemon, or 
ruling class, uses to keep control over the public and maintain the status quo. 
Political society, as seen by Gramsci, is not only the government, but also the 
army, police and legislative and constitutional arms. Civil society on the other 
hand includes the private sphere (one’s own family, for instance), as well as 
cultural institutions, educational and religious establishments, trade unions and 
the media. Because political society’s coercion to achieve and reproduce 
hegemony is not enough, Gramsci argues that civil society rule is needed to 
achieve consent through propagating the ruling class ideology (1971, p.145). 
Together, political and social societies form what Gramsci calls the historical 
bloc. The hegemon aims to influence classes to adopt dominating classes’ 
values and ideas and to assert that the status quo is normal, favourable for the 
majority and not just the ruling class and unchallengeable. This takes place 
under authoritarian and democratic states alike. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) 
have developed the concept of hegemony as introduced by Gramsci to include 
struggles beyond the obvious class struggles, including those of gender 
relationships, for instance. In Egypt, hegemony was often achieved through 
coercion although under late president Gamal Abdel Nasser’s regime it was 
achieved partially through coercion and partially through consent over the 
ideologies of socialism, pan-Arabism and the common struggle against 
occupation.  
 In reproducing social order, alliances change to incorporate what might 
have previously looked like counter hegemonic elements. This reproduction of 
the submission to the ruling ideology requires the collaboration of cultural 
institutions, including the church, or in Egypt’s case, religion, and the mass 
El	Sayed,					50	
media, the political apparatuses and overall management of the state, (Hall, 
1977). Ayubi argues that no Arab regime had achieved a specific publicly 
announced political and economic ideology for people to gather around and 
constantly shifted from one policy to another; what Gramsci calls political 
nomadism (2001, p.3-5). This then, Ayubi argues, led to the existence of a 
déclassé segment of the society, a marginalized one, which is arguably how 
bloggers can be seen. Bloggers can be seen as déclassé, counterhegemonic 
elements that might be joining the historical bloc through consensus, not 
coercion. This shift from underground and private social networks accounts to 
mainstream media platforms is not specific to Egypt alone. In fact, Thurman 
and Rodgers conclude in their research that mainstream media key players like 
the New York Times and the Guardian have used live blogs to cover crises and 
get the most eye witness accounts, often depending on individuals’ social 
media accounts to build up their stories (2014). But it’s one that potentially 
goes against some of the original foundations of the blogosphere. Park’s 
research on four A-list bloggers in the U.S. concludes that “bloggers assert 
authority largely through opposing themselves to journalism. They are 
authorized, they seem to say, precisely because they are not journalists, and 
this independence is played off as if it makes them closer to the authentic needs 
of the audience…These bloggers highlight their own anti-professionalism, at 
least in part because it allows them to venture into discussions of any topic and 
claim a commonality with their audience,” (p.267). Although his study was 
conducted on only four cases in the U.S., it resonates with what sets Egyptian 
bloggers apart; they were not journalists and they provided material and 
covered issues the media never has, often questioning the integrity and 
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credibility of mainstream media.  
Gramsci argues that class struggle never disappears but is kept at bay by 
the ruling bloc making concessions required to win consent and legitimacy. For 
Gramsci, this is often manifested in how particular interests are presented as 
general interest in which all classes have an equal stake, (Hall, 1977, p.334). In 
the Egyptian context, this can be seen in prioritizing democracy as a general 
interest over issues of poverty, for instance.  
Fraser debates whether the bourgeois public sphere shifted political 
power from a repressive mode of domination to a hegemonic one, rather than 
opening up the political realm to the general public. Similarities can be drawn 
between the blogospheres and the proletariat spheres, although blogs are 
different in nature and content due to the education and culture of bloggers as 
compared to the proletariat. We can then pose the question of whether, like 
proletariat spheres, the blogosphere is being subjected to a process of coercion 
or consensus into the historical bloc, becoming an exclusive bourgeois public 
sphere on its own.  
In fact, Mohamed’s findings suggest that bloggers do try to promote 
themselves outside the realm of online and in the mainstream realm (2010, 
p.260), suggesting possible willingness to join the historical bloc by consent. 
He points out Hossam El Hamalawy’s blog which had a section for his 
interviews on mainstream media, suggesting bloggers also care about their 
popularity and penetration both online and offline. He goes further to explain 
that his research suggests that bloggers might move to larger media 
organizations online when they start feeling their impact on the ground is real 
(2010, p.163).  
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 To understand the new public sphere post January 25th, we need to look 
at the implications of the shift of political bloggers, previously 
counterhegemonic elements, from the margins and to the mainstream and 
historical bloc on their independence and content. It’s also relevant to see 
whether those bloggers joining the historical bloc are only star bloggers with 
intellectual or financial elite backgrounds, leaving out other non-star bloggers 
in the counterhegemonic bloc. It is also insightful to see the implications of 
how the ideologies of bloggers influence the element of the historical bloc they 
decide to join. This is manifested in rightist bloggers joining the capitalist 
elements of the bloc, for instance. 
2.3.2. Manufacturing Consent 
Herman and Chomsky’s theory of manufactured consent (1988) suggests that 
mass media often, willingly, act as propaganda agents for state ideologies 
without the state having to coerce them to. Self-censorship in favour of the 
state is often a result of market dynamics and media economics and availability 
of sources. Officials provide access to information for media outlets that are 
more favourable in their coverage of state policy, and so opposing media is left 
with little access to official information, news and sources. This in turn affects 
their readership and so ultimately their advertising revenue. Herman and 
Chomsky argue that the private sector, whose interests often intertwine with 
that of the state, also shies away from advertising with media outlets that are 
strongly opposing state and corporate policies.  
 This government and financial pressure then forces the mass media 
outlets to refrain from harsh state or corporate criticism to stay in business, 
without the state having to coerce them into favourable coverage. 
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 In the Egyptian context, the media is often under both, state and self-
censorship. The state can sue and imprison journalists for what they write 
under umbrellas such as religion disdain and others. This means the media is 
often careful to what they write, but it is also because of media ownership in 
Egypt. Most of the popular newspapers and channels are owned by 
businessmen whose interests coincide with those of the state. Therefore, there 
is always the editorial struggle to have enough freedom to gain readers’ trust 
without affecting the financial interests of their shareholders through harsh 
attacks on the state or the private sector’s biggest players. So censorship comes 
in the form of state-imposed, self-censorship in fear of one’s security as well as 
censorship imposed by shareholders and owners who want to maximize 
advertisement revenues as well as ensure being on the favourable side of the 
regime.     
 Chomsky and Herman then argue that given such pressures, mass media 
have filters through which they decide what to include or exclude from the 
news agenda. These filters normally answer to the interests of not only the 
media elite, but the society’s power elite as well, which is normally involved in 
one way or another with the media elite. This is manifested in media ownership 
in the Egyptian context where businessmen and political players, or power 
elite, like Sayed Badawy and Naguib Sawiris own two of the most popular 
satellite channels; Hayah and ONTV and therefore intertwining with the media 
elite. Chomsky and Herman argue that coverage of mass media undergo five 
filters that often bias their reporting. Those filters are the size, concentrated 
ownership, owner wealth and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media 
firms, the advertising as a primary source of income, the reliance on 
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information provided by the government, business, and experts, flak as means 
of disciplining the media and finally anti-communism as a national religion 
and control mechanism, (1988, p.2). The last element, anti-communism, has 
since been revised to fit any popular ideology that serves as a scarecrow to 
fight. This element can now be seen as political Islam in the post-January 25th 
Egyptian context. 
  The ownership of mass media firms is at strong play in Egypt because 
there are not many media platforms that are independently funded as discussed 
in chapter 4. The model of popular public service broadcaster is weak in Egypt 
due to state television and newspapers losing credibility, especially after their 
biased reporting on the 2011 uprising. Therefore, the majority of popular 
media platforms in the country rely primarily on advertising for revenue. When 
it comes to bloggers in particular, however, the third filter “reliance on 
information provided by the government, business, and experts” does not 
directly apply because bloggers who join mainstream media are mostly 
opinion-writers and so do not need sources to write their columns, unlike 
traditional journalists or reporters. Flak is a strong element as well in the 
Egyptian context because journalists and bloggers have been known to be 
targeted for what they write. Throughout the last five years there have been 
many court cases against journalists and bloggers for articles or posts they 
wrote, some in front of military courts. Flak also came in the form of media-
sponsored character assassinations to particular writers through channels and 
newspapers that are known to be supportive of the state. Finally, the fifth filter; 
anti-communism as a national religion and control mechanism, came into play 
strongly after the Muslim Brotherhood year in power. Public figures, including 
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writers, who oppose the state would easily be dubbed pro-Islamist or pro-
political Islam as a way to restrict them from expressing anti-regime 
sentiments.  
 Herman and Chomsky’s theory of manufactured consent helps guide this 
research when studying the implications of bloggers joining the historical bloc 
after being once independent from the pressures Herman and Chomsky lay out 
for mainstream and media elite. It will help determine whether bloggers are 
becoming media elite through joining mainstream and media elite platforms 
and so the implications of that on their content. If the bloggers are joining 
institutions that undergo those five filters, biasing their reporting, it is 
important to see the degree to which bloggers’ content, both on those media 
platforms and on their own blogs, are affected by the same filters that are the 
result of the pressures mass media undergo. 
2.3.3. Conceptualizing intellectuals 
Gramsci views intellectuals as a key element in hegemony because of their 
ability to speak on behalf of, as well as influence, segments of the society. 
Bloggers holding influence over certain segments of society and moving from 
alternative spheres to the mainstream bears resonance of Gramsci’s concept of 
intellectuals. But it is important to go beyond the concept of intellectuals that 
Gramsci draws for a bourgeois sphere. Here, I examine how Gramsci (1971), 
Julien Benda (1927) and Edward Said (1993) view the concept of intellectuals 
to develop a definition of intellectuals that is suitable for the context of this 
research. 
 Although Gramsci believes all men are intellectuals, he believes they do 
not all have that role in society and categorizes those who have that function 
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into traditional and organic intellectuals (1971, p.132–148). Traditional 
intellectuals, Gramsci argues, view themselves as separate from society while 
organic intellectuals are often affiliated with certain classes or enterprises that 
use them to gain more power and spread certain ideologies and influence. He 
views organic intellectuals as those arising naturally as thinking groups from 
every class and representing the interests of those particular classes. He argues 
that traditional intellectuals are often more concerned with conceptual and 
philosophical interests; the likes of priests and teachers. While traditional 
intellectuals’ role in society is more or less stagnant in its function, organic 
intellectuals are more dynamic in nature and constantly looking to expand their 
roles. 
 Benda, on the other hand, has a more romantic view of intellectuals and 
sees them as a “tiny band of super-gifted and morally endowed philosopher-
kinds who constitute the conscience of mankind. Real intellectuals constitute a 
clerisy, Benda says, ‘those whose activity is essentially not the pursuit of 
practical aims, all those who seek their joy in the practice of an art or a science 
or a metaphysical speculation,’” (Said, 1993). Writing in the context of the 
First World War, Brenda views those intellectuals are often ready to risk their 
lives and suffer in defence of their morals, principles and the weak. In short, 
she views intellectuals as the heroes of their times who are detached of worldly 
interests and needs and willing to sacrifice for their cause. 
 But Benda fails to acknowledge intellectuals’ own, personal needs and 
the pressures of modern society to develop his theory beyond the context of 
post-war romanticism. Said, on the other hand, takes a more realistic view of 
intellectuals that is closer to Gramsci’s view, but still accounts for a degree of 
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romanticism and develops the definition to fit the 21st century. He argues that 
Gramsci’s view of intellectuals is “much closer to the reality,” in the late 20th 
century when “so many new professions – broadcasters, academics, computer 
analysts… and indeed the whole field of modern mass journalism itself- all 
these have vindicated Gramsci’s vision,” (1993). But Said sees intellectuals as 
having specific public roles in society that cannot be reduced to faceless 
professionals. An intellectual, to Said, is “an individual endowed with a faculty 
for representing, embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, 
philosophy or opinion to, as well as for, a public, in public,” (1993). To do so, 
Said argues, he has to raise uncomfortable questions that defy and confront 
orthodoxy and dogma, rather than be the person producing them, to advance 
human freedom and knowledge. This person, therefore, cannot be easily co-
opted by governments or corporations. He argues that the significance of 
intellectuals are not in the arguments they pose only, but in who they are, their 
constant stands on various issues and their personal stakes and mannerisms. 
But Said tackles a question that is of crucial importance to this research; he 
poses the issue of intellectuals being distracted in their pursuit of advancing 
knowledge and critical thinking by modern society, and that includes the 
distraction that is the emergence of journalism, advertising and a sphere where 
“all ideas are marketable, all values transmutable, all professions reduced to 
the pursuit of easy money and quick success,” (1993). He poses C. Wright 
Mills’ argument that, in facing a sense of powerlessness at their marginality, 
intellectuals are often faced with the choice of joining the ranks of institutions, 
corporations or governments and become the hired agents of the information 
industry, thus hindering their independence. He concludes that the intellectual 
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needs not to be viewed in the idealist, romantic sense, but with steady realism 
and the energy to balance between the problem of his own selfhood and that of 
the demands of publishing and speaking in public.   
 This research adopts a modified amalgamation of Said and Gramsci’s 
views on intellectuals. I do not intend to look at intellectuals as romantically as 
Benda does, but I also take on a more modern view of intellectual than 
Gramsci does. Intellectuals, in the context of this research, are not any 
individuals affiliated with institutions or organizations and able to influence the 
public in any context, because, as Said points out, this, in the context of today, 
can include marketing professionals who are able to influence consumers into 
buying goods, but this type is irrelevant to my research. The aspect of 
intellectuals in Gramsci’s definition that is relevant to this research, however, 
is their categorization into organic and traditional intellectual to assess whether 
the shift in bloggers’ status also meant a shift in between those categories, or 
whether they always existed as dynamic organic intellectuals who, as Said 
describes, had to balance between their own needs and the their independence 
as gifted speakers. The aspect of Said’s definition that is of interest to the 
research is this very struggle between modern society’s pressures and 
distractions and maintaining a sense of independence. 
2.4. Theorizing Elites 
 
Habermas describes a public sphere dominated by businessmen, literary people 
and an overall bourgeois stratum. It would be insightful to compare this to the 
composition of the blogosphere and adapt criticisms of the Habermasian public 
sphere’s lack of inclusivity to the nature of the existent online public sphere. It 
is then important to see whether the hypothesis that political bloggers are part 
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of a power elite, or were born into one and thus possess advantages to become 
one themselves, holds true. If it does, the implications and consequences for 
the nature of blogging, their content and the plurality they present to the public 
space are important to look at.  
This then implies looking at theories of elites and what defines power 
elites. We need to differentiate here between different types of elites among 
Egyptian bloggers. While there are bloggers who come from financial elites, 
others come from politically-powerful elites, intellectual and educational elites 
or a mixture of all of this. Alaa Abdel Fattah, for instance, comes from a family 
of prominent activists and academics, and so forms an intellectual and 
educational elite, while Sandmonkey comes from a financial and power elite, 
having a financially well-off family and a mother who was a member of the 
formerly ruling National Democratic Party. 
2.4.1.Power elite 
 
Karl Marx speaks of elites controlling opinion in his theory of political 
economy: “The class which has the means of material production has control at 
the same time over the means of mental production so that […] the ideas of 
those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it […] Thus their 
ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch,” (Cited in Thussu, 2006, p.40). This 
implies that the financial elite holds control over personally forming public 
opinion or using intellectual elite to do so. In his book The Power Elite Mills 
defines elites as those who can by their decisions mightily affect the everyday 
worlds of men and women (1956, p.3-4).  Steven Lukes argues that those who 
hold power believe they know what is best for others because people are not 
capable of truly knowing their true wants and preferences due to the system 
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influencing them into wanting certain things that are, in reality, not truly in 
their own interest (2005, p.38). In this radical view we can reflect on the 
current status of political bloggers, calling for democracy as opposed to 
minimum wages, for instance, which were workers’ demands during the labour 
strikes in Egypt in 2007.  We can then compare the expressed wants of 
different bloggers; prominent or less-prominent ones. 
Mills (1956) claims that power elite runs in the same social circle and acts 
in each others’ interests because it is ultimately common interests and thus 
achieving hegemony. He suggests that although those born into this ruling elite 
class do possess the tools and advantages to become a power elite of their own 
in the future, it is not an inherited condition. This means that unless they put 
those inherited tools and advantages to work to become a power elite, they 
would not naturally become one just because they were born in a power elite 
family.  
How and whether certain political bloggers might be regarded as power 
elite is studied in light of Mills definition of elites, looking at their 
backgrounds to see whether they come from elite backgrounds. As Fraser 
points out, the notion of a common interest is a flawed one because what might 
be a priority for certain classes could be insignificant to others (1992). What 
the blogosphere, which is composed of certain strata, may see as common 
interest, the majority of the public might not necessarily prioritize. Therefore, 
power elite theories also guide the analysis of the blogs to see whether issues 
discussed on the more prominent blogs reflect more elitist interests as opposed 
to those discussed on less-prominent ones.  
Research on the Egyptian blogosphere’s possible eliteness needs to be 
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put into the Egyptian social, cultural, educational, political and financial 
context. The digital divide found in almost every country, is strongly present in 
Egypt, not only due to the high illiteracy rates, but also due to the economic 
situation and access to the internet. One needs to remember that this digital 
divide is also present between users of the internet, something that is especially 
peculiar to Egypt due to the spread of internet cafes where users who cannot 
afford access at home pay per time used. This means that while the internet 
penetration rates may be higher than official statistics, it also remains true that 
internet café users are limited in their usage by the money they have to spend 
on surfing the web. Their usage may also be guided by the social pressures 
present in using the internet in public, which might hinder the content users 
access in fear of either social pressures or legal prosecution as the internet 
cafes are known to fall under the eye of the state. This means, for instance, that 
while users may confidently check extremely anti-governmental blogs in the 
comfort of their homes, they may not be able to do so in a public area in fear of 
prosecution. Similarly, while they might be able to upload content, be it text or 
video, that is either culturally or politically sensitive from the privacy of their 
homes, they might fear doing so in internet cafes. The internet divide is also 
present between dial-up and ADSL users and it affects the way users use the 
internet. Wilson (2000) distinguishes between formal access that is physical 
availability to the internet, and effective access, that is affordable connectivity 
and diffusion of skills that people need to benefit from the technology, (cited in 
Taki, 2010, p.36). This is true for both users and content creators. Bloggers 
need to have the financial means to afford high-speed access to internet to be 
able to upload not only videos, but also texts and photos. Similarly, they need 
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smart phones to be able to take on-the-scene footage and Tweet or blog 
instantly, or report to others.  
Jo Ann Oravec argues that a blog is a medium where “individuals can 
develop an individualized voice that will reflect facets of their personal style 
and idiosyncratic intellectual approaches,” (Oravec, 2002, cited in Saif 2013, 
p.19). If blogs are manifestations of personal styles and beliefs, how much 
plurality do bloggers actually add to the public space if the most prominent 
ones dominating the blogosphere are of elite backgrounds? 
2.4.2. Media Elite and the Blogosphere 
 
 To better understand the changing image, status and influence of bloggers, it 
is useful to compare the concept of media elite to the nature of bloggers post 
January 25th, as evident in this research’s findings. Comparing the findings to 
the elements of what constitute media elite helps determine whether the 
political bloggers are becoming media elite and so limiting the plurality they 
add to the public sphere. 
Media elite and agenda setting 
Elite media are defined as “the agenda-setting media because they are the ones 
with the big resources, they set the framework in which everyone else 
operates,” (Chomsky, 1997, p.1). Chomsky and Herman (1988, p.5) argue that 
the media’s top tier, the elite media, sets the agenda for the two remaining tiers. 
In The Media Elite, Robert Lichter, Stanley Rothman and Linda Lichter 
have conducted research on 238 journalists from leading American media 
organizations in 1980 to compare beliefs of journalists to those of the general 
public and how editorial team’s beliefs biased their reporting. Their research 
suggests that the media elite in the US is largely very different from the general 
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public in their backgrounds, status and political orientations (Lichter et al, 
1986). Through psychological tests, surveys and content analysis, they 
concluded that the media, especially elite media, had an overwhelmingly 
liberal agenda, which yielded biased reporting and an agenda that was rather 
different than the general public’s. Although their research has been insightful 
in many ways, their conclusions were often criticized for generalizations, as 
well as the lack of a national random sample to which they can compare the 
findings from this study, something Rothman and Lichter admit themselves.  
“Unsophisticated attempts to ‘objectify’ the problem of media bias through the 
application of projective psychological tests are thus of necessarily limited 
value,” (Teachout, 1987, p.346).  
Regardless of the generalizability of The Media Elite, other researches on 
the blogosphere concluded similar findings signifying that bloggers might be 
becoming the new media elite. Taki found that bloggers in Lebanon, Syria and 
Jordan, are mostly males who are well-educated with at least a master’s degree 
(2005). Half of her respondents had also studied in Europe or America (ibid). 
This indicates that bloggers in those countries were born in a certain financial 
elite that allowed them to become media elite. 
 Studying bloggers in the US, Mathew Hindman (2008) concludes that 
bloggers are the new elite in the media world. Hindman concludes that while 
there are many voices on the internet, only a few of those voices are heard. He 
finds that the demographics of major political bloggers find an overwhelming 
emphasis on highly educated and Ivy-league lawyers and academics. He found 
that the political blogosphere was dominated by an elite class of mostly men 
without any significant representation of minorities.  
El	Sayed,					64	
In Egypt, one can argue that in the months following the 2011 uprising, 
online political bloggers have set the agenda for other media, which monitors 
blogs and social activists to break stories, relay opinions and report on current 
affairs. They also gained certain status similar to that of media elites. They are 
becoming similar to the cultural saloons that Habermas contended were places 
for any works of literature, music or art to gain legitimacy, given the status 
opinions formed at those saloons had. One could argue that the blogospheres 
are becoming spaces for providing legitimacy to works and products amongst a 
certain segment; a trait similar to that of elite media. 
Elites trending, search engines and the polarization of the blogosphere  
 
Hindman concludes that one of the main reasons a few voices get heard on the 
blogosphere is interlinking between popular bloggers, which leads to its 
domination by only a few star bloggers as well as its polarization as each 
segment is drawn to communicate with and follow those in their same circles 
or those whose beliefs fall in line with their own. This interlinking, according 
to theories of networks, results in popular bloggers getting more and more 
popular as the interlinking secures them higher spots on search engines. In the 
meantime, other less-popular bloggers struggle to appear on search engines and 
so their voices are rarely heard online (Hindman, 2008). 
More specific to Egypt, David Faris had already noticed in 2008 that 
only star bloggers like Hossam El-Hamalawy, Wael Abbas and Nora Younis, 
are what he referred to as “pushers,” or bloggers who can push stories into 
mainstream media. Faris explains that the Egyptian blogosphere is a scale-free 
network, which means, “most nodes will be relatively poorly connected, while 
a select minority of hubs will be very highly connected,” (2010, p.28). This, 
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Faris argues, means that according to the science of networks, those well-
connected nodes of the network, or prominent Egyptian bloggers, will become 
more and more connected and so get more popular and dominant. This gap not 
only continues post-January 25th, but is even prone to growing wider. Given 
the vast amount of information available online, users find themselves with an 
information overload. When users first start a Twitter account, for instance, 
they find themselves faced with hundreds of thousands of possibilities for 
people to follow. Naturally, they follow those they are familiar with their 
names, be it from the mainstream media that began hosting bloggers after 
January 25th, or through their friends’ or Twitter’s recommendations. Those 
recommendations are usually for Tweeps who have a large number of 
followers or were validated by their followers as a trusted source in a certain 
issue. This means that the divide between elite micro-bloggers and lesser-
known ones could possibly be growing wider, eventually re-instating their 
status as online media elite. “Some bloggers are vastly more influential than 
others, continue to gain further influence, and make it harder for newer 
bloggers to crack the scene,” (Faris, 2008, p.3). Those star bloggers and 
Tweeps’ influence on individuals’ opinions is amplified due to an “information 
cascades” effect, which is a situation where “it is optimal for an individual 
having observed the actions of others ahead of him, to follow the behavior of 
the preceding individual without regard to his own information,” (Lotan et al 
2011, p.1380). On Twitter, the authors add, this is manifested in the form of re-
tweeting and reposting content. This is amplified by the trending topic feature 
on Twitter, which highlights content that is related and statistically outstanding 
on the system. 
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This is why it’s important to study how links between blogs affect their 
prominence during the content analysis as a step to contribute towards 
determining whether star bloggers have become media elites, contributing to 
the limitation and polarization of the blogosphere. 
Implications of being media elite in elite media outlets 
This shift in status from underground to media elite in elite media outlets has 
many implications. Chomsky (1997) explains that elite media are 
institutionalized where there is a certain framework set for their employees and 
subsequently the mainstream, non-elite media, to abide by. The top media 
conglomerates also undergo the five news filters Chomsky and Herman laid 
out (1982). Thus the rules that apply to underground activists are very different 
than those that the elite media goes by, which makes it important to study this 
shift in status’ implications in theory and in practice on the political bloggers.  
2.5. Funding, Organizational theory and Institutionalization of Blogs / 
Blogs as a Business 
 
Although certain blogs might be becoming elite media, most scholarly works 
ignore the financial aspect of blogging and seem to be predominately 
concerned with the new media’s democratic potentials. Chomsky argues that 
elite media are subjected to the editorial pressures that come with 
advertisements more so than other media outlets (1997). Elite media’s 
capability to influence the public and reach viewers makes them lucrative to 
advertisers. Internet also provides organizations the advantage of targeted 
marketing, of knowing who exactly their advertisements reached and getting 
statistics on how many people viewed their ads as well as data on where they 
are from and the language they use.  
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2.5.1. Costs of blogging 
In his revision of the public sphere theory, Habermas (1992) speaks of the 
increasingly expensive media operating costs and higher barriers to entry, 
which have resulted in a changed public sphere that leads to growing rules and 
pressures. Unlike conventional media that incurs increasing costs of publishing 
or broadcasting and employing staff and overhead costs of large 
conglomerates, blogs, which are normally run by one or few people, incur very 
little overhead or operation costs. But blogging requires high-speed internet 
access, smart phones with internet plans and free time. Financial requirements 
of blogging are affordable to certain classes, but not all members of the lower 
and middle classes. Additionally, if blogging is conducted as a part-time 
hobby, bloggers can afford the time spent. But if it takes up more time than 
they can spend after working hours, then the question of making it a viable 
activity to avoid decreasing the frequency of posting starts to pose itself — 
unless they are of financial elite who can afford to carry on blogging without 
having a revenue generating job to support themselves. Calhoun argues, “A 
public sphere adequate to a democratic polity depends upon both quality of 
discourse and quantity of participation,” (1992, p.2).  
 Golberg (2011) discusses the economic dynamic between internet users 
and networking services in new media scholarship which assumes transmission 
of data online is free or too cheap to matter or meter. He gives examples of 
scholars like Anderson  (2009), Benkler (2006), Currah (2007), Kelly (2008) 
and Slater (2000) who assume data is a non-rivalrous resource in that “its 
consumption by one user does not preclude or inhibit its consumption by 
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others,” (Golberg, 2011, p.746). Lowry (2009) explains that while scholars 
often ignore the profit angle of the virtual sphere, it remains true that the 
internet service providers are growing dissatisfied with unlimited access for 
flat fees, and are beginning to experiment with tiered pricing. Golberg argues 
that there is a conflict between the economic value produced for content 
providers as users consume content and the inadequate value produced for 
service providers when users consume data online (2011, p.747). He cites 
YouTube as an example of a content provider who spent $300 million on 
bandwidth in 2009, forcing them to look for revenue generation.  
2.5.2. Institutionalizing Blogs 
 
Blogs as organizations  
The blogosphere audience is of prime importance to advertisers in Egypt; they 
are the middle class youth advertisers often seek. Peter Golding and Graham 
Murdock argue that the audience is the commodity as the higher the channel’s 
viewership is, the more advertisers are willing to pay for a slot (2000, p.75). 
But as Colin Hoskins et al argue, it goes beyond viewership quantity as “the 
price advertisers are willing to pay to access an audience also depends on the 
audience’s demographic characteristic,” (2004, p.255). The blogosphere 
audience, therefore, is an expensive commodity advertisers hold interest in as 
they turn more towards online.	
 From an organizational viewpoint, bloggers can be considered multi-sided 
platforms, which Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) define as serving two or 
more interdependent customer segments; advertisers who finance production 
and distribution and readers who attract advertisers. “Both segments are 
required to make the business model work,” (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010, 
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p.21). They explain that customers and companies can have various forms of 
relationships, including forming communities — formed by being involved 
with the customer to facilitate connections between community members — 
and co-creation, getting customers involved in the production and engaging 
them. Bloggers’ relationship with the readers can be categorized as 
communities and co-creation, two categories that engage the customers with 
the brand and create a sense of belonging, which advertisers often seek. 
Bloggers’ value proposition, “the reason why customers turn to [them],” 
(Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010, p.22) is that they are an alternative source of 
news that breaks through the mass media clutter and is able to cover issues not 
covered elsewhere without being subjected to the same pressures the media is 
subjected to. “Some value propositions satisfy an entirely new set of needs that 
customers previously did not perceive because there was no similar offering,” 
(Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010, p.23). One could argue that bloggers have this 
as their value proposition; an interactive media for the voiceless that speaks the 
same language to roughly the same age group as the content providers. Also a 
value proposition is price (as they access the information without paying a fee 
other than internet access), accessibility (which is valid only to those with 
internet access) and convenience, (which applies because online users can 
access information anywhere and anytime). Blogs and micro-blogs provide 
free access to fresh voices who have on the ground coverage at the fingertips of 
the readers from any place and at any time.  
The dangers of institutionalizing blogs 
Scholars fear that commercialization of the internet will work against the 
potential it has for democracy as they get mainstreamed into larger media 
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conglomerates or the mainstream economy, allowing them less flexibility and 
autonomy over content. Habermas argues that in a market economy, the media 
needs to appeal to the widest audience possible, hence, neutralizing the content 
to do so, appealing to the lowest common denominator.  
 Davis (1999), Margolis and Resnick (1997), among other scholars have 
noted that the internet is colonized by commercial concerns manifested through 
collaborating and merging with media conglomerates. Papacharissi cites AOL, 
Napster and Excite as examples of online forums that emerged as alternatives 
to mainstream media but were merged into larger corporates, forfeiting their 
singularity (2008, p.21). Murdoch (1994) and King (1995) also argue that it is 
only a matter of time until media conglomerates take over the internet and 
merge traditional media with the digital world (cited in McChesney, 1995). 
This has been already proving partially true with takeovers as well as 
convergence of newsrooms.  
 Davis (1999), Margolis and Resnick (1997) argue that commercial 
concerns of the internet neutralize and standardize its content, much like 
traditional media. 
 Habermas and other scholars, including Putnam (1996) and Hart (1994), 
argue that the public sphere has been ruined by forces of commercialization 
and corporate conglomerates, transforming it into a vehicle for capitalist 
hegemony and ideological reproduction. Commercialization of blogs, 
therefore, might hinder their objectivity, credibility and editorial direction and 
voice. Because bloggers did not have to answer to an editor, advertiser or 
sponsor before, they were not afraid to tackle certain taboo issues. If they do 
attempt to generate revenue, the revenue streams adopted might mean they will 
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have to answer to someone, which in turn might hinder the autonomy they 
have over their content. Depending on advertisements also means depending 
on the most hits possible, and so possibly tailoring their product to fit the mass 
product to get the most audience. “The premium prices are commanded by 
shows that can attract and hold the greatest number of viewers,” (Golding and 
Murdock, 2000, p.75). In fact, Mohamed’s research on Egyptian blogs 
concluded that readership increases as topics covered became more 
controversial (2010). In a book by two expert bloggers to guide beginners on 
how to make their blogs popular and generate revenues, Forrester and Powell 
(2008) warn users against being overly opinionated and advise them to keep a 
positive tone. This is an indication that professional bloggers, under financial 
pressures to appease advertisers by a neutral content that does not oppose their 
interests or drive away traffic, may neutralize their content and limit the issues 
covered. “Keep in mind that if those opinions clash with the best interests of 
advertisers, you could have problems,” (Forrester and Powell, 2008, p.3). 
Although the issue of commercial interests and editorial integrity is 
present in any medium, the issue is more problematic in the blogosphere where 
no set of regulations and codes of conducts govern. Bloggers are not subjected 
to any editorial constraints nor do they follow any organizational or 
professional regulations, values and codes of conduct to revert to. Philip Eliot 
argues that working for prestigious media organizations like the BBC and the 
Time magazine carries with it notions of appropriate styles and behavior that 
leads to audience respect (1977, p.147). It also means, however, that there is 
often a conflict between different ideals or goals of the reporters, or conflict 
over control and autonomy in the workstation (Elliott, 1977, p.147). “The 
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demands of commerce, the despised polar position in the dilemma have come 
to invoke most types of control over the creative process,” (Elliott, 1977, 
p.147). This is a double-edge sword as it was this particular independence that 
allowed bloggers to discuss issues that were not discussed before, but it is also 
this non-compliance with rules that makes many scholars question the editorial 
direction, integrity, objectivity and overall balance of the content provided on 
blogs. This also means that if they are subjected to commercialization, there 
are no guides or rules to separate editorial from advertisement interests as is 
theoretically the case with other media outlets. It also means that there are no 
rules or guidelines to ensure quality if the time dedicated to blogging is 
hindered with the lack of funds, there is no editor to ensure compliance to 
standards. Elliott (1977) divides journalists into straight reporters who give 
facts and let readers decide, participant and committed journalists who give 
facts, backgrounds, analysis and even opinions on behalf of readers. We can 
assume bloggers mostly fall under that second category; the committed 
journalists. As Elliot (1977) and other media scholars contend, these are the 
hardest to follow moral codes and ethics because they are driven by a need to 
give opinions and often reject rules. This means that advertisers might shy 
away from advertising on their blogs because of the lack of journalistic 
guidelines and their opinionated coverage.  
 McChesney (1995) compares the development of the internet to that of the 
radio, which started out with great hopes for democratization in the 1920s. He 
explains that eventually, the medium developed from being controlled by 
amateurs and non-profit groups to being commercialized. This, McChesney 
argues, has already been seen in the internet’s computer networks which were 
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eventually privatized after being subsidized (1995). Although this article was 
written in 1995, when the effects of the internet could not yet be fully detected, 
the argument and questions posed still remain relevant. Scholars try to 
speculate the effect of commercialization on the internet and whether or not a 
medium like the blogosphere might yield to commercial interests as have many 
traditional media outlets.  
2.5.3. Funding alternatives 
 
While some blogs are backed by political parties and organizations, including 
Muslim Brotherhood bloggers, most prominent liberal, secular leftist and 
democratic bloggers in Egypt are independent of any funding or resources 
provided by political powers. This means that the funding options they might 
have are limited to sponsorship, forms of advertisements, syndicating content 
to, or joining altogether, mainstream media. Osterwalder and Pigneur (2008) 
explain that organizations have several options to stream revenues; asset sale, 
usage fee, subscription fee, lending, licensing, brokerage and advertising. Of 
those, advertising and licensing, which is content syndication for the media, are 
the most relevant as research has shown that paying for online content has 
proven unsuccessful in Egypt (El Sayed, 2009). 
 Forrester and Powell (2008) advise bloggers that there are certain things to 
keep in mind to attract advertisements. Along with keeping a positive, neutral 
and objective tone, bloggers need to watch for the amount of advertisements 
they carry as too many ads can chase readers away. They also warn against 
offensive postings “Yes, the internet does have a spirit of free speech and free 
enterprise, but if you are trying to make money, avoid commentary that could 
cause offense,” (2008, p.5). But it is not just a matter of caution to increase 
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hits, when using ad agents like Google Adsense, bloggers need to follow terms 
of service that include steering away from offensive content and hate speech. 
The terms of service on Google include  
“You agree that the Site does not at any time contain any 
pornographic, hate-related, violent or offensive content or contain 
any other material, products or services that violate or encourage 
conduct that would violate any criminal laws, any other applicable 
laws, any third party rights, or any service policies issued by 
Google from time to time.”  
This clause can be subject to various interpretations as terms are left loose, for 
instance, would the calls for civil disobedience fall under call for violence? 
Similarly, footage of police brutality, for instance, may fall under violent 
content as well.  
 While setting up a blog, users have the option to choose from a variety of 
open-source platforms, which offer different options as some platforms require 
that they control the ad space and others leave it up to the user.  Bloggers have 
the option of running their own ad spaces, hiring online advertisement 
companies as their agents or using services like Google Adsense. Political 
blogs in Egypt have an advantage in advertisement in that they write about key 
issues and so come up in the top results on search engines, which attracts 
advertisers. When choosing ad programs, bloggers have three main options; 
contextual ads, ad networks and affiliate programs. Contextual ads “put 
advertisements on your website that are in the same contexts as (closely related 
to) the content of the webpage where you place those advertisements,” 
(Forrester and Powell, 2008, p.79). This program, however, does not seem 
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relevant to political blogs as they normally carry current affairs issues and so 
cannot link to any product or service advertisers provide, although they could 
simply relate to Egypt.  AD networks are agents for ad spaces, they could be a 
group of advertisers or publishers, (Forrester and Powell, 2008). Finally, 
affiliate programs are programs that focus on one product or service and they 
normally pay higher than contextual programs, these include Amazon.com and 
Commission Junction. These last two categories seem to apply more to 
bloggers than contextual ads. It remains to be studied, however, what 
categories bloggers are using, if any, and how different categories affect the 
bloggers’ content, as a sub-research question under the effect of existence or 
lack of ads on blogs.  
 Forrester and Powell (2008) explain that there are two other types of 
revenue streams for bloggers, spin-off revenue and personal revenue. Spin-off 
revenue is revenue generated from referring to other things or people when the 
blog has high traffic, while personal revenue is revenue generated from selling 
the bloggers’ expertise. Referral revenue puts in question integrity and 
objectivity of the blogger as the blogger is paid when they mention or 
recommend the advertiser and may not be the most relevant method to political 
bloggers. 
 Personal revenue could be generated through many ways. Political 
bloggers could also possibly use their skills in providing their services to 
companies or organizations that might want them to run their blogs or social 
media accounts, on the side of political blogging. Similarly, bloggers could 
join mainstream media as freelancers, part-timers or full-timers. As scholars 
like Taki (2010, p.191) point out, some bloggers in the Arab world are either 
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former journalists, current ones, or have ties with the mainstream media, which 
came to collaborate with them recently for topics they are more experienced in. 
 Monetizing social media platforms for micro-bloggers or bloggers using 
those platforms is also a possible revenue stream for some outlets. YouTube, 
for instance, allows users to post ads on their videos and set up Google 
AdSense and then the user might become a YouTube partner if they have 
managed to monetize videos with large numbers of viewers. Partners have 
more tools on the platform and are able to generate more income through 
sponsorships. Users can also generate money from their Facebook and Twitter 
accounts through affiliate marketing or sponsoring certain products on their 
posts and Tweets. This means brands would pay them to Tweet or post on 
Facebook favorably about their products. Affiliate marketing, like other types 
of advertising, puts those once-free platforms under pressures of the political 
economy of the media in the sense that they cannot write negatively about 
brands advertising with them and that they will have to alter content to attract 
the maximum number of readers and so maximize profits.  
2.6. Summary and Discussions 
The blogosphere has several elements of what constitutes a Habermasian 
public sphere; grounds for debate, opinions from the readers, theoretical 
inclusivity, low entry barriers, relatively free speech and serious debate of 
public affairs. The question remains, however, as to whether we can actually 
claim there exists a plural virtual sphere given the penetration rate in Egypt, the 
growing polarization and limitation of the blogosphere to a few prominent 
voices, the possible eliteness of leading bloggers and the possibility of them 
turning into media elite. One also needs to question the plurality this 
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blogosphere gives to the public space of discourse if the activity decreases, or 
bloggers resort to mini-statements on microblogs that requires less in-depth 
features and opinions as a result of the lack of funding needed to maintain the 
time-consuming activity. Plurality is also at risk if the blogosphere gets 
commercialized as a result of being coopted into the historical bloc because of 
a need for funding and a shift in status. Commercialization might lead to either 
complete shifts in editorial directions or toning down the opposition voice. 
Habermas himself is wary of the democratization potential of the internet 
due to the growing commercialization of it (2006). I have made a conscious 
decision, however, not to generalize the findings of this study beyond the 
plurality blogs add to the public sphere in Egypt after 2011. I do not, therefore, 
intend to reach deterministic utopian or dystopian conclusions around blogs’ 
role in the democratization process of Egypt. Scholars like Marc Lynch 
advocate other approaches to new media studies than assessing their 
democracy potential, “Rather than focus on whether blogs alone can deliver 
democracy or a political revolution, analysts should explore the variety of ways 
in which blogs might transform the dynamics of Arab public opinion and 
political activism,” (2007, p.3). However, theories of plural public spheres, 
what forms them, their necessity and the potentials the internet may have in 












Chapter III: Methodology 
3.1. Introduction and Overview 
 
The study is based on both qualitative and quantitative research methods; 
namely quantitative content analysis, framing analysis and qualitative 
interviews. The change in the media’s coverage and portrayal of independent 
political bloggers was studied using quantitative content analysis of blogs and 
qualitative framing analysis of selected media outlets. The change in prominent 
and less-prominent bloggers’ status and relationship with the private sector and 
media was covered through in-depth, semi-structured qualitative interviews 
with selected marketing executives from the private business sector and media 
professionals. After the initial content analysis of mainstream media was over, 
quantitative content analysis of blogs and in-depth, qualitative interviews with 
12 bloggers was conducted. The content analysis of blogs aimed to assess 
whether the existence or lack of a revenue stream affects the length and 
frequency of posts in 6 prominent blogs and 6 less-prominent ones. The 
analysis also served to see whether the number of links the blog is carrying to 
other blogs is related to the blogger’s popularity, prominence and coverage in 
the media.  The blogs were also studied in terms of the topics discussed in both 
prominent and less prominent ones to assess whether the issues prioritized are 
of elite nature or reflect more mainstream demands and issues. Interviews were 
then conducted with the 12 bloggers to study their backgrounds, available 
revenue streams and changing relationship with the media and the private 
sector. The interviews served to determine whether more prominent bloggers 
come from a power elite and whether they are becoming media elite.  
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3.2. Literature on methods used and limitations 
 
3.2.1. Qualitative and quantitative research and triangulation 
 
Cassel and Symon  (1994, p.7) define qualitative research as a “focus on 
interpretation rather than quantification; an emphasis on subjectivity rather 
than objectivity; a flexibility in the process of conducting research; an 
orientation towards process rather than outcome; a concern with context.” In 
the definition and application of qualitative methods lie both its advantages and 
shortcomings. Qualitative methods allow the researcher to have an in-depth 
grasp of the data and focus on analysis and context of the data rather than 
quantifying data. Qualitative research is useful for this research for many 
reasons. This research studies a new multi-dimensional phenomenon in a 
relatively new field, taking into account the context and various factors 
contributing to it; something that qualitative research is often used for 
(Kohlbacher, 2006). The research also does not begin with a hypothesis to 
validate or negate, but rather a research question to answer, which is why 
qualitative methods need to be used in addition to quantitative ones.  
While earlier works on content analysis were mainly focused on 
quantitative approaches, as early as 1952, scholars like Kracauer have 
advocated the use of qualitative content analysis to study aspects of the text 
that quantitative content analysis cannot study. He advocated going beyond 
counting and measuring patterns and gaps in texts and looking at the various 
possibilities of interpretations and meanings. Scholars like Mayring (2000) 
argue that by using a qualitative content analysis guided by theory, aspects that 
are ignored by quantitative analysis—like the context of the text being studied 
and the distinct individual cases beyond text—could be analyzed. 
El	Sayed,					80	
However, qualitative analysis also has several shortcomings. For 
instance, findings from qualitative methods may not be generalizable and can 
be more prone to subjectivity, in both research and interpretation, than 
quantitative methods. Scholars including Denzing and Lincoln (2000) do not 
believe in the merits of qualitative research and believe qualitative researchers 
are more like journalists, describing their work as unscientific, subjective and 
exploratory (cited in Kohlbacher, 2006). Even Mayring (2000) who advocates 
qualitative content analysis realizes that there are issues with qualitative 
research, including reliability issues with coding and the inability to draw 
inference from a small sample to the whole population.  
The debate between the merits of quantitative and qualitative research 
has often led researchers to abandon or pursue one method over another, 
“based on their ideological commitment to the particular methodological 
paradigm rather than on the nature of the phenomena they are describing and 
the epistemological and practical issues most applicable to that particular 
context,” (Hammersley, 1992, p.163). This is what led researchers like 
Bourdieu and Hammersley to advocate the use of both quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies as appropriate to the research itself and not adhere to 
one or the other regardless. Similarly, researchers like Kohlbacher (2006) and 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) adopt a mixed approach to exploit advantages 
of qualitative and quantitative approaches; “these attempts share the conception 
that qualitative and quantitative methods should be viewed as complementary 
rather than as rival camps,” (Kohlbacher, 2006). The debate between scholars 
on the merits and issues associated with quantitative and qualitative research 
methods has led media scholars to adopt more reconciliatory methods in their 
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research. The merits of pro-quantitative and pro-qualitative arguments have led 
many to use triangulation methods to reap the benefits both methods have to 
offer as well as compensate for the shortages they both bear. Kohlbacher 
(2006, p.15) argues that using qualitative content analysis in analyzing data 
from interviews provides a method that ensures better understanding of data at 
hand while minimizing risks associated with qualitative content analysis. 
Similarly, Trochim (2006) argues, “our best hope for achieving objectivity is to 
triangulate across multiple fallible perspectives.” So while quantitative 
research might detect a certain pattern or phenomenon, qualitative research can 
give insight on why it is happening and provide deeper analysis of it (Cassel 
and Symon, 1994). 
In the particular case of this research, triangulation, as well as 
combining interviews with content analysis, is also useful in compensating for 
the shortcoming of interview bias. Combining those methods also provides 
more quantifiable and objective evidence to support the interpretation drawn 
from qualitative data that might be hindered by the interviewee or the 
interviewer’s subjectivity. The quantitative content analysis serves to detect 
change in bloggers’ portrayal in the media while framing analysis gives more 
insight to this change and how it compares across bloggers. The qualitative 
interviews help determine why this change detected by quantitative analysis 
happened and the consequences it has on the nature of blogging.  
I also used quantitative coding in framing analysis to analyze the 
qualitative data to measure media’s attitudes and beliefs accurately and 
objectively and rectify some of the qualitative methods shortcomings. I also 
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manually conducted the quantitative content analysis to avoid limitations of 
automated content analysis. 
3.2.2. Media framing and content analysis 
One of the limitations of content analysis in general is the limited information 
available in the text, which in my case means that not all media attitudes 
towards bloggers are portrayed in the text studied. Using interviews in parallel 
with the content analysis amended for this shortcoming to draw more insight 
from media professionals themselves.  
Framing 
Framing analysis of main stream media seemed the most appropriate to assess 
the change in the attitude of the editorial staff towards different bloggers and 
how they’re portrayed (framed) before and after January 25th. 	
 Framing stems from the notion that people rely on broader interpretive 
schemas, or primary frameworks, which are the result of stable and socially 
shared category systems. People use those frames to interpret new information 
because human beings look for easier and quicker ways to process information 
and so find it easier to depend on existing schemas in interpreting incoming 
messages. Entman (1993, p.52) argues that “to frame is to select some aspects 
of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in 
such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, 
moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.” 
Gitlin (1980, p.7) defines frames as “persistent patterns of cognition, 
interpretation and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which 
symbol handles routinely organize discourse.” Framing is meant to make the 
audience build associations between an issue presented and “particular 
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considerations relevant to its definition, causes, implications and treatments,” 
(Tewkesbury and Scheufele, 2009, p.24). 
 Framing, as a theory, can be traced back to Heider (1959) and Erving 
Goffman (1974), who studied the organization of experience and concluded 
that reporters’ understanding of the world determines which issues get selected 
to be told, and how they will be told. But it was Todd Gitlin (1980) who first 
undertook a news media framing analysis and analyzed media frames from a 
social perspective. Iyengar’s (1991) work on “episodic and thematic political 
news framing and attributions of responsibility,” was also one of the most 
significant academic contributions to media framing, (Tewkesbury and 
Scheufele, 2009, p.18). Robert Entman (1993) was one of the leading media 
researchers who tried to build on the framing concept and its applicability.  
 Scheufele (1999) explains that individuals interpret the same information 
differently depending on the framing of the message received. This is the 
essence of news frames and media framing theories, which contend that news 
can be framed in ways to influence the viewers’ beliefs, attitudes and 
behaviors. Entman argues that for frames to be successful, they need to 
resonate with elements of stored schemas in the audience’s mind (2010, p.391). 
Frames are used to introduce new issues to the audience when they do not have 
a set of linkages between this issue and diverse countervailing considerations. 
Frames are also used to suggest to the audience to think about a familiar issue 
in a novel way that is different to the existing beliefs, values and attitudes, they 
associate with this issue, (Tewkesbury and Scheufele, 2009: 24). Gamson and 
Modigliani (1987) believe media elite use packages to characterize an issue, 
and those include arguments, information, symbols, metaphors and images, and 
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these affect how “people understand, interpret and react to a problem or issue,” 
(Tewkesbury and Scheufele, 2009, p.19). The frame used in the message is the 
element that unifies information into a package and builds associations 
between concepts: it is a “central organizing idea or story line that provides 
meaning to an unfolding strip of events,” (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987, 
p.143). The strongest frames rely upon culture-based meanings, norms and 
values and so do not need to be explicitly introduced. Those frames are 
normally the most successful in making the audience think of issues introduced 
in a certain manner. 
 Frames can be studied as an independent or a dependent variable. I intend to 
study framing as an independent variable; so instead of studying how frames 
were built (frame building), I studied the effect of frames on the bloggers’ 
status and image (frame setting). And while some scholars are concerned with 
equivalency frames, others study emphasis. Equivalency frames (Chong and 
Druckman, 2007) studies the use of two terms that bear the same meaning but 
connote different frames to lead the audience to respond in favorable or 
unfavorable ways. This is manifested, for instance, in coverage of the issue of 
abortion using the term baby by pro-life advocates as opposed to fetus. 
Emphasis frames, however, rely on qualitative differences in the angles used to 
cover certain stories. For instance, while readers would respond to a story 
tackling illegal immigration from a refugee’s point of view in certain way, they 
would respond very differently if the same issue was covered from their 
negative impact on the economy.  
Framing, Agenda Setting and Information Persuasion  
The content produced by the media is often affected by three effects that are 
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often confused together; media framing, agenda setting and information 
persuasion. Researchers like Ettman (1993, p.53) and Iyengar (1990, p.160-
285) believe that framing stems primarily from accessibility, meaning that 
people store the more frequently and recently used information in a portion of 
their memory that is more accessible, and hence automatically retrieve this 
information to make judgments or interpret messages. This school of thought 
bears resonance with agenda setting theories, which made various scholars 
argue for media framing to fall under the umbrella of agenda setting. Other 
researchers, however, like Scheufele (1999) and Nelson et al (1997) argue that, 
unlike agenda setting, framing does not only rely on accessibility of the 
information that agenda-setters prioritize in the audience’s minds. The authors 
argue that framing relies primarily on applicability in that the audience applies 
frames that are the most applicable of the set of frames and schemas their 
memories have stored. The agenda-setting effect, on the other hand, is “the 
process by which audience exposure to news about an issue raises its 
accessibility,” (Tewkesbury and Scheufele, 2009, p.21). Agenda setting makes 
issues covered the most become the most important in the viewers’ minds.  
 Persuasion effects, much like framing, are concerned with how content is 
presented in a way to influence the audience towards a certain attitude and both 
framing and persuasion effect consider the source credibility as a moderating 
effect. The difference between the two, however, is that while framing includes 
the origin, evolution, presentation, and effects of frames, persuasion is not 
concerned with the origin and evolution of messages. Persuasion studies also 
involve the audience being aware of the intentionally-persuasive content while 
news framing studies presume the audience is not aware of frames used. 
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Framing is also often studied in comparison to priming, which occurs when 
news content suggests to news audiences that they ought to use specific issues 
as benchmarks for evaluating performance of the authority (Tewksbury and 
Scheufele, 2007, p.52). 
Critique of Media Framing  
Media framing has been criticized for obliqueness and operational 
inconsistency by various scholars, making its theoretical grounding hard to 
apply. “Part of this vagueness at different levels stems from the fact that 
framing researchers have often approached the theory very inductively and 
examined framing as a phenomenon without careful explication of the 
theoretical premises and their operational implications,” (ibid, p.17). Many 
scholars like Snow and Benford (cited in ibid, p.28) have argued that a set of 
master frames need to be created for researchers to apply across various issues 
for more consistent and reliable application of framing approach.  
 But through studying various scholarly work that used media framing as a 
method before, including Entman (1993 and 2010) and Kensicki (2001), one 
can get an idea of the applicability of media framing in research. The 
quantitative content analysis also helped set the frames used for media framing 
on the chosen media outlets. In fact, Kenisicki’s work on media framing of a 
movement against the administration of a university accused of racism is 
insightful to this particular research. She concluded that in general, frames used 
to cover the movement were overwhelmingly positive, reflecting internal unity 
of the movement, external support of its cause, a plausible and justifiable set of 
demands as well as effective action taken towards achieving it. These frames 
all resonate with the media framing of January 25th activists and 
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revolutionaries. One of her findings was that due to the unavailability of elite 
sources at the university to comment on the issue, users of the social media 
became primary sources quoted by most mainstream media, which made the 
frames used in their coverage more favorable. This is comparable to the 
situation in Egypt where often official and elite sources were unavailable to 
comment and so bloggers and opposition voices were louder and more 
accessible by the media, hence framed more favorably.  
 The approach I took to answering the lack of operational guidance when 
using frames is that I used the data collected from the quantitative analysis of 
the media to create my own set of frames that are relevant to this particular 
research, as discussed in section 3.3.1 of this chapter. 
3.2.3. Interviewing  
 
Interviewing falls under the umbrella of case studies; studying particular cases 
of the population at hand to draw not generalizations, but inferences and 
insight from the research. Robert Yin (1994) defines case studies to be an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident. Case studies cope with a situation where there are more 
variables of interest than data points and relies on multiple sources of evidence, 
with data needing to converge in a triangulation fashion, (Yin, 1994).  
Yin explains that explanatory case study is useful in understanding 
complex social phenomena as it allows researchers to “retain the holistic and 
meaningful characteristics of real-life events,” and are useful when the 
researcher is looking at how or why questions, has little control over events 
and is studying a contemporary phenomenon (Yin, 1994, p.4). Although there 
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are several merits to the use of case studies, critics argue that although they 
might bring insight on particular phenomena, they cannot be grounds for 
generalizing. Yin (1994), however, argues that while data gathered from case 
studies are not statistically generalizable to the population, they are analytically 
generalizable to the theoretical propositions being studied. For the interest of 
this research, which does not aim to reach a statistical generalization that is 
applicable to the population of bloggers, collective case studies of the bloggers 
serve to provide an analytical generalization of the theory in question; the 
plurality added by the blogosphere.  
 Stake (2000) outlines three different kinds of case studies; intrinsic, 
instrumental and collective (cited in Kohlbacher, 2006). While the intrinsic and 
the instrumental studies differ in the degree to which they focus on the unique 
or generalizable features of the case research, the collective study is a study of 
several cases (ibid), which is the type of case study I am looking at. Bloggers 
interviewed are not samples of the population studied, they are case studies that 
serve to answer a theoretical research question.  
 Yin (1994) identifies 5 techniques for case studies analysis; pattern 
matching, explanation building, time-series analysis, cross-case synthesis and 
logic models. To ensure validity of research and accurate analysis of data at 
hand, he lays out three crucial strategies for case study analysis; relying on 
theoretical propositions, considering rival explanations and developing a case 
description.  
Qualitative interviewing is a process of bringing the interviewer into the 
interviewee’s world, and “the quality of the information obtained during an 
interview is largely dependent on the interviewer,” (Patton, 1990, p.341). 
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Semi-structured interviews were used because with most interviewees, I 
needed the possibility of probing further to better understand the answers, 
especially with political activists, and get more commentary. It is also crucial 
to have open-ended questions to be able to assess attitudes through the 
respondents’ own words. Analyzing open-ended comments and probing might 
hinder the standardization of the interviews. But for qualitative assessment 
purposes, it works better than standardized structured interviews, which do not 
allow the researcher to probe for more or allow respondents’ enough room for 
expression. Semi-structured interviews also serve to get conversational flow 
and ease the respondents into the questions gradually to avoid evaluation 
apprehension as the interview seems more conversational and less survey-like.  
 Evaluation apprehension was introduced by Nickolas B. Cottrell in 1972 
and happens when respondents are aware they are being studied and so respond 
differently than they would normally do. There is a social desirability issue as 
respondents would not want to look too materialistic and at the same time 
would not want to speak of monetizing their activism. It is also hard for them 
to admit they are dedicating a long time to blogging because they are getting 
financial help from others, be it family or a party. At times financing sources 
might be confidential or the bloggers might not want to admit to a funding by a 
political party or power for fear of being judged or sounding biased. Studying 
the blog’s content, however, at times helped account for bloggers’ reluctance to 
share some information, including affiliations with political groups, parties or 
movements. I also use hypothetical projective respondent technique (Trochim, 
2006) to pose questions of sensitive nature as hypothetical and general. This 
technique means, for instance, enquiring about issues like financing in relation 
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to editorial content or frequency of blogging and micro-blogging in a more 
general sense at first. I then pose the personal question to be able to get as 
honest a response as possible. For instance, I start by asking about whether 
they know of bloggers who have succeeded in generating revenues or funding 
off their blogs, or how much they think blogging might yield and what are the 
funding options they deem suitable for bloggers and micro-bloggers to be able 
to carry on their activity and whether it is important to get funding. I then ask 
them about their particular case. To ease the bloggers into the interviews, I start 
by general opening questions and leave the most sensitive questions to the end, 
until after they have relaxed and I have gained their trust. I start the questions 
by asking about the nature of the blog, the content, the direction, when and 
how it started. When tackling sensitive questions, such as income, it is also 
essential to explain why these questions are posed and why answering them is 
insightful to the research. To gain entry, I use the language used by the 
bloggers, as detected from the content analysis, and dress casually so they can 
familiarize better with me, and explain exactly what the research is about, what 
I am looking to find and its importance. 
  The research bias in this method was counterbalanced by setting out 
guides prior to the interviews as to how to probe and using vocabulary that 
maintains objectivity and avoids influencing answers. I also study blogs’ 
content as a form of parallel testing as well as any research and biographies 
conducted on them to eliminate bias and ensure internal reliability of the data. 
 The population in question, the bloggers, are literate, and speak either 
English and Arabic or Arabic, hence there is not a language barrier. There is 
also no geographical barrier as I am studying Egyptian bloggers and most of 
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the popular ones are based either in Cairo or, less likely, Alexandria. There are 
also no issues with elite interviewing as most bloggers are of young age and 
similar backgrounds to the researcher. 
The researcher’s bias is especially strong when the interviewer and 
researcher come from the same ethnographic background as the subject s/he is 
studying, as well as her/his interviewees. This means that the researcher might 
have strong feelings or attitudes towards the issue or the subjects of study that 
may bias either their methods, the interview itself, their selection criteria or his 
interpretation of the data found. 
To make up for this bias, this research uses triangulation methods, discussed 
above, as well as pre-written set of questions, probes and topics for the semi-
structured interviews and preset guideline for the framing analysis, interpreting 
data and conducting the interviews.  
3.2.4. Collecting background data on blogs and the media 
The background data on the Egyptian media landscape and the emergence of 
the blogosphere were collected through secondary research on theoretical 
works on the Egyptian blogosphere and media as well as access to press 
archives. It was also gathered through the interviews with the bloggers and 
media professionals during the fieldwork. 
Several researches have been conducted studying the Egyptian media’s 
map as well as the emergence and history of the blogosphere in the Arab world 
in general and Egypt in particular. The data on both, therefore, was rich and 
provided historical and contextual grounding for the research. My experience 
in the media allowed me access to archives of magazines like Egypt Today and 
Business Today that often ran in-depth features on the media and bloggers, as 
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well as various other newspapers and magazines. The interviews with bloggers 
and media professionals also helped shed light on history of not only the 
bloggers or media platforms studied, but on the blogosphere and the media in 
general. 
 
3.3. Methods used and application to research questions 
 
The research question, “How much plurality is the blogosphere really giving 
the public sphere in Egypt post January 25th, 2011.” This rests on several sub-
questions: 
- How did the media’s coverage, portrayal of bloggers and relationship 
with bloggers change post January 25th? 
- Who are the bloggers most quoted and covered by the media and are 
they of elite backgrounds?  
-  How are less popular bloggers featured in the media in comparison to 
more prominent ones?  
- How do issues discussed in prominent blogs compare to those 
discussed in less prominent ones—in terms of whether topics 
prioritized in some blogs are of elite nature?  
- How is bloggers’ inclusion in mainstream media and changing status 
affecting their status as counterhegemonic elements? Are they joining 
the historical bloc through collaborations with mainstream media or 
their private sector? And how does this compare between prominent 
and less prominent bloggers? 
- Are bloggers seeking revenue streams to make their blogging 
financially sustainable?  
- If they are seeking revenue streams, how is this affecting their content?  
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- If they are not seeking revenue streams, how is this affecting the 
frequency of their posts? And if it does not, are they of elite 
backgrounds who can afford time and cost of blogging?  
- Given the private sector and media sectors are now more interested in 
online advertisements, are they targeting elite or otherwise bloggers?  
- Are prominent bloggers becoming similar to media elites and making 
the blogosphere less inclusive and blogging unsustainable? This 
question is of conclusive nature and should be based on the answers to 
all of the above questions.  
 
3.3.1. Content and Framing Analysis 
 
Three newspapers have been chosen for the purpose of the quantitative and the 
framing analysis, Al-Masry Al-Youm, Al-Ahram and The Daily News Egypt 
(DNE). The reason for choosing those particular newspapers are several: first 
they represent diversified directions as Al-Ahram is a pro-government 
newspaper while Al-Masry Al-Youm is perceived as an independent newspaper 
and DNE is an independent English newspaper. Furthermore, it is interesting to 
look at the case of Al-Masry Al-Youm, being a private newspaper funded by 
businessmen, to see how businesses react to changing social orders. Also, two 
of the newspapers have an accessible archive and therefore were possible to 
research. Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Ahram are published daily while the DNE 
is published daily except Sunday as it combines Saturdays and Sundays issues 
in one, published every Saturday. 
 As for the TV channels, the initial plan was to study three shows; two 
aired on satellite channels and one on state television. I looked at Baladna Bel 
Masry (Our Country in Egyptian Dialect), an evening talk show on ONTV, 
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satellite channel funded by liberal businessman and founding member of Al 
Masreyin Al Ahrar Party, Naguib Sawiris. This is based on the availability of 
the show’s archives as well as their popularity and the peculiarity of the 
channel being funded by one of the business tycoons in Egypt who recently 
engaged in politics. Baladna Bel Masry was hosted by Reem Magued and aired 
five times a week for two hours and is off Fridays and Saturdays. This show 
was discontinued in June 2013 as Reem Magued declined to renew her contract 
with the channel post June 30th, 2013 – when the Muslim Brotherhood regime 
was ousted after mass protests against their rule and the army detaining then-
president Mohamed Morsi – for what she calls ‘editorial differences.’ I also 
studied Al Ashera Masa’an (Ten PM) as another example of a popular talk 
show aired on a satellite channel funded by businessman Ahmed Bahgat, 
Dream TV. Ten PM airs five times a week from Saturdays to Wednesdays for 
three hours and was hosted by Mona El Shazly at the time of the episodes 
chosen for analysis. The show was taken over by Wael El Ibrashy when El 
Shazly left for MBC Masr in November 2012. I attempted to study state 
television’s popular El Beit Beitak evening talk show for comparison but failed 
to get access. El Beit Beitak, however, was discontinued in May 2011 after 
initial hosts Mahmoud Saad, Khairy Ramadan and Tamer Amin had all quit by 
April 2011. A much-less popular show replaced it for a short period. However, 
access to the Maspero archives – archives in the headquarters of state 
television – of the show was not granted despite repeated attempts through 
contacts with producers in Maspero. Although some of El Beit Beitak’s 
episodes were available on YouTube, the replacement show was not. This is an 
indication of the gatekeeping process in Egyptian state television; access to 
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archived media and general access to information is rarely simply granted. The 
process of accessing archives needs connections and persistence, but access to 
information became especially sensitive after January 25th when the state 
television was heavily criticized for its massively biased coverage of events. 
 A total of 178 issues of newspapers were studied and a total of 88 
episodes totaling around 230 hours of broadcast. 
Getting access and gathering data for broadcast  
Baladna Bel Masry and Ten PM were both analyzed for the months of 
November 2010 and November 2011 as well as the first week of December 
2010 and December 2011.  
All of Ten PM’s episodes were available on the channel’s YouTube 
channel but Baladna Bel Masry was only available starting November 2010. 
After contacting producers of the show, they advised me to refer to the 
available episodes on YouTube as the team was rather busy with current events 
breaking every day and uploading 22 episodes would prove too big a task for 
the time. This is why broadcast was studied in November of 2010 and 2011 
and not in October 2010 and 2011 as the initial plan was.  
November 2010 was the month where the parliamentary elections were 
run under Mubarak’s regime. November 2011 was the month of the first 
parliamentary elections post-January 25th and the month following the Maspero 
events where 28 protestors, including many Copts and prominent blogger Mina 
Daniel, were killed and 212 injured. Many activists and protestors were also 
arrested after the events, including prominent blogger Alaa Abdel Fattah. 
November 2011 also witnessed the Mohamed Mahmoud events that took place 
from November 19th to 24th when police forces brutally dispersed a sit in on the 
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19th. The events yielded many deaths and injuries, including a prominent 
activist, Ahmed Harara, losing his sight completely as he had lost one eye 
during the January 25th events, and a prominent blogger, Malek Mostafa, losing 
one eye. The clashes resulted in 45 dead and more than 60 injured.  
Baladna Bel Masry was analyzed in the period from 1 November 2010 
to 6 December 2010 as the show did not run on the 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th 
because it was the Feast of Adha and so the 4 episodes missing were replaced 
with four episodes from December 2010. This means that a total of 22 episodes 
of Baladna Bel Masry were studied, each running for two hours. For the 
analysis of 2011, the show was studied from 1 November 2011 to 11 
December 2011 as it was off for the Feast of Adha on the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 
10th and then off again on the 15th, 16th and 17th as the hostess was traveling. 
Therefore, 8 episodes were studied from December 2011. A sum of 22 
episodes were studied in 2011, each running for two hours, except three 
episodes of special election coverage that varied in length from three to five 
hours.  
Ten PM was studied from November 1st in 2010 to December 8th as it 
was off for feast on the 13th, 15th, 15th, 16th, 17th and 20th. The six missing 
episodes were replaced by episodes from December 2010.  Total episodes 
studied in 2010 were 22 episodes, each episode runs for three hours. For the 
analysis of 2011, the show was studied from November 1st to December 7th as 
it was off for the feast on November 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th, replaced by five 
episodes from December. The total was also 22 episodes, each also running for 
three hours. 
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All episodes of the two shows were watched and double checked to see 
if they were all, in fact, covered through a date search on Google videos and on 
the channel to make sure no segments are missing. Baladna Bel Masry was 
then searched by the keywords Baladna, Bel Meftesher (or Frankly Speaking), 
the name given to the introductory segment of the show, which was all mostly 
missing from the show’s playlists but available on YouTube. Other keywords 
searched were ‘bloggers’, ‘activists’ and key bloggers’ names were then 
Googled along with the name of the show in the periods studied and a hashtags 
search was also performed for special election coverage and coverage of the 
Mohamed Mahmoud clashes. All suggested videos on the right bar of every 
clip watched on both shows were also checked to make sure all episodes’ 
segments are covered. This yielded an extra 48 clips for Baladna Bel Masry 
that were not included in the original playlist but did not yield anything for Ten 
PM as it was all uploaded in full in their playlist. 
Getting access and gathering data for print 
Al-Masry Al-Youm has a full archive online providing all old issues, the online 
archives were used in conjunction with past printed issues bought from a 
newspaper stand in Abbaseya. The DNE used to have online archives for its 
past issues but were put offline when the new management and ownership took 
over in June 2012. DNE’s assistant editor in chief was contacted and he 
provided the needed issues of the newspaper in the form of soft copies. Al-
Ahram also has an online archive but the server would often fail to connect to 
the archives and so Al-Ahram Archives were contacted to buy print copies of 
the needed issues. Missing issues from the print were studied from soft copies 
bought from Al-Ahram Archives and others from their online archives. Al-
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Ahram Archives is often accessible to researchers and journalists and old 
issues are easy to get hold of through them. 
October 2010 and 2011 were studied for each newspaper as the original 
plan was to analyze October, the month leading up to the first parliamentary 
elections post-January 25th and leading up to the 2010 parliamentary elections 
under Mubarak. The dates could not be changed to follow the change in 
broadcast as the DNE assistant editor in chief had already provided copies of 
October 2010 and 2011 when the dates for broadcast were changed and so it 
was not possible to get hold of him again for November 2010 and 2011. This 
meant that while print was studied for October 2010 and 2011, broadcast was 
studied for November 2010 and 2011. Although unfavorable, it does not, 
however, make a significant difference in the findings as both months had 
similar political context and issues discussed were similar. 
All print was read thoroughly and then an advanced search on Google 
specifying each newspaper’s website was performed for the set dates for 
keywords found commonly—including popular bloggers’ names and the words 
Facebook, Twitter, social media, bloggers, activists and blogs.  The DNE’s 
PDFs were searchable and so after the initial reading and research, the issues 
were again double checked with above-mentioned keywords. Al-Masry Al-
Youm past issues online archives were also searchable and so were searched for 
the keywords after initial reading and research. Al-Ahram’s PDFs were not, 
however, searchable so could not be double checked in the same manner.  
Quantitative offline content analysis 
The quantitative content analysis focused on counting the number of times 
bloggers were quoted, hosted or covered in chosen media channels, the number 
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of times they made headlines or front pages as well as whether directly quoted, 
hosted or had their pictures featured in the article. The data was then compared 
from October and November 2010 to those of October and November 2011. 
 The quantitative analysis not only indicates the changing attitude of the 
media towards different bloggers, it also allows for determining which 
bloggers are hosted the most, and so serves as one of the selection criteria I use 
to determine the bloggers to be used in this research.  
The quantitative analysis for broadcast was coded and divided as follows: 
 
C: Coverage, this indicates the news of the blogger were covered in particular 
in the show, this includes, for instance, news or updates on Alaa Abdel Fattah’s 
arrest.  
M: Mention, this indicates that the presenter or an interviewee or guest simply 
mentions the blogger in the middle of a general issue but the coverage is not 
specific to their case. This indicates the blogger’s name came up while 
discussing a general issue. 
CA: Caption, this indicates the newsreel or caption on the screen mentions the 
blogger. 
IIP: Interview in Person, this indicates that the blogger was interviewed in 
person, either in the studio or elsewhere, but they appear in person on the show 
being interviewed by a reporter or the show hostess.  
PI: Phone Interview, this indicates the blogger was not hosted in person but 
was interviewed over the telephone.  
The number of times segments on YouTube were named after the bloggers 
were also counted. 
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This division was used to differentiate between the different kinds of coverage 
the blogger was subjected to and to indicate the level and degree of importance 
given to the issue or their opinion in each instance. 
At the end of the analysis, a summary of the number of times the 
blogger was interviewed (in person or over the telephone,) covered, mentioned 
or their name appeared on the screen is calculated and the total number of 
minutes they were covered or interviewed is also calculated. The number of 
minutes does not include, however, the Mentions category where their name 
was simply stated.  The number of times segments on YouTube were named 
after the bloggers were also counted. 
The quantitative analysis for print was divided and coded as follows: 
Q: Quoted, this indicates that the blogger was quoted in the article; either in an 
exclusive interview, quoted from their social media account or quoted at a 
conference. In one incident, an article written by the blogger himself (Mostafa 
El Naggar) was included into this category.  
M: Mentioned, this indicates the article mentions the blogger in a general 
issue or incident but the article itself is not specifically about or covering the 
blogger. 
GM: General Mention, this was used in incidents where no specific blogger 
was mentioned but the article mentions the words ‘bloggers,’ ‘social media 
activists,’ ‘Twitter activists,’ ‘Facebook activists’ or ‘online activists.’ 
FC: Full coverage, this indicates the article is about the blogger, covering their 
news or updates. This includes, for instance, coverage of a conference held by 
bloggers, news about Maikel Nabil’s detention, for instance, and the likes. 
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Those four categories were the primary categories that went into the total, final 
calculations for all newspapers to calculate the number of mentions and space 
given to bloggers in terms of number of words covering them across all three 
newspapers. The below categories were also considered in the quantitative 
analysis but did not go into the final calculations for each month. 
H: Headlined, this indicates the blogger’s name or the word ‘blogger,’ ‘online 
activist,’ ‘social media activist,’ ‘Twitter activist,’ or ‘Facebook activist’ was 
mentioned in the headline. This was subdivided into two categories; headlined 
with names and headlined without names. 
P: Pictured, this indicates the blogger’s picture was included in the article, or 
in one case, his mother’s picture. 
FP: Front Page, this indicates the article was in the front page of the 
newspaper. 
In both print and broadcast, some cases were not clear-cut as to whether 
the activists mentioned are bloggers or simply activists who, sometimes, use 
social media. The issue arose, for instance, when it came to cases of journalists 
who are also prolific bloggers, like Nora Younes, for instance. In that case, if 
they, themselves, identified themselves as bloggers at any point and were 
keeping a steady blog separate from their professional capacity as journalists, 
i.e. not under the publication they work for, they were considered in the study. 
The reason for this is that many bloggers cross the line between blogging and 
contributing to mainstream media, including prominent bloggers Mahmoud 
Salem (Sandmonkey) and Alaa Abdel Fattah, which is at the core of this study. 
Qualitative print and broadcast framing analysis: 
The qualitative offline framing analysis serves to study how the mainstream 
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media’s portrayal of bloggers and social media makers has evolved throughout 
2011.  
The framing analysis was conducted to assess how bloggers are 
presented, the degree of familiarity between the blogger and the presenter, how 
they are identified and the weight given to their opinions. The frames used 
were all derived from the findings of the quantitative analysis after detecting 
repeated patterns used to describe, address and cover bloggers. Four frames 
were used to analyze print and five frames used to analyze broadcast. The four 
main frames for print and broadcast were the Identification Frame, 
Representation Frame, Analytical Frame and Framing as 
Heroes/Criminals/Victims. The extra frame used for broadcast was the 
Familiarity Frame; how the presenter addresses the blogger, using the word 
‘hadretak,’ a common courtesy when speaking to strangers or elders in Egypt, 
or ‘ustaz / ustaza,’ (mister or miss) or simply calling them by their first names 
and enta (you).  
Identification Frame: Analyzing the terms used for introduction leads to 
studying how the bloggers are framed in terms of their identity; whether they 
are framed as bloggers, activists, party members, victims, martyrs, defendants, 
alternative media or a mixture of those. When the article identifies the blogger 
as a member or a spokesperson of the April 6th movement they would be 
considered being framed as an activist not a party member as they belonged to 
a youth movement not an official party.  
Representation Frame: This frame looks to see whether the bloggers are 
asked about their personal opinion or if the question is framed to ask the 
blogger about the street’s, the revolutionary youth’s or the general public’s 
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opinion. The presenter sometimes asked bloggers hosted to predict or reflect 
the reactions of the ‘street.’ Although this might be a problematic wording as 
there are several ‘streets’ in any given social and economic context, the ‘street’ 
frame reflects the wording the presenter uses to address the question to the 
blogger. This is indicative of the weight given to their opinion and how big a 
segment they are framed to represent. This further shows whether they are 
framed as an elite group or a group representing the revolution or the 
population. A further Representation Frame of Out of Context was added to 
indicate instances where the bloggers were not hosted or quoted in their 
capacity as bloggers or activists but on a separate activity and the issue 
discussed is irrelevant to the political activism studied. 
Analytical Frame: This is used to see whether the bloggers are framed as 
eyewitnesses or as political analysts. This means looking at whether the writer 
or presenter asks or quotes the bloggers on their analysis of the situation and 
what they predict for the future of the situation discussed or about only the 
events that took place. A further Analytical Frame of Out of Context was also 
added. When the blogger was interviewed as a political analyst but was also 
asked about events they were an eyewitness to, the Political Analyst frame 
overrides the eyewitness one as analysts are often asked about events they 
partook in but normal eyewitness are not often asked about their analysis of the 
situation or predictions for the future. 
Framing as criminals, defendants heroes or victims: This frame is used to 
see what the media chooses to highlight; their roles in demonstrations before 
and after January 25th and what they stand for, the risks they have taken and 
hardships they go through for their causes and their successes or whether the 
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media highlights how they disrupted peace, blocked traffic and contributed in 
the downfall of the economy and the lack of security. If the presenter or writer 
is neutral about their charges and simply portrays them as charged without 
showing signs of them being wronged or being truly criminal, then the framing 
is categorized as defendants. 
The Familiarity Frame: While the use of the person’s first name and a simple 
‘you’ would be common among strangers in some cultures, it is rather 
uncommon for strangers in professional context and in the public space in 
Egypt. Therefore, dropping titles and addressing by the familiar enta is hence 
indicative of the familiarity between the presenter and the blogger. 
Often not all of those five frames were applicable to the given segment 
or article, and in that case, the frames were referred to as N/A. This includes, 
for instance, times where the blogger is mentioned but not quoted or 
interviewed and so is not under any Representation or Analytical Frame.  
The line between the Victim and the Hero frames is very thin because 
bloggers are often framed as both, victims and heroes who have withstood 
injustice and prosecution for their cause. However, only when their heroism is 
clearly discussed or spelled out, they were categorized as victims. In the case 
where their strength, resilience or achievements are mentioned equally 
alongside their detention or injuries, they were categorized as both. In case 
where their heroism was the aspect most focused on, then the framing moved 
to Hero and not Victim. 
In some instances, none of those frames applied because the reference 
was too general, the segment or mention was too short to analyze or because it 
was not applicable. Those were disregarded from the framing analysis. 
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Web content analysis 
The quantitative web content analysis was performed after the mainstream 
media analysis was conducted. The prominent blogs studied in this research 
were run by bloggers who were covered by the mainstream media, as indicated 
by the quantitative content analysis of these shows and newspapers. The other 
blogs studied, however, were chosen by convenience sampling of available and 
accessible, non-prominent bloggers. 
 The quantitative online content analysis was conducted on blogs in the 
same periods as print media, October 2010 and October 2011, to track the 
changes in the frequency and length of posts, number of links they carry to 
other blogs, the issues discussed and number of advertisements posted, if 
existent, three months immediately before the revolution compared to eight 
months immediately following it. These were also the months leading up to the 
2010 and 2011 parliamentary elections that took place in November 2010 and 
2011. The results were then compared between prominent and less prominent 
blogs. 
The frequency and length of the posts were compared in the same 
months chosen for all the content analysis, October 2010 and October 2011, 
but the number of advertisements on the websites cannot be tracked back, and 
so were only studied in the present. During the blogs’ content analysis, when 
the blogs had no posts in October of 2010 or 2011, November was studied 
instead if available, if not, then posts of months available in both 2010 and 
2011 were studied. The relevance between sources of revenue and 
advertisements to the frequency and length of posts and issues covered was 
determined through asking the bloggers themselves when their blogs started 
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carrying advertisements or when they started looking for revenue streams off 
their blogging and how this helps or hinders the frequency or length of their 
posts. 
The blogs, Twitter and Facebook statistics in each blogger profile were 
all updated until February 2015, so they might have changed afterwards. It is 
important to note that Facebook only shows a select number of notes for each 
user and therefore the first Facebook note showing for each person might not 
actually be the first note the author created.  
 The data gathered from mainstream media analysis was compared against 
the data found from the quantitative web content analysis and then from 
interviews to see how the media reactions affected different blogs’ content, as 
well as bloggers’ own awareness of those factors.  
3.3.2. Interviews with bloggers, marketing executives and media 
professionals 
For the selection of bloggers, I used modal instance sampling, under purposive 
sampling, to interview the bloggers quoted or hosted most in the media, as per 
the quantitative content analysis. This was done to be able to identify 
prominent bloggers the media covers and then compare them to non-prominent 
ones who were not featured in the media. Purposive sampling is useful when a 
targeted sample needs to be reached quickly and sampling for proportionality is 
not of primary concern, (Trochim, 2006, chapter 4). I opted for purposive 
sampling to reach the most popular bloggers and because it is hard to get hold 
of the population of political bloggers in Egypt.  
 As for sampling marketing executives and media professionals for 
interviews, I used convenience and expert sampling because I am not looking 
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to generalize the attitudes of marketeers or media professionals interviewed on 
the whole population. I am only drawing insight to assess changing attitudes’ 
implications on the plurality of the public discourse, which is the primary 
question. “Expert sampling involves the assembling of a sample of persons 
with known or demonstrable experience and expertise in some area. Often we 
convene such a sample under the auspices of a ‘panel of experts,’” (Trochim, 
2006, chapter 4). 
 Furthermore, I used non-heterogeneity sampling in that I used non-
political bloggers to ensure diversity in the sample interviewed to provide a 
point of comparison and get a well-rounded image. 
Bloggers  
 
The interviews with the 6 prominent and 6 less-prominent bloggers aim to 
determine the changes they have lived between 2011 and 2014, their 
backgrounds, the difficulties they perceive as bloggers, how sustainable they 
perceive their activity is, as well as how conscious or unconscious they are of 
revenue generation possibilities and how all of this compare between the two 
categories of bloggers. The filtering criteria I used for choosing those bloggers 
are that they should be bloggers blogging or tweeting on current affairs in 
Egypt, excluding party-backed bloggers. They should have also been 
maintaining a blog before January 25th, 2011.  
 The interviews with bloggers, who mostly do not have an office, were 
conducted in the time and place of their choosing for their convenience, and to 
be in their comfort zone. The topics covered were explained before setting the 
interview so they can choose the time and place accordingly and to avoid 
unpleasant surprises. Times slotted for each blogger were 90 minutes. During 
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the interview, there was a laptop to be able to navigate through the relevant 
blog to allow bloggers to comment on advertisements, advertisements 
placement, frequency and length of blogging and the particular posts they were 
asked about. While questions relating to their beliefs, priorities and nagging 
issues in the Egyptian context were asked without referring to the blogs 
themselves at first, they were followed by follow-up questions referring and 
demonstrating on the bloggers’ own blogs and posts. This helped probe 
bloggers without hindering or biasing their responses at first. 
Bloggers’ prominence and non-prominence was initially determined 
based on their social media popularity, although the initial list of bloggers to be 
contacted was based on both social media popularity as well as their media 
appearances during the periods studied. The more the research went on, 
however, the harder it became to differentiate between prominent and less 
prominent bloggers. The fieldwork has shown that because this research only 
studied a specific period of time, some bloggers who are most prominent in 
terms of popularity on social media did not appear in the mainstream media 
during periods studied but had several other media appearances during other 
times as interviews showed. An example of this is one of the first bloggers, 
Amr Ezzat, who has 176,000 followers on Twitter but was never featured in 
the media in the periods studied. On the other hand, a blogger like Bassem 
Fathy who only has 40,500 followers on Twitter, compared to 1.39 million 
followers in the case of Wael Ghoneim, happened to appear on the media twice 
during the period studied. Given his popularity as measured here, he is not 
considered among the prominent bloggers. However, his media appearances 
did make him seem prominent. When I interviewed him, Fathy expressed 
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surprise at having appeared twice in the media during the period studied as he 
explained he kept a low profile and limited his appearances.  
With the exception of Fathy and Ezzat, the popularity of bloggers 
interviewed on social media seemed consistent with the number of times the 
media hosted them during the period studied. These two variances were 
therefore attributed to the time limitation of the research, and were rectified 
through their re-categorization and the interviews. Fathy was categorized as a 
less-prominent blogger in the analysis, despite appearing twice in the media. 
Meanwhile, Ezzat, who did not appear in the media studied in the period of the 
research, was considered a prominent blogger in the analysis.  
The primary determinant of prominence throughout the study was the 
blogger’s social media popularity. The threshold of 100,000 followers, held 
good for 15 out of the possible 19 bloggers who were covered at least twice by 
the media during the period studied and applied to every prominent blogger 
interviewed. The popularity of the blogger here is then considered the 
independent variable and their media coverage the dependent one, by which 
one can assess how their social media popularity correlates with their media 
appearances. 
Because less-prominent bloggers are, by definition, not famous, they 
were harder to get a hold of. With the exception of Bassem Fathy, who was 
covered in the media during the period studied, the other less-prominent 
bloggers interviewed were reached through research, personal networks and 
asking the more prominent bloggers to recommend names to be interviewed. 
Another issue faced during the research arose in relation to Esraa Abdel 
Fattah who never had a blog, despite having been very active on social media 
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and being one of the two people behind the online calls for general strikes in 
2008. She was, however, categorized as a prominent blogger because she was 
one of the first Egyptian micro-bloggers to utilize Facebook for writing notes 
and was always active on Facebook and Twitter, having a large followership in 
both. She was dubbed the Facebook Girl in 2008 and received wide local and 
international attention as one of Egypt’s most prominent online activists. She 
was hence considered a micro-blogger for the purposes of this research. 
It is also important to note that Ali Hisham, a less-prominent 18-year-
old blogger, was studied to compare between older bloggers and younger ones. 
This was done because interviews have shown that the first wave of Egyptian 
bloggers, the founding generation of the Egyptian blogosphere, have become 
focused on things like career and livelihoods as they grew older. 
A few issues arose trying to get access to the bloggers interviewed. 
Although the initial plan was to interview bloggers after media and marketing 
professionals, their interviews had to be held in June, before media and 
marketing professionals’ interviews, because at the time many of them were 
getting detained. Out of 20 possible bloggers to interview, four were in prison 
and one was abroad in fear for his security at the time of fieldwork and after 
the interview was conducted, Esraa Abdel Fattah was put on a travel ban. Some 
bloggers were also reluctant to speak at a time where some media outlets were 
attacking them.  
Marketeers and media professionals 
 
I conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with three marketing 
executives from an advertising and marketing agency, an online advertising 
agency and a beauty brand to determine changes to their marketing activities to 
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reflect the growing use of social media. This is important to assess whether 
there is a demand for marketeers to sponsor or advertise on blogs. It is also 
important to analyze the criteria they might use for cooperating with bloggers 
and how they feel towards cooperating with prominent bloggers compared to 
less prominent or non-political bloggers. 
 I also conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with five media 
professionals from broadcast and print backgrounds to study the influence of 
bloggers and Tweeps on setting the agenda. Those media professionals are 
from managerial positions in the shows and newspapers I conducted the 
content analysis on. 
 The interviews with media professionals and marketeers were conducted 
in their offices, when possible, for convenience, and at the times they set. The 
relevant findings from the analysis of their newspapers or shows were present 
in the interview for probing on interesting findings. Time slotted for each 
interview was 60 minutes. 
3.4. Reflecting on the Ethical Dimension of Interviewing Opposition 
Figures  
Researching figures of opposition in an authoritarian country carries with it 
various connotations on the security and safety of the subjects in question. It 
also carries with it responsibility in maintaining the integrity of the research 
and the desire to represent all facts and data collected, all the while 
safeguarding the interviewees against possible harm. The interviewees were all 
adults and all aware that this research would be made public and so, 
consequently, anything they tell me. I, however, still had to weigh the benefits 
of publishing certain facts against the risks that this would pose on the 
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interviewees — despite their knowledge and consent — given the changes that 
happened to the Egyptian blogosphere and the dynamics of its relationship with 
the public realm and so, ultimately, the authorities. 
Despite the measures taken in informing all my interviewees that 
everything said during the interview will be used for the academic purposes of 
this research there were several ethical considerations to reflect upon in 
deciding, not only whom to interview, but also what to include in the findings. 
The Association of Internet Researchers’ (AoIR) report on “Ethical 
Decision Making and Internet research” advises that the greater the 
vulnerability of the subject studied, the greater the obligation of the research to 
protect them (Markham and Buchanan, 2012). My subjects were not in 
particular a vulnerable segment in the traditional sense, but their identities as 
opposition figures in the Egyptian context made them vulnerable to state 
crackdowns or character assassinations by a media that is directed in most 
cases. 
 The first ethical issue faced was the fact that my list of potential 
interviewees included several bloggers who were either in prison or 
undergoing trials. Although the authorities had several of my sources under 
scrutiny before I began this research, bundling those with other names the 
authorities are not necessarily aware of or familiar with might shed light on the 
lesser-known ones. So although my subjects are all operating in the public 
realm of the internet, at least, if not the mainstream in the cases of the more 
prominent ones, as the AoIR puts it, “data aggregators or search tools make 
information accessible to a wider public than what might have been originally 
intended,” (Markham and Buchanan, 2012). So while the less-prominent 
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bloggers may have been public and accessible online only, the research would 
make them public and accessible in other platforms that might attract more 
attention to them and thus possibly putting them at risk. The impact each 
blogger interviewed had on the political street and his popularity, however, was 
made clear in the chapter discussing their backgrounds. This means that the 
research made it clear that the lesser-known bloggers — who might not have 
been under authorities’ radar despite having publicly accessible blogs and 
social media profiles — were not of huge influence, which would make them 
far less important to the authorities. 
 The second ethical dilemma was including quotes the interviewees told 
me on the record that could potentially cause them harm, but that were 
interesting to include. Although the sources had given me prior permission to 
include everything said during the interviews, they often drifted off in the 
middle of conversation, saying information and giving quotes that might 
subject them to state crackdowns. At times as well the bloggers told me 
inappropriate or personal details about other bloggers I was interviewing in the 
midst of our long conversations. I have made a conscious decision to remind 
them on the spot that they were on record and that this research would be made 
public as I believed that they might get carried away, saying things they would 
later realize might harm them. In many cases what they had said was 
interesting to include, but would cause them serious harm and would not be of 
potential significance and its exclusion would not hinder the conclusions 
driven from fieldwork. In those cases I found that the rights of the subject not 
to be harmed outweigh the benefits those specific quotes would add to the 
research, (Markham and Buchanan, 2012). In the seldom cases when the 
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information given was of significant importance to the research, I opted to 
include the data without using the specific quote of the said blogger to avoid 
putting them at risk. 
 Finally, I had to deliberate on the authorities possibly using my 
research, or myself, as sources to pry on my subjects. It is important to 
remember, however, that English-language content is often of less importance 
to the authorities as it reaches a narrower audience, as discussed in the findings 
and background chapters (4, 5 and 6). The authorities have been known to give 
English media more freedom as they know the impact it has is limited to an 
English-speaking audience and so do not monitor as thoroughly as they do 
Arabic media. This means that research published in English is not as 
accessible, nor as interesting, to the authorities as that published in Arabic. The 
personal data I have included on each blogger’s background was often either 
not sensitive information, or information easily found online; sensitivity of 





















Chapter IV: Contextualizing the Egyptian Media 
Landscape 
 
This chapter contextualizes the research in light of a pivotal period in Egypt’s 
political and media life and that is the period between 2006 and 2010. Through 
studying the political and media scene around that period, we can see that it 
marked a changing political life in the country, but also a changing media 
scene and the emergence of a stronger, more influential blogosphere. 
4.1. A turning point  
 
The period from 2006 to 2010, right before the uprising, is significant in the 
political and media scenes in Egypt. The period saw the start of public 
mobilization that led to the 2011 uprising and the emergence of various 
political movements that had influence on the street and ultimately played 
significant roles in the 2011 uprising. It was also a significant period in terms 
of the changing degree of freedom in the media, the new media platforms 
emerging as well as the state’s reaction to the changing media direction.  
 Under the Emergency Law, which was instated from 1967 to 1980 and 
then again in 1981, the state had various unconstitutional rights in the name of 
fighting terrorism. The law gave the state the right to arrest anyone without 
directing any immediate charges, but also the right to arrest anyone for 
protesting as public gatherings were not allowed. The year 2010, for instance, 
marked the massacre of nine church goers on the eve of the Coptic Christmas 
in Nag’ Hammadi, Upper Egypt, as well as suicide bombing of a church in 
Alexandria, leading to the death of 21 people. Both events led the state to claim 
more rights under the Emergency Law and their fight against terrorism. But for 
over 10 years before 2006, protests were very limited and quickly dispersed. 
But since the formation of the Kefaya (Enough) movement in 2004, protests 
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were brought back to the political map, (Springborg, 2009). The movement 
was called Enough to reflect its calls for an end to the Emergency law, 
Mubarak’s rule of 23 years, corruption and rigged elections. They were also 
known to raise awareness and gather strong opposition against possible plans 
by Mubarak to instate his son, Gamal, as the next president Although the 
movement was formed in 2004, it was not until 2005 and 2006 that it began 
gaining momentum as it called for protests against a constitutional referendum 
and the rigged results of the parliamentary elections. The constitutional 
referendum was on a change to Article 76 of the constitution to allow for the 
first direct, multi-candidate presidential elections. Before 2005, the parliament 
would decide on a presidential candidate who would then be approved or 
rejected by the people through a referendum. Kefaya, however, was calling for 
an end to the emergency law before holding any elections. It is important to 
note that the year 2005 marked two elections; presidential and parliamentary, 
which was an unusual coincidence since the former is held every six years and 
the latter every five. This led to an exceptionally increased political activity, 
especially towards the end of the year. The presidential elections of 2005 – 
where the Muslim Brotherhood was not allowed to run and neither was 
prominent politician Talaat El Sadat and no international monitors were 
allowed – brought about a wave of protests. Protestors called the results rigged 
as Mubarak allegedly won 88.6% of the votes and candidate Ayman Nour of 
Al -Ghad (Tomorrow) Party called for a re-run. By the end of 2005, Kefaya 
had become known in the political scene for its success in mobilizing relatively 
small numbers – the media had then estimated protests to have gathered 10,000 
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at most. But 2005 also marked the Egyptian Judge’s Club protests against the 
rigging of elections; a move that was unheard of in post-1952 Egypt. 
 In 2006, as Mubarak carried out a neo-liberal economic plan to 
privatize the public-sector factories, a wave of protests were held by the 
workers in the city of El Mahalla El Kobra, a major industrial city, leading to 
clashes with the police. Workers were calling for an end to the ongoing 
privatization, minimum wage and overall better conditions. This was the re-
birth of the workers’ movement in Egypt, which was stagnant for decades. It 
was also a call to put an end to the deteriorating workers’ conditions and 
instating a decent minimum wage because, despite the inflation rates and 
general economic indicators improving in 2006, distribution of wealth 
continued deteriorating. The year 2006 also marked the Salam Ferry disaster 
where an estimated 1,000 passengers and crewmembers were killed when the 
ferry sank in the Red Sea due to the boat’s unfit condition and the negligence 
of Egyptian authorities to act quickly or ensure the safety of the ship. The 
ship’s owners also reportedly ordered the captain to continue the trip despite 
him asking for permission to return to the port as fire broke out. Private media 
launched a campaign discussing the negligence of relevant authorities and 
possible corruption that led to the death of 1,000 Egyptians. The owners were 
acquitted in the first trial, held in 2008, but after wide public anger, the owner 
was sentenced to seven years in prison in a later hearing in 2009. 
 Soon after, the April 6th movement was formed in 2008 and many 
former members of Kefaya and supporters of Nour joined it. The first major 
activity of the movement was to form a Facebook group supporting El Mahalla 
El Kobra workers in their strikes, calling for a general strike on April 6th, 2008. 
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The movement has subsequently called for several strikes and protests, 
including those in the 2011 uprising.  
But the protests were quickly and violently dispersed by tactics 
Springborg calls unique to Egypt (2009:11), namely the use of plain-clothed 
men to arrest, harass and beat protestors. The plain clothes mean the media 
cannot document the violations against harassers and the protestors cannot 
foresee the crackdowns.  
Although quick to disperse protests, Springborg (2009:7) points out that 
as hybrid states – those carrying aspects of both democratic and authoritarian 
regimes – normally do, the state separates between political action and political 
expression; allowing the latter and prohibiting the former. The state did not 
believe the written word could have direct impact on the political life and so 
allowed for a degree of freedom in the press that was still restrictive, but 
unprecedented since 1952. In fact, by 2009 Freedom House had upgraded 
Egypt’s status from “Not Free” to “Partly Free” due to the efforts of Egyptian 
journalists and newly-launched media platforms as well as the blogosphere to 
cross red lines, despite harassment and imprisonment of journalists, 
(Mohamed, 2010).  
In fact, up until the launch of newspapers like Al-Masry Al-Youm and 
Al-Shorouk, the press was categorized, in the minds of officials and the public, 
as either “national” press, such as Al-Ahram, or “opposition” press. Since late 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the press, independent, credible 
press was unheard of until the introduction of Al-Masry Al-Youm in 2004, 
followed by Al-Shorouk and the online newspaper Youm7 in 2009, which was 
later turned into a daily, printed newspaper. The rise of independent 
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newspapers, blogger Baheyya argues, pushed the boundaries of journalism and 
challenged state’s oppression, introducing a new breed of journalism to a 
largely stagnant media scene (quoted in Sakr, 2013, p.22). 
Although the new media platforms, both online and offline, were able 
to cross some previous red lines and provide more credible and unbiased 
coverage of the political scene, their freedom was quickly stifled in 2010. As 
the 2011 report on media coverage of the elections by the Cairo Institute for 
Human Rights Studies shows, the private media – which the report said 
balanced the official media bias in elections coverage – faced a state 
crackdown right before and during the elections. The report stated, “In the run-
up to the elections, several blows were directed at media and media 
professionals, which in the space of four weeks led to an almost complete 
restructuring of media freedoms in Egypt. The campaign spread a climate of 
fear and anxiety and fostered self-censorship among media professionals, 
which was further sharpened by subsequent measures,” (2011). A month 
before the parliamentary elections of 2010, the National Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority instated a rule that prevented private media from sending 
text messages to their readers to follow the news without prior licences from 
the Ministry of Information and the Supreme Press Council. The ministry also 
suspended licenses of 17 channels stating they incited hatred and strife and 
carried out several crackdowns on specific journalists known to be critical of 
the regime. The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies report also cited 
various threats, both official and unofficial, made to newspapers and channels 
during these periods. 
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Crackdown on media platforms continued after January 25th, 2011. 
Sakr argues that “threats to free speech in Egypt not only persisted but 
intensified after the uprising,” (2013, p.3). This crackdown continued strongly 
under SCAF and the freedom the press enjoyed shortly after the uprising was 
“short-lived” as Sakr (2013, p.6) describes it. After January 25th, the state shut 
down several channels, filed lawsuits – often in military courts – against 
several journalists and their media platforms and arrested several reporters. 
4.2. Media landscape and plurality 
 
The media outlets chosen for the purpose of this study represent the different 
types of media platforms in Egypt and embody the Egyptian media landscape 
in terms of its limited diversity and the controls, biases and pressures it 
undergoes. And so in studying each of those five media outlets — three 
newspapers and two talk shows on different television channels — one can 
envision the limited plurality in the Egyptian media map. 
 The next section demonstrates how, as Ali Mohamed puts it, “the 
Arabic media is caught between the hammer of government and the anvil of 
professional responsibility” (2010). He argues that Arab regimes dominate the 
media through ownership, approving licences, appointing editors and using the 
media to promote their policies. At the same time, Mohamed argues, the public 
expects the media to undertake the responsibility to reveal corruption, defend 
human rights, and champion their interests and concerns. 
 It is important to note that circulation figures were intentionally 
excluded from this research as such data is often problematic in Egypt due to 
the lack of an independent body to monitor or regulate the figures and so they 
normally depend solely on the figures the publications provide. Two other 
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factors skew those figures; the fact that a copy of the newspaper is often read 
by more than one person and the number of free copies provided to institutions, 




One of the three main state-dominated daily newspapers in Egypt, the other 
two being Al Akhbar and Al Gomhoureya, Al-Ahram was founded in 1875 is 
the second oldest newspaper in Egypt. Although originally founded by 
Lebanese brothers Beshara and Saleem Takla and functioned as independent 
newspapers, Al-Ahram, like other private newspapers, was nationalized by 
Nasser in 1960. The newspaper, like all state press in Egypt, is controlled by 
the state, which directly appoints its editors. It is widely circulated but its 
popularity had been dwindling especially during 2010 as its pro-government 
stand became stronger and more obvious. The introduction of new independent 
newspapers like Al-Shorouk and Al-Masry Al-Youm also decreased Al-Ahram’s 
popularity and added to the credibility crisis it was facing as the readers had 
access to more credible and objective news and analysis sources.  
Al-Ahram faced a major credibility scandal when they published a 
photoshopped picture of Mubarak heading a group of presidents in 2010. 
Shortly after its publishing, blogger Wael Khalil published the original photo 
where Mubarak was at the back of the group and exposed Al-Ahram.  During 
the 2011 uprising, the newspaper was largely pro-regime and attempted to 
undermine the size of the protests. The newspaper even claimed that those in 
Tahrir Square were in support of Mubarak (Sakr, 2013, p.1). The biased 
reporting, however, only lasted until February 11th, the day Mubarak 
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announced resigning his post. After this date, the editorial policy took a sharp 
turn, becoming supportive of the uprising and critical of the previous regime. 
The newspaper, however, remained supportive of the then-ruling SCAF, 
suggesting it was supportive of whichever regime in rule, with the exception of 
that of the Brotherhood. This exception, however, could be explained by the 
fact that although the military rule remained in control of various institutions 
and bodies inside the state, including the media, the Brotherhood’s regime had 
not yet infiltrated institutions on the micro-level and so had not been able to 
co-opt or coerce the media. Despite the Brotherhood regime appointing several 
new Islamist-leaning newspapers editors in August 2012, this attempt to 
control the press did not strongly reflect on the editorial policies of most 
newspapers, which remained largely opposed to their regime.  
While Al-Gomhoureya and Al-Akhbar are two of the oldest newspapers 
in Egypt, established in 1954 and 1952 respectively, and, like Al-Ahram, state 
publications, their popularity is not comparable to that of Al-Ahram. Much like 
Al-Ahram, the two newspapers are largely government mouthpieces. Not only 
does Al-Ahram have better access to government sources and so normally have 
exclusive news that the other two newspapers do not, it is also more of an 
educational press institution than the other two. Al-Ahram, with its various 
affiliated publications, often runs training programs and was considered a 
learning institution that many now-established journalists trained and gained 
experience from. It is worth mentioning that Al-Gomhoureya was once the 
leading newspaper of the 1952 military regime before Al-Ahram replaced it. 
 
4.2.2. Al-Masry Al-Youm 
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Al-Masry Al-Youm was launched in 2004 and was the first independent 
newspaper to provide credible and unbiased coverage after the scene was 
dominated by partisan or official newspapers only. The newspaper was 
launched in 2004 by three businessmen; Salah Diab, former National 
Democratic Party member Ahmed Bahgat and the liberal Naguib Sawiris. It 
quickly grew to become a credible news source, competing with the long-
established Al-Ahram as an alternative, more objective news source. 
Newcomers came to the picture almost five years later, including the daily 
independent Al-Shorouk, which launched in 2009, and the online Youm7, 
launching in the same year.  
A 2012 Oxford Business Group Report indicates that independent 
newspapers like Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Shorouk as well as online 
newspaper Youm7 were gaining more popularity in the years leading up to and 
after January 25th, especially online.  
Each newspaper, however, represented different content and targeted a 
different audience. While Al-Masry Al-Youm was perceived as targeting the 
average Egyptian, with a mix of hard news and editorials, Al-Shorouk was 
perceived as targeting a more elite reader. Al-Shorouk was known for its 
credibility and unbiased, professional reporting, but was also renowned for a 
selection of trusted and highly regarded columnists from intellectual circles 
that other newspapers did not have; including novelist Alaa Al Aswany and 
renowned veteran journalist Hamdy Qandil. Youm7 was largely different in the 
content it provided because it was an online platform that provided largely hard 
news and used simpler language than Al-Shorouk and Al-Masry Al-Youm. In 
competition with Al-Masry Al-Youm as well was the older Al-Dostour 
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newspaper, which was launched in 1995 and was known to be outspokenly 
critical of the regime. Al-Dostour’s editorial style, however, was often 
criticized because it often lacked objectivity and would use a sensational style 
of writing to draw readers in. Al-Dostour’s fierce attacks on the regime and 
outspokenness caused the newspaper several issues, the most famous of which 
was the dismissal of its editor, Ibrahim Eissa, in 2010. 
 
4.2.3. The Daily News Egypt (DNE) 
 
The DNE was launched in 2005 by the International Herald Tribune and then 
again in 2012 by Business News for Press, Publishing and Distribution under a 
different editorial team. The DNE management announced they had to shut 
their operations down due to the declining advertising revenue, something 
several newspapers and magazines reported during that period. The DNE 
represents a niche market for English readers and was preceded by several 
other independent English dailies, weeklies and monthlies, but none as popular 
as the DNE, with the exception of the state-owned Al-Ahram Weekly. The DNE 
enjoyed credibility among its readers but its circulation was limited to English-
speaking readers, foreigners living in Egypt and expatriates as they updated 
their website with the content daily so were an accessible source for Egyptians 
abroad. It was also a source of credible news for researchers on Egyptian 
affairs as it had an accessible archive that covered all its issues since 2005 until 
2012. The archive, however, was taken offline under the new management.  
The newspaper, like many of its counter-parts, enjoyed a degree of 
freedom that other Arabic newspapers did not because the state knew its 
circulation was limited to the niche. Even the state-owned Al-Ahram Weekly 
seemed to enjoy far more editorial freedom than the Arabic Al-Ahram or other 
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Arabic-language publications under the same establishments. The content the 
DNE presents, however, is different than that of Al-Ahram Weekly because 
while DNE specializes primarily in news, Al-Ahram Weekly publishes more 
features and softer news due to the fact that it is only published weekly, as 
opposed to the DNE which publishes both online and in print on daily basis. 
Before DNE there had been several similar newspapers, including Cairo Times 
and The Middle East Times.  
4.2.4. Ten PM  
 
Ten PM was hosted by Mona El Shazly from its launch in 2006 until 2012 but 
was taken over by Wael El Ibrashy in November 2012 when El Shazly left for 
MBC Masr. The show ran on satellite channel Dream TV, the first private 
satellite channel to be launched in Egypt in 2001. Dream TV is funded by 
businessman and former National Democratic Party  (NDP) member Ahmed 
Bahgat and was known to be largely pro-state although El Shazly was known 
to be reservedly critical of the regime. 
Although Ten PM was one of the oldest political talk shows, before it 
were two popular talk shows, the oldest and first of its kind being Al-Qahira 
Al-Youm (Cairo Today), which ran since 2000 and the other being El Beit 
Beitak, launching in 2004 on state television. Cairo Today came as a 
revolutionary concept to the Egyptian media and aired on the satellite channel 
Orbit, presented by the fiery, outspoken Amr Adib. Adib’s casual style, 
directness and openness in handling political issues were new to the reserved 
media scene in Egypt and his style quickly gathered massive popularity for the 
show. The show, however, was suspended in 2010 and its host, Adib, claimed 
that the show was not suspended due to the alleged outstanding debts, but 
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rather due to political reasons, especially that the program was willing to pay 
its debts but the state-owned Media Production City – where satellite channels 
air and most studios are – refused. Soon after the 2011 uprising, however, the 
show started re-airing and it remains one of the most popular evening talk 
shows in the region. 
El Beit Beitak came as a response to a change that was taking place on 
satellite channels, forcing state television to liven up their broadcasting to be 
able to compete. El Beit Beitak tried to compete with the popular Cairo Today 
but due to the limited freedom the hosts were given, its editorial voice was 
never as strong as the satellite channels’ talk shows. It ended up going off air a 
few months after the uprising as its main presenters, Mahmoud Saad, Khairy 
Ramadan and Tamer Amin, quit and moved to satellite channels.  
 
4.2.5. Baladna Bel Masry (Our Country in Egyptian Dialect) 
One of the most popular political evening talk shows, Baladna Bel Masry was 
launched in 2009 and ran on ONTV, a satellite channel funded by liberal 
businessman and founder of Al Masreyin Al Ahrar Party, Naguib Sawiris. The 
show was initially co-hosted by Reem Magued and journalist and Al-Dostour 
editor Ibrahim Eissa, who was known to be critical of the Mubarak regime. 
Before the 2010 elections, however, Eissa was removed from ONTV and the 
show and the channel’s owner, businessman Naguib Sawiris, claimed it was 
due to problems with the advertisers over Eissa. Magued declined to renew her 
contract with the channel after June 30th, 2013 – when the Brotherhood regime 
was ousted – for what she called “editorial differences.” 
OTV, which later became known as ONTV, enjoyed the most freedom 
in its coverage and was the most critical of the regime. It also hosted some of 
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the most critical talk show presenters, including Magued and Yousry Fouda. 
Baladna Bel Masry was known to be critical of the regime and showed obvious 
support of the protests and the causes of the uprising from the early days, 
unlike several other shows that only showed their support after Mubarak 
stepped down. One of the show’s most popular episodes was aired in March, 
2011 when she hosted then-prime minister Ahmed Shafik, novelist Alaa El 
Aswany and the renowned journalist Hamdy Qandil. The debate between 
Shafik and Aswany got heated and ended with Shafik resigning his post a few 
hours after the episode was aired. Magued was also summoned in May of that 
year to the hearing in a military trial where blogger Hossam El Hamalawy was 
accused of spreading lies during one of the Baladna Bel Masry’s episodes. 
 
4.3. Opinionated journalism  
 
The Egyptian blogosphere has had a strong status in the Arab world since 2004 
when the Kefaya movement established cyberspace platforms for opposition 
voices (Taki, 2010). In its early days, the blogosphere was a space for freedom 
of expression, opposition of the regime and coverage of issues that the 
mainstream media ignored, not only political issues, but taboo ones like 
homosexuality and atheism.  
The Egyptian blogosphere was diverse in content and the voices it 
represented and divided into several categories; April 6th movement, Kefaya 
movement, Muslim Brotherhood, professional journalists, online activists, 
politically-oriented bloggers, citizen journalists, religiously-oriented bloggers 
and a small segment of personal blogs. The blogosphere also included Marxist 
bloggers like Hossam El Hamalawy as well as Islamists like Abdel Moneim 
Mahmoud. Several of the most prominent bloggers were a mixture of those 
El	Sayed,					128	
above-mentioned categories or went back and forth between one category and 
the other. 
The Egyptian blogosphere was not always that diversified.  When it first 
emerged in 1999, it was composed of mailing groups and only a handful of 
them. But later on, the Muslim Brotherhood found it a useful space for 
dissidence and by 2005 many members were blogging their opinions and take 
on news, which they could not do in conventional media. Members of the 
Kefaya and April 6th opposition movements were also blogging heavily and 
acting as citizen journalists and online activists, spreading videos on police 
violence and calling for action. First-wave bloggers, or those who established 
the Egyptian blogosphere, included leftist bloggers like Wael Abbas, Alaa 
Abdel Fattah, El Hamalawy and Malek Mostafa, Islamist bloggers like 
Mahmoud as well as former Brotherhood members like Amr Ezzat and 
Mostafa El Naggar. Right-leaning, non-Islamist, liberal first wave bloggers 
were far fewer than leftists and Islamists and the most known of those was 
Mahmoud Salem, who is known as Sandmonkey. In 2006 bloggers started 
gaining some media attention, not as individuals, but as a phenomenon as they 
started covering incidents mainstream media neglected, including graphic 
police brutality footage. That year blogger Demagh MAK uploaded a graphic 
video of two police officers abusing minibus driver Imad Al-Kabir. It was soon 
picked up by other bloggers, including Wael Abbas and widely circulated and 
eventually, in 2007 the officers were sentenced to three years in jail 
(Isherwood, 2008). A few months later, blogger Malek Mostafa uploaded 
footage of mass sexual harassment downtown during Eid, which was also 
widely circulated, eventually leading mainstream media to pick up the news. 
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Another turning point in the Egyptian blogosphere was in 2008 when online 
and offline activists as well as political bloggers and members of Kefaya, April 
6th and the Muslim Brotherhood collaborated their efforts both online and 
offline to call for labour strikes in opposition to minimum wages and 
privatization. By 2008, 160,000 of the 490,000 blogs in the Middle East were 
Egyptian, (Abdallah, 2011, p.23). 
Unlike Western blogospheres, the Egyptian one was largely dominated by 
politics, current affairs, religion and, to a lesser extent, personal issues. Some 
blogs were run by female bloggers speaking of their personal lives and tackling 
social norms that concern women while others discussed sensitive issues that 
the mainstream media shied away from; like homosexuality and atheism. A 
Bahaii, for instance, ran a blog about his religion and the struggles he faces in 
the Sunni-dominated Egypt. With a still young online advertising market in 
Egypt, marketeers and the private sector largely ignored the blogosphere for 
advertisements, product features or reviews. This means that, unlike 
blogospheres in the UK or the U.S. for instance, independent bloggers who 
were not funded by political parties were not able to generate revenues from 
their content. However, most political bloggers had full-time jobs and blogged 
as a hobby or part-time activity and so were not in dire need to generate 
income from blogging to sustain their activity.  
Although most bloggers stayed off the state’s radar before January 25th, 
some bloggers were prosecuted for posts they had written. Brotherhood 
blogger Abdel Moneim Mahmoud, for instance, was arrested in 2007 and 
Kareem Amer was arrested twice, once in 2005 and again in 2006. Amer was 
sentenced in 2007 to four years for posts deemed anti-Islamic and insulting to 
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Mubarak. Bloggers and activists, however, rallied behind both bloggers and 
although they were not successful in revoking Amer’s sentence, they were 
successful with Mahmoud.  
The relationship between the bloggers and the media at first was not a 
collaborative one. The media would use material shot or recorded by bloggers 
or citizen journalists mostly without any accreditation or reference to the 
bloggers, (Wael Abbas in Mohamed, 2010).  
Social media and blogs were used before January 25th to call for public 
mobilisation. This was seen in the calls for general strikes on April 6th over the 
years and to report on workers’ protests and strikes in 2007. But the impact it 
had on public mobilisation was limited to a few hundreds at most joining the 
protests. 
Before January 25th 2011, pictures of Khaled Said, a citizen who was 
arrested from an internet café and killed in June 2010, circulated widely. While 
the official autopsy claimed the official reason behind Said’s death was 
suffocating on a roll of narcotics he swallowed as he was getting arrested, the 
social media circulated a picture of his dead body that showed signs of 
violence. Online activists argued Said was brutally beaten and killed for having 
circulated videos of police violence. Micro-bloggers Wael Ghoneim and Abdel 
Rahman Mansour created a Facebook page titled Kolena Khaled Said (We are 
All Khaled Said), which raised awareness on his case and called for putting an 
end to police brutality. In less than two weeks after its launch, the page had 
gathered over half a million followers. On January 14th, the day former 
Tunisian Zine El Abeddine Ben Ali fell after the Tunisian uprising, the Khaled 
Said Facebook page made calls for nation-wide protests on January 25th, the 
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annual national holiday celebration of the police forces, to protest against 
torture, corruption, unemployment and injustice, collaborating with other 
activists on the ground. The calls spread online and offline and January 25th 
saw larger numbers than any protest that was called for online before. 
 
4.4. Conclusion and discussion  
 
Blogging is often defined as the unedited voice of a writer (Winer, 2003), and 
its definition often stresses the opinion angle of blogging. The Egyptian 
blogosphere, however, became popular, not for opinions offered on it, but 
rather for the facts and news it presented that were not presented elsewhere in 
mainstream media. People started turning to bloggers to know stories the 
media were not covering and hear the truth from people who were on the 
ground and were not as politicized as the popular media platforms. 
 The rising popularity of blogs came at a time when the state allowed a 
degree of freedom for the media but various of its popular platforms were used 
in the process of manufacturing consent (Herman and Chomsky, 1988) and 
ensuring the continuity of social order. In the process of achieving hegemony, 
the former regime miscalculated the importance of the increasingly popular 
alternative media platforms like blogs and social media as well as the growing 
popularity of independent media platforms.  
The state varied between coercing the media into submission and 
coopting it through the intertwining interests of its owners and the regime. 
Coercing the media came through the above-mentioned crackdowns on certain 
shows or presenters who crossed the red lines, which ultimately led to self-
censorship. Coopting some platforms, on the other hand, was easy to achieve 
because the main media owners in Egypt were either part of that political 
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historical bloc – as was the case with people like former NDP member and 
Dream TV owner Ahmed Bahgat – or had interests and investments that they 
needed to secure through staying on the good side of the state  – as was the 
case with people like ONTV owner Sawiris. This meant that the state didn’t 
always have to exert direct and obvious coercion and consent was often 
achieved willingly by media owners wishing to safeguard their investments.  
However, as Springborg argues, the state did not deem the word strong 
enough to stir political action (2009) and so it was during the period around 
2006 that the introduction of independent press and the blogosphere offered a 
degree of plurality to the discourse in Egypt. It was this sense of irrelevance on 
the ground that also allowed English-language publications a higher degree of 
freedom than other media outlets. The state knew the extent to which these 
platforms targeting a rather elite readership are able to influence and so 
allowed for a higher degree of political expression. This degree of plurality in 
the media, however, did not come close to what Mouffe (2000) stipulated for a 
revised Habermasian public sphere (1989) but the blogosphere offered a much 
closer version of a Habermasian public sphere than the mainstream media and 
institutions did at that time. The media did not operate independently from the 
state and corporate restraint, a key element in a Habermasian public sphere. 
This meant that the freedom the media was allowed since 2006 was quickly 
stifled in 2010 through direct state crackdowns as well as media owners 
themselves cracking down on their own journalists or presenters to safeguard 
their investments. The inclusivity required for the creation of a public sphere as 
per Habermas (1989) was also non-existent given how the state had power over 
appointing editors in state media. But the state also eliminated the inclusivity 
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factor given how it could indirectly control who can and cannot be heard 
through controlling the media, owners of the media as well as tools like 
broadcasting facilities at the Egyptian Media Production City. Voices that were 
strongly opposed then were excluded from this sphere.  
It is then apparent that the mainstream media in Egypt had close ties 
with political circles and was largely a significant part of the historical bloc 
that worked, more or less, towards achieving hegemony and maintaining social 
order. The ties between the media and the state institutions, however, ran much 
deeper than simple coercion or abiding by the regimes’ rules. This was obvious 
in how the media reacted to the toppling of Mubarak; media outlets that have 
always been known to support his regime were quick to turn against it once the 
army took over power. This is not because those media outlets suddenly 
changed editorial directions into more revolutionary-inclining agendas, it was 
rather because media institutions and the state’s institutions had deep ties on 
the micro, not just the macro, level and so the elements of the historical bloc 
ran deep and strong. This meant that some of the media platforms’ loyalty was 
not to the president or parliament in power, but rather to the institutions of the 
previous historical bloc – including the army –, which remained largely the 
dominating institutions in the country, despite changes in presidential or 









Chapter V: Media Findings: Image and coverage of 
bloggers before and after January 25th  
 
Quantitative and framing analysis was conducted on all October 2010 and 
October 2011 issues of three newspapers: the state-run Al-Ahram, the 
independent Al-Masry Al-Youm and the English-language The Daily News 
Egypt. Quantitative and framing analysis was also conducted on all November 
2010 and November 2011 episodes of two popular political talk shows: 
Baladna Bel Masry and Ten PM. The analysis served as a comparative study of 
media’s portrayal of bloggers in 2010 and in 2011.    
 When looking at findings from the Identity Frame applied, one needs to 
keep in mind that bloggers often also held other positions and performed 
several other activities they might deem more important than blogging. 
Prominent blogger Mostafa El Naggar, for instance, was also a parliament 
member while many other bloggers are prominent activists. Therefore, the 
writers, presenters and the bloggers themselves often prioritize their identities 
as activists, for instance, over their identities as bloggers. This holds especially 
true in more mainstream media outlets, like Ten PM, where the audience might 
be familiar with the term activist but not blogger.  




Codes used in print: 
 
Quoted: The article has a direct or a paraphrase of a quote by the blogger. 
Mentioned: The blogger’s name is simply mentioned in the middle of 
coverage that is not specific to his/her news. 
General Mention: The article generally discusses or mentions bloggers but 
does not refer to a specific one. 
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Full Coverage: The article is covering the news of a certain blogger. 
Headline: The blogger’s name appears in the headline. 
 
Pictured: The blogger’s picture is included in the article. 
 
Front Page: The coverage of the blogger is in the front page.  
 
Bloggers were only covered 9 times in the media studied for October 2010, 8 
of those times were in the DNE. 
They were covered 118 times in October 2011. Articles where bloggers 
were mentioned, quoted or featured most in print of October 2011 were 
covering Alaa Abdel Fattah’s arrest, Maikel Nabil’s detention, Asmaa 
Mahfouz winning a prize, Mina Daniel’s death and Esraa Abdel Fattah, Wael 
Ghoneim, Ahmed Maher and Mahfouz being possible nominees for Nobel 
Peace Prize. Star bloggers Esraa Abdel Fattah, Ghoneim, Maher and 
Mahfouz’s participation in a conference was also covered frequently.  
5.1.1.1. Al-Masry Al-Youm 
 
 
Table 5.1: Comparing Al-Masry Al-Youm’s coverage of bloggers in 2010 and 2011 
 
 
In October 2010, Al-Masry Al-Youm only had one mention of bloggers in the 
form of a 119-word long quote from Mohamed Adel in an article about 
different student movements. Their coverage of bloggers in 2010 came in the 
middle rank between Al-Ahram and DNE in terms of frequency and space 
given to bloggers. 
In October 2011, Al-Masry Al-Youm had a total of 44 mentions of 
bloggers and a total of 5,520 words. The word count excluded articles with 
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simple name mentions and nothing further on the blogger. Their 2011 coverage 
was the highest in terms of space given to bloggers. The space results were 
skewed, however, due to six articles covering social media reactions to current 
issues vaguely calling all social media users online activists. Users quoted were 
often not bloggers at all, but rather casual social media users. During the 
interviews, Ehab El Zelaky, managing editor of Al-Masry Al-Youm, said that 
this term was used loosely and inaccurately during this period because the 
concept of online activists was new to some reporters and it was a chaotic 
period due to the amount of news covered, especially online, throughout the 
day, leaving space for such errors. The frequency of mentioning bloggers came 




Table 5.2: Comparing Al-Ahram coverage of bloggers in 2010 and 2011 
 
 
In October 2010, Al-Ahram had zero mention of bloggers; the lowest in all 
three publications. 
In October 2011, Al-Ahram had a total of 12 mentions of bloggers and a 
total of 1,838 words. Their coverage of bloggers was also the least of all three 
newspapers in terms of space and frequency. 
5.1.1.3. The Daily News Egypt 
 
 
Table 5.3: Comparing the Daily News Egypt coverage of bloggers in 2010 and 2011 
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In October 2010, DNE had 8 mentions of bloggers and a total of 832 words; 
the highest in all three newspapers.   
In October 2011, DNE had a total of 62 mentions of bloggers and a 
total of 4,791 words; not accounting for simple name mentions in the word 
count.  
5.1.1.4. Reflections and total statistics for quantitative content analysis of print 
 
 
Table 5.4: Comparing newspapers’ coverage of bloggers in 2010  
 
In 2010, there were 9 mentions of bloggers and a total of 951 words 
 
 
Table 5.5: Comparing newspapers’ coverage of bloggers in 2011 
 
In 2011, there were 118 mentions of bloggers and a total of 12,149 words.  
Changes in print coverage of bloggers from 2010 to 2011 
 
Table 5.6: Comparing total newspapers’ coverage of bloggers in 2010 and 2011 
 
In general, it seems all three newspapers showed significant increases when it 
came to space and frequency of the media coverage of bloggers. The total 
mentions increased from 9 in 2010 to 118 in 2011. The space given to bloggers 
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increased from 951 words in 2010 to 12,149 in 2011. The increase was drastic 
across all categories, as seen in table 5.6. The highest increase was seen in 
Mentions category and the lowest in the General Mentions. The Front Pages 
category increased from 6 in 2010 to 14 in 2011 and saw the lowest increase 
across all categories, possibly due to the fact that it was the highest category in 
2010.  
Expectedly, the state-owned Al-Ahram gave bloggers the least space 
and frequency of coverage while the independent English-language Daily News 
Egypt (DNE) showed the most interest in bloggers’ issues. 
It is important to note that Al-Ahram never put bloggers on the front 
page while Al-Masry Al-Youm did so only twice. This is a significant indication 
that while the coverage of bloggers increased dramatically across all three 
newspapers, their perceived priority in Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm 
compared to other news still remained relatively low when compared to the 
priority the DNE gave to their news. 
Al-Ahram has increased its coverage from zero coverage in 2010 to 12 
mentions and a total of 1,838 words. Ahram Online (the online edition of the 
newspaper which gets updated throughout the day) covered issues, like Mina 
Daniel’s death, that were not in the print edition of the same day. Hesham 
Younes, the website’s managing editor, says their editorial policies are separate 
than the print edition and they enjoy more freedom. This is an indication of the 
perceived importance of the news, which would go into a frequently updated 
website but does not find space in the more-space-scarce print edition. It is also 
an indication of the target audience of print versus online and what news would 
be more relevant to an audience with access to online reading. This study, 
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however, is concerned with the print edition only. A news article on Maikel 
Nabil’s referral to the mental health hospital was covered in the first edition of 
Al-Ahram but was replaced with an article about the Muslim Brotherhood in 
the second edition of the newspaper. This is also an indication of the 
importance the blogger’s news presented to the editors; although it was 
important enough to cover, it was not important enough to keep when space 
got tight as other news came in. All this indicates that while Al-Ahram may 
have changed its editorial policy to shed more light on bloggers, it has not 
necessarily matched the attitudes of other newspapers. Al-Ahram is shown to 
have remained, to a certain extent, conservative when it comes to covering the 
lesser prominent online dissident voices. 
DNE was clearly the highest newspaper in terms of frequency and 
space of coverage in 2010; comparing a zero in Al-Ahram and a 1 mention in 
Al-Masry Al-Youm to 8 mentions in DNE in a total of 832 words. DNE was 
also the only newspaper to cover and quote less prominent bloggers like Lilian 
Wagdy and Evronia Azer while Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm quoted and 
covered only star bloggers like Alaa Abdel Fattah and Asmaa Mahfouz. DNE 
also quoted and covered bridge bloggers like Sandmonkey and Gigi Ibrahim 
who blogged mainly in English while other newspapers opted for star bloggers 
who blogged in Arabic. It is also worth noting that even in 2010, six of the 
eight articles covering bloggers came in the front page of the newspaper and 
three of them indicated bloggers in the headline. The editorial policy of the 
DNE did not seem to shift post-January 25th, although much more space was 
given to the coverage of bloggers. The number of mentions in the issues 
increased from 8 in 2010 to 62 in 2011. DNE, although the highest in terms of 
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frequency in both 2010 and 2011, was not, however, the highest in terms of 
space given to bloggers in 2011. Al-Masry Al-Youm dedicated 5,520 words to 
bloggers while the DNE dedicated 4,791. This, however, could be attributed to 
six articles Al-Masry Al-Youm carried that covered social media reactions to 
current issues. Those articles vaguely identified all social media users, who 
were not online activists or bloggers, as online activists. DNE, however, was 
the highest when it came to putting the articles carrying the bloggers news in 
their front page: 12 times compared to zero in Al-Ahram and only 2 in Al-
Masry Al-Youm. They were also the highest to feature their pictures; 9 times 
compared to 5 in Al-Masry Al-Youm and 3 in Al-Ahram. This indicates that 
although DNE’s editorial policy did not really change, their focus on bloggers 
was much more emphasized in 2011. The fact that DNE dedicate more space in 
front pages and to cover issues of specific bloggers indicates the importance 
they give to both, the bloggers’ voices, as well as their arrests, deaths and 
various issues. DNE would also be the highest in space if the six articles where 
Al-Masry Al-Youm covers social media reactions were deducted. The audience 
of DNE as well as their journalists are significantly different than those of Al-
Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm. While the DNE’s audience and editorial team 
are English-spoken middle and upper class mostly youth, those of Al-Ahram 
are more mainstream and wider. Al-Masry Al-Youm, on the other hand, comes 
somewhere in the middle of those two spectrums, with a team of mostly young 
journalists and slightly middle-aged editors and a print audience of wider pool 
and backgrounds than DNE but slightly upper classes and younger ages than 
Al-Ahram.  
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Al-Masry Al-Youm seems to come in the middle in all aspects between 
Al-Ahram and DNE except in the category of headlines where it tops both as 
well as the total number of words dedicated to online activists for the above-
mentioned social media reports. Al-Masry Al-Youm increased the frequency of 
their coverage from 1 in 2010 to 44 in 2011 and the total number of words 
dedicated to bloggers from 119 in 2010 to 5,520 in 2011. This is a significant 
increase that reflects a drastic shift in their editorial policy, especially given 
that the one article they had in 2010 was a quote from Mohamed Adel of April 
6th on political movements in universities. They also dedicated six articles in 
October 2011 to cover social media reactions, which shows how much 
emphasis they decided to shed on bloggers and the online world.  
5.1.2. Broadcast 
 
Codes used in broadcast: 
 
Coverage: Covering news about the blogger. 
 
Mention: An interview or the presenter mentioning the blogger’s name in the 
middle of a discussion that is not mainly about the blogger. 
Caption: When the blogger’s name appears in a caption or the newsreel. 
 
Interview in Person: When the blogger appears on the screen as they are 
being interviewed in the studio or elsewhere. 
Phone Interview: The blogger is interviewed over the telephone.  
 
In November 2010, bloggers were only mentioned twice, both times on Ten 
PM. 
In November 2011, they were mentioned 60 times. Issues where 
bloggers were mentioned, covered, hosted in person or through the phone in 
October 2011 were mostly about Alaa Abdel Fattah’s detention or bloggers’ 
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analysis and account of the November 19th Tahrir events where prominent 
blogger and activist Malek Mostafa lost his eye and activist Ahmed Harara lost 
a second eye (he had lost his first during the January 25th events) when 
violence erupted as police violently dispersed protestors calling for the rights 
of those injured or killed during the January 25th events. Maikel Nabil’s 
detention was still discussed in November 2011, although not as heavily as 
Alaa Abdel Fattah’s detention, which was then fresher. 
5.1.2.1. Ten PM  
 
 
Table 5.7: Comparing Ten Pm’s coverage of bloggers in 2010 and 2011 
 
 
In October 2010, Ten PM had a total of 2 mentions of bloggers and a total of 
18:10 minutes of coverage.  
In October 2011, Ten PM had a total of 13 mentions of bloggers and a 













Table 5.8: Comparing Baladna Bel Masry’s coverage of bloggers in 2010 and 2011 
 
 
In October 2010, Baladna Bel Masry had 0 mentions of bloggers. 
 
In October 2011, Baladna Bel Masry had a total of 47 mentions of 
bloggers and a total of 172:52 minutes of coverage. 




Table 5.9: Comparing broadcast’s coverage of bloggers in 2010  
 
In 2010, there were 2 mentions of bloggers and 18:10 minutes (not accounting 
for the time they do not speak but are still on air). 
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Table 5.10: Comparing broadcast’s coverage of bloggers in 2011 
 
In 2011, there were 60 mentions of bloggers and 253:31 minutes. 
  
Table 5.11: Comparing total broadcast’s coverage of bloggers in 2010 and 2011 
 
Although Baladna Bel Masry covered bloggers more frequently and at more 
length than Ten PM did in 2011, Ten PM had 2 mentions of bloggers in 2010 
while Baladna Bel Masry had none. Ten PM also had a weekly segment 
dedicated to the internet in 2010. It is, however, important to note that both 
those mentions came in the coverage of underground neighborhood channels 
where they compared bloggers to alternative television. The blogger hosted 
was not interviewed as an activist or a blogger, but rather as the man behind 
the documentary about the phenomenon they were covering.  
Other than that, Baladna Bel Masry was significantly more focused on 
bloggers than Ten PM was. Baladna Bel Masry had 47 mentions of bloggers in 
2011 and gave them 172:52 minutes of coverage whereas Ten PM only had 13 
and gave them 80:39 minutes of coverage only.  
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Baladna Bel Masry covered news of Alaa Abdel Fattah intensively (16 
times in November 2011 in a total of 66:16 minutes). Malek Mostafa was also 
covered intensively (mentioned 6 times and interviewed over the telephone in a 
total of 10:29 minutes) and Maikel Nabil’s case remained a prominent part of 
the media coverage of bloggers in November 2011, although not as extensive 
as in October. Mina Daniel was also mentioned several times in the show.  
Meanwhile, Ten PM covered issues like the death of Mina Daniel and 
Abdel Fattah and Michael Adel’s arrest, although Abdel Fattah’s arrest did not 
take up nearly as much space as it did with Baladna Bel Masry. While Baladna 
Bel Masry had 16 mentions of Abdel Fattah, Ten PM only had 3 in a total of 
1:50 minutes, compared to 66:16 in Baladna Bel Masry. They mentioned 
Malek Mostafa’s injury only 2 times (compared to 6 in Baladna Bel Masry) but 
did not interview him.  
Although Baladna Bel Masry generally had more lengthy and frequent 
mentions of bloggers, both shows were comparable when it came to time 
dedicated to Interviews in Person, although not the frequency. While Baladna 
Bel Masry hosted bloggers for 69:44 minutes, Ten PM hosted them for 62:22 
minutes, a difference of only 7:22 minutes. The difference in frequencies, 
however, is not as close. While Those 69:44 minutes included interviews with 
7 bloggers for Baladna Bel Masry, the 62:22 in person interview time for Ten 
PM included only 3 bloggers. The difference is greater, however, when it 
comes to Phone Interviews where Baladna Bel Masry interviewed bloggers 6 
times with a total of 28:27 minutes of phone interview time whereas Ten PM 
only had 2 with a total of 10:13 minutes of phone interview time.  
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The difference between each show across other categories was also 
wide, especially in the Coverage category where Ten PM had only 2 instances 
whereas Baladna Bel Masry had 16.  
It was also apparent that bloggers hosted the most by Ten PM were 
those who were more mainstreamed than others; for instance, hosting 
parliament member Mostafa El Naggar twice and for extended periods. It was 
also apparent that Baladna Bel Masry was more concerned with bloggers’ 
human rights’ issues, like the injury of Malek Mostafa and the detention of 
Alaa Abdel Fattah and Maikel Nabil, than Ten PM, which dedicated fewer 
mentions and lesser times to those issues than Baladna Bel Masry did but 
rather hosted bloggers to speak of events and analyze it. 
Both shows, however, significantly increased their coverage of 
bloggers. While Baladna Bel Masry had zero mentions of bloggers in 2010, 
they increased this to 47 in 2011 and a total of 172:52 minutes. Ten PM 
increased the number of mentions from 2 and 18:10 minutes in 2010 to 13 and 











Names of bloggers covered by the media in 2010 and 2011: 
 
 
Table 5.12: Bloggers mentioned most by the media in October and November of 2010 and 2011 
 
Other bloggers mentioned only once: 
 
By DNE: Kareem Amer, Dalia Ziada, Lilian Wagdy, Nadia El Awady, Tarek 
Shalaby, Gigi Ibrahim, Evronia Azer, Mohamed Barakat, Tassony Ragheb, 
Zeinobia and Sarah El Sirgany. 
By Al-Masry Al-Youm: Mahmoud Afifi, Tarek El Khouly and Nora Younes. 
By Ten PM: Baraa Ashraf, Michael Adel, Ahmed El Eish and Mohamed El 
Kasas. 
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By Baladna Bel Masry: Abdel Rahman Fares, Mohamed Agaty, Nawara 
Negm, Wael Abbas, Mohamed Marei and Lobna Darwish.  
 
 
5.2. Findings from framing analysis of offline media 
 
Frames Used: 
 - Identification Frame: Whether the blogger is framed as blogger, 
activist, victim/martyr, party member, defendant or alternative media. 
Martyr implies in Arabic that the person died on the hands of an 
aggressor while fighting for a cause. - Familiarity Frame: Whether the tone used with the blogger is a 
familiar or a professional one.  - Representation Frame: Whether the blogger is framed to represent 
their own opinion (personal representative), that of the revolutionary 
youth, the street’s opinion (street representative) or the public’s 
opinion.  - Analytical Frame: Whether the blogger is framed as an eyewitness or 
a political analyst.  - Framing as victims, heroes, defendants or criminals. The defendant 
frame is used when the writer or presenter presents the blogger’s 
charges objectively without showing a certain bias towards framing 











5.2.1.1. Al-Masry Al-Youm 
 
 
Table 5.13: Al-Masry Al-Youm’s framing of bloggers in 2010 and 2011 
 
In October 2010, the only applicable frame in April 6th activist Mohamed 
Adel’s quote was the Identification Frame. He was framed as an activist and 
not a blogger.  
In October 2011 bloggers were mainly identified as activists (15), and 
they were only identified as bloggers 5 times. This shows that while Al-Masry 
Al-Youm is aware of the importance of those bloggers, their status as activists 
is more familiar to the Al-Masry Al-Youm readers than their status as bloggers.  
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Bloggers framed as revolutionary youth representatives in the print 
issues studied were prominent bloggers like Alaa Abdel Fattah, Esraa Abel 
Fattah and Maher. Other non-star bloggers were never framed as 
representatives of the revolutionary youth, with the exception of Bassem Fathy.  
Bloggers framed by the newspapers as analysts were prominent 
bloggers Esraa Abdel Fattah, Alaa Abdel Fattah, Maher and El Naggar. The 
only bloggers to be framed as eyewitnesses and not analysts were Tarek El 
Khouly (who is relatively unknown outside the world of Twitter and blogs) and 
star blogger Alaa Abdel Fattah’s accounts of Maspero. The author highlights 
how true and honest Abdel Fattah’s accounts are while mainstream media 
broadcasts lies. This shows that when prominent bloggers were quoted, they 
were mostly quoted as political experts analyzing the situation. In the event 
when they were quoted as eyewitnesses, however, their accounts were 
published as more honest truths than that being told by other outlets.   
Bloggers were often framed as heroes for the role they played in the 
revolution. Those framed as heroes were star bloggers like those said to be 
nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize (Esraa Abdel Fattah, Maher and 
Ghoneim), Mahfouz who won a prestigious award, Alaa Abdel Fattah who was 
framed as a hero siding with the Maspero victim, Mina Daniel.  
Out of the 27 martyrs of the Maspero events, Mina Daniel was the one 
often mentioned for his leading role in the revolution and often described as 
“one of the revolutionary youth’s leaders” and dubbed as Che Guevara of 
Egypt. Activist and former parliamentary member Zeyad El Eleimy wrote an 
opinion piece on the Maspero martyrs and mentions seven of those but leads 
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with Mina Daniel. His article in Al-Masry al-Youm introduces Daniel as a 
young man: 
“whose feeling of responsibility drove his family to depend on him 
for their modest livelihood. He dreamed of this nation’s freedom 
and believed that freeing Egyptians will not come without them 
owning their own living. So he went out with his friends to defend 
our freedom. Mubarak’s bullets failed twice to defeat him as he got 
shot in his shoulder and foot on the Friday of Anger and the Battle 
of the Camel. He withstood the pains of the Mubarak regime’s 
bullets, not leaving the square and his fellow revolutionaries until 
Mubarak left and Mina had surgery to remove the bullet from his 
foot. But the army’s bullets defeated him this time.” 
Daniel here is identified as an activist and clearly framed as a hero. El Eleimy 
explained he knew Daniel and the six other activists he writes about. Daniel 
ran in the same circles as the prominent activists like El Eeimy and so his name 
was publicized the most whereas others who died and did not hold the same 
status between activists and bloggers were often not mentioned by the activists 
or the media. Other articles covering Maspero events death seldom mentioned 
any other martyrs than Daniel. 
Meanwhile, Maikel Nabil was framed as a defendant in two articles, a 
blogger in three, a criminal in two and a victim in two. While some articles 
highlight groups and activists’ support and the dangers of his hunger strike, 
others highlight the charges against him and refute his claims about his health 
condition. This shows dual framing of Nabil; at times a victim and others a 
criminal, but overall equally framed as both.  
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The article referring to Alaa Abdel Fattah’s written account of the 
Maspero events compares his report to those presented by members of the 
Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) on television. The article describes 
the SCAF accounts on Dream channel as lacking vision and creativity and 
underestimating the audience intelligence. The Al-Masry Al-Youm author 
comments that Abdel Fattah’s article “made me cry a lot.” She adds that the 
accounts on Dream were the “cold, blind” voices of authority while Abdel 
Fattah’s was “the voice of the revolution when it writes about death so the 
writing becomes about life, revolution, hope and victory.” This is rather 
indicative of how the author perceives Abdel Fattah’s voice; he is portrayed as 
the true, honest voice of the revolution that speaks the truth to counter the 
lying, cold voices of authorities, as the author describes them. The article the 
author refers to was one he had written in a column of Al-Shorouk newspaper. 
So even though Abdel Fattah’s accounts of the day were actually those he 
published in mainstream media he started writing for, he is still viewed as more 
credible than mainstream media in general. This is important to demonstrate 
how the once-alternative-media ventured into the mainstream media, but 
remain, apparently, in the views of their readers as more credible and honest. 
On the identification frame, Abdel Fattah is framed as an alternative media, 
rather than a blogger or an activist, because he was never introduced but was 
framed to represent an honest, independent source of news. He is also framed 
as a symbol of the revolution and hence a revolutionary representative. The 
article also speaks of how he broke the lies and told the truth as well as implied 
his—and other activists’—fight for freedom; he is hence framed as a hero. 
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Social media reports presented as ‘activists reactions’ were not included 
in the qualitative analysis as they were simply social media users’ reactions but 
did not include any bloggers and no frames were applicable. 
Bloggers were not quoted in Al-Masry Al-Youm as much as they were 
quoted in other newspapers, and therefore, the Analytical and Representation 
Frames were not always applicable.  
5.2.1.2. Al Ahram 
 
 
Table 5.14: Al-Ahram’s framing of bloggers in 2011 
 
Al-Ahram had no mentions of bloggers in October 2010. In October 2011, Al-
Ahram identified bloggers as defendants 4 out of the 16 times, or one fourth of 
the times, they were mentioned.  
Bloggers were framed as criminals twice more than they were framed as 
heroes and six times more than they were framed as victims. Those framed as 
criminals were Maikel Nabil (framed 4 times as a criminal), Ayman Mansour 
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and Asmsaa Mahfouz. While Nabil and Mansour are of much lesser 
prominence than other bloggers, Mahfouz, a star blogger, was framed only 
once as a criminal and another as a hero in the 3 times she was mentioned that 
month. This shows a certain tendency by Al-Ahram to frame lesser-prominent 
bloggers differently than the known ones. 
An article on Nobel Prize candidates Esraa Abdel Fattah and Wael 
Ghoneim shows strong hero frames used to describe both activists, but 
especially Ghoneim. The article goes on to say that the Oslo Peace Research 
Institute’s director, Christian Berg Harpvikin, suggested the names of the 
Egyptian activists for the primary role they played in continuing the Egyptian 
revolution and protecting its peacefulness. Harpvikin adds that Ghoneim spent 
12 days in prison for the great role he played and was chosen by Time 
magazine as one of the most influential personalities of 2011. This shows a 
possible change in the editorial policies of the newspaper that once put news of 
bloggers like Alaa Abdel Fattah and Maikel Nabil in the crimes section.  
Similarly, when tackling the memory of martyr Mina Daniel, who was 
killed during the Maspero events, the tone taken by Al-Ahram is always a more 
supportive, emotional one than that taken to cover Nabil’s case, for instance. 
Daniel is often framed as a hero who fought long and hard for a better Egypt 
and survived many violent events and a victim who was killed too young. 
The only times bloggers were quoted and framed as political analysts or 
revolutionary youth were when Ahmed Maher was quoted speaking of his 
expectations of the future parliament’s composition and elections results and 
when Maher, Esraa Abdel Fattah and Asmaa Mahfouz are quoted from a press 
conference in Washington speaking of the political situation in Egypt.  
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The frames are not always positive, however. Out of 12 mentions of 
bloggers, 3 were in the crimes section. 
Maikel Nabil is covered twice in the crimes section. Nabil is once 
introduced as spending a three-year sentence for insulting the armed forces 
through his blog. The placement of the article in the crimes section and 
introducing him as “serving a three-year sentence” indicates a strong framing 
as a defendant on the Identification Frame and a criminal on the Criminal/Hero 
frame. Similarly, coverage of blogger Ayman Mansour three-year sentence for 
offending religion was also in the crime section.  
An article covers a court case against Asmaa Mahfouz and others who 
insulted and used profanities against police officers, and mentions Maikel 
Nabil’s case frames both as criminals on the Hero/Criminal Frame. The article 
frames Mahfouz and Nabil in very different frames than the above. Neither 
Mahfouz nor Nabil is identified, although later in the article Mahfouz is framed 
as an activist. Nabil, however, is framed as nothing but a defendant in his case 
with no mention of his activism or blogging. The focus was primarily on their 
charges without any mention of their side of the story or defense. Mahfouz, 
especially, was framed as a revolutionary who was caught directing profanities 
to the state despite her status as a member of the peaceful revolutionary youth. 
Mahfouz was also framed by the police officers’ statements as a representative 
of the revolutionary youth.  
The above four articles show tendencies to revert to the old editorial 
direction and stand from bloggers. Al-Ahram only framed bloggers in positive 
lights when they were of certain prominence or status that any attack against 
them might be analyzed as an attack against the revolution and its youth.  
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The one time a star blogger like Asmaa Mahfouz was framed as a criminal 
was when the source quoted was expressing his disappointment that a model 
revolutionary like Mahfouz would insult the officers and use profanities. This 
shows certain expectations from renowned activists and bloggers like Mahfouz 
and insinuates that Mahfouz is breaking a positive frame that had been set for 
her and so shedding light in the issue in a negative frame but without failing to 
acknowledge the positive frames associated with her. Otherwise, it was the 
lesser-prominent blogger Nabil and the relatively unknown Ayman Mansour 
who saw criminal frames in their coverage. A possible explanation is that the 
readers would not be familiar with those bloggers and so setting a negative 
frame around them would be far easier than if they had been already known to 
the readers.  
Their coverage, be it the positive or the negative, however, is indicative of 
the growing attention the bloggers are receiving—going from absolutely no 
mentions to covering their arrests, accomplishments and conferences they take 
part in. The coverage is also indicative of how the newspaper still perceives 
issues of activists and bloggers. Certain bloggers seem relatively untouchable 
in Al-Ahram in the sense that even if they are being framed in a negative light 
it can only be done up to a certain limit and a positive frame has to be used in 
parallel. The lesser-known bloggers, however, are still subject to criticism of 
the newspaper. In other words, the newspaper shows sympathy towards those 
who are too prominent to do otherwise and have already a set of positive 
frames associated to them, or those who have gained public sympathy and 
cannot be framed other than victims of the regime, like Mina Daniel. Other 
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bloggers who do not have a set of frame associated with them, be it positive or 
negative, are still subject to negative framing by Al-Ahram.  




Table 5.15: Comparing Daily News Egypt’s framing of bloggers in 2010 and 2011 
 
In 2010, DNE framed bloggers in only positive frames in October 2010. DNE 
was also the only paper to cover issues of bloggers’ arrests and 
accomplishments in 2010.  
Two articles covering Ahmed Doma’s detention are published on two 
consecutive days. The articles show an indirect support of the detained activist 
through stressing the fact that he should have been released six days prior to 
the article as well as indirectly showing disbelief of the charges against Doma. 
The article highlights Doma’s peaceful protest against police attempting to 
prevent them from practicing their right to demonstrate. His prolonged 
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imprisonment and concern over human rights further frame him as a victim 
rather than a criminal. He is also identified as an activist not a defendant. 
DNE publishes statements by Freedom House and the Cairo-based 
Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI) condemning 
restrictions on media freedom, including crackdown on bloggers. Bloggers 
here are shown as victims but they are put in the same basket as journalists and 
activists. This shows DNE’s commitment to reporting on human rights issues 
in general, but also on violations against bloggers. The two other newspapers 
never covered either of those reports.  
In 2011, 13 out of the 34 times the bloggers were covered they were identified 
as bloggers and twice as both bloggers and activists, totaling 15 times where 
their blogging identity was presented. This shows that this blogger frame is 
almost as important as their activism frame. With other newspapers, this was 
not the case, where their blogger frame came behind other frames. This is an 
indication of how the DNE perceives their readers’ familiarity with blogging. 
DNE also most often framed bloggers to represent revolutionary youth (15 
times) but never as street or personal representatives.  They were interviewed 
as political analysts 9 times and only once as defendants but never as criminals. 
Those positive frames are used much more often than in other newspapers, 
however, the total coverage dedicated by DNE to bloggers is overall higher 
than other newspapers. 
Eight articles were published in October 2011 about Maikel Nabil’s case; 
all framing him clearly as a victim and several making front page. Nabil’s 
hunger strike, deteriorating health condition and right to better conditions are 
often highlighted and even stated in the headline and his charges are seldom 
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mentioned. One headline reads “Retrying detained blogger ‘toying with his 
life,’ says Amnesty.” Another article identifies Nabil as a blogger and an 
activist imprisoned by a military court who is on day 41 of his open-ended 
hunger strike. This is immediately followed by a quote from Nabil saying, 
“Death is better than living in an oppressive country.” The lede of the article 
clearly indicates a sympathy with Nabil for being trialed in front of a military 
court and for his hunger strike that threatens his health. The article also quotes 
a human rights activist defending Nabil and describing the accusations as 
“petty” and against freedom of expression. The article ends by “Maikel is 
among an estimated 12,000 civilians who have been subjected to military trials 
after Egypt’s uprising.” The article clearly frames Nabil as a face for unjust 
military trial and oppression of freedom of expression. It quotes people who 
support the blogger and the charges against him are never mentioned 
throughout the article—only that he was sentenced for three years. The very 
next day, October 4th, Nabil is covered again in an article covering news of 53 
detained protestors. His coverage took 85 words of the 423-words article 
originally covering other protestors’ cases. The fact that coverage of one 
blogger who was covered the day before took up space from another article 
about 53 activists indicates the importance a known blogger like Nabil has in 
comparison to lesser known protestors originally covered in the article.  
Seven articles covered possible Nobel Peace Prize nomination of key Arab 
Spring activists and their reactions to Tawakol Kerman winning the prize. All 
those articles framed activists Maher, Ghoneim and Esraa Abdel Fattah as 
heroes and quoted sources speaking of the role they played in directing the 
revolution and maintaining its peace. The activists were often framed as 
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representatives of the revolutionary youth as they were identified often as 
representatives of the Arab Spring. The newspaper also carried the same quotes 
from Harpviken Al-Ahram published about bloggers Nobel nomination. One 
article added Esraa Abdel Fattah is Harpviken’s top pick for the Nobel prize.  
An article covering news of interrogation of Alaa Abdel Fattah and Bahaa 
Saber shows discrepancy in coverage of the two activists. The article was in 
the front page and identified both as activists who face alleged charges of 
inciting violence during the Maspero events and who are supported by a 
number of protestors demonstrating against military trials of civilians. The 
article, however, only mentions eyewitness accounts denying allegations 
against Abdel Fattah, but no mention of any in defense of Saber. So while it 
frames Abdel Fattah as a victim—insinuating that the charges are false—it 
frames Saber as a defendant facing alleged charges but, like Abdel Fattah, also 
getting support from protestors for the unjust military trials.  
5.2.1.4. Reflections and total statistics for framing analysis of print 
 
 




Print in October 2010: While DNE covered issues such as Doma’s arrest and 
oppressing bloggers, the only mention of bloggers in the two other newspapers 
came in an Al-Masry Al-Youm article quoting blogger and April 6th member 
Mohamed Adel speaking about the movement. DNE was the only newspaper to 
cover, for instance, Freedom House and ANHRI reports on crackdown on 
journalists and bloggers.  
Only DNE covered Dalia Ziada winning the Anna Lindh Journalist award. 
This might be due to the nature of the DNE readers who might be familiar with 
the award and the winners, who include Mona El Tahawy. But it is also a result 
of a general editorial direction that supports activists and bloggers as shown in 
other articles. What’s interesting is that Ziada worked at Al-Ahram for two 
years and tweets and blogs in Arabic, but Al-Ahram never mentioned her win. 
DNE was the only newspaper to use social media for reporting in 2010 and 
use prominent bloggers as eyewitnesses before the trend caught on in 2011. 
Gigi Ibrahim’s Twitter account of a workers’ protest is quoted in an article 
covering the protests and she was used as an eyewitness to the protests.  
 
Print in October 2011: Bloggers were mainly identified as activists in 2011 
(40 times) but their blogger identities were also mentioned 27 times (23 as only 
bloggers and 4 as both bloggers and activists). This signifies that while the 
leading frame is still their activism, the blogging frame also appeared 
frequently, although almost half as frequent as the activism frame. Framing 
bloggers as defendants came mainly in Al-Ahram (4 times) but also in Al-
Masry Al-Youm (2 times). In print, when the Representation Frame was 
applied—which was applied far less than in broadcast—they were only framed 
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as revolutionary youth representatives (24 times). They were framed mainly as 
political analysts (19 times) and only 3 times as eyewitnesses. They were 
framed mainly as heroes (31 times) and victims (22 times). But they were also 
framed as criminals (9 times) and only once as defendants. This shows that 
they were mainly positively framed in the news (either heroes or victims of 
unjust trials and charges) but they would also sometimes be framed as 
criminals, mainly in Al-Ahram (6 times) but also in Al-Masry Al-Youm (3 
times). DNE never framed them as criminals. It is also significant that Al-
Ahram was the least frequent to frame bloggers as heroes; only 3 times 
compared to 11 times in DNE and 17 times in Al-Masry Al-Youm. 
The three newspapers covered news of the bloggers being possible Nobel 
Peace Prize nominees. DNE covered bloggers’ nomination the most (5 times), 
however, followed by Al-Masry A- Youm (twice) and then Al-Ahram which 
only covered it once. The three newspapers carried similar positive frames in 
covering the news. However, only DNE and Al-Masry Al-Youm published 
reactions of bloggers to Tawakol Kerman winning the Nobel Peace Prize, but 
while DNE quoted three bloggers and gave them 330 words, Al-Masry Al-
Youm only quoted two bloggers in 78 words. 
The three newspapers coverage of bloggers cooperating with Occupy Wall 
Street protestors used similar frames and context. The three activists are quoted 
giving advice to their fellow protestors and commenting on the situation in 
Egypt and were framed as activists and representative of the revolutionary 
youth as they are quoted speaking in the name of the protestors in Egypt and 
the revolution’s youth. They are also framed as political analyst as they are 
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quoted giving advice to American activists and analyzing the political scene in 
Egypt as well as criticizing policies of the US.  
The three newspapers covered news of Maikel Nabil’s case although the 
DNE covered it most frequently and in more positive lights than other 
newspapers. Al-Ahram covered his case three times and in the most negative 
frame, framing him as a criminal and putting his coverage in the criminal 
section twice. The DNE covered Nabil eight times, always framing him as a 
victim while Al-Masry Al-Youm covered him five times framing him twice as a 
victim, twice as a criminal and once as a defendant. This means that while Al-
Ahram coverage was overwhelmingly in a negative frame and the DNE a 
positive one, Al-Masry Al-Youm had the most balanced positive and negative 
framing of Nabil’s case. 
Mina Daniel was also covered by all three newspapers but Al-Masry Al-
Youm was the most to show sympathy to his death and portray it in the most 
emotional frames. Al-Masry Al-Youm covered him the most, eight times, and 
most often framing him as both a hero and a victim frame. Al-Ahram only 
mentioned Daniel once but carried heroic frames and showed apparent 
sympathy. DNE covered Daniel three times, framing him always as a victim 
and never in an emotional tone or a heroic frame. His coverage in DNE was 
less sensational and came in the form of solid news. The other newspapers, 
however, covered him in an emotional tone and often used a heroic frame.  
Only DNE covered the bloggers’ reactions to the Khaled Said’s killers 
verdict. This is an indication of how important the DNE editorial team believes 
bloggers’ reactions to a milestone case like Khaled Said is. They have also 
quoted several bloggers and activists and only one human rights lawyer. 
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While Al-Ahram did not cover Alaa Abdel Fattah’s case and Asmaa 
Mahfouz winning the Sakharov Prize, the DNE and Al-Masry Al-Youm did. 
A blogger, Ayman Mansour, is covered in Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-
Youm for getting a three-year-prison sentence for insulting religion and other 
charges, but not in DNE. In both papers he is identified as a blogger but is 
framed mainly as a criminal as the whole article is about his charges and how 
they affect ‘national unity’ and insult Muslims and Islam. This shows similar 
editorial tendencies when it comes to less-known bloggers.  
Blogger Mohamed Dahshan’s nomination for the Anna Lindh Journalist 
Award was only covered in DNE. Although this article was not included in the 
qualitative analysis as he was identified as a journalist, not a blogger, it is an 
indication of how dedicated DNE is to covering news of a certain segment of 
journalists and bloggers that other, more mainstream media channels do not. 
This might be due to the nature of the DNE readers who might be familiar with 
the nominees as well as a general editorial direction that supports activists and 
bloggers as shown in other articles.  
Similarly, an article covers the release of a book by Egyptian bloggers and 
journalists recounting their personal experiences of the revolution. Although no 
frames were applicable here, it is worth analyzing in terms of why DNE chose 
to cover this news that was not carried out by other newspapers. One of the 
authors, Sarah El Sirgany and another author are editors at the DNE while 
Dahshan contributes regularly to it. Co-author Nadia El Awady also runs in the 
same circles as the DNE editorial team.  
The above two articles indicate a certain familiarity that led the newspaper 
to cover news of the book launch that was not covered elsewhere. Not only is 
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this agenda setting guided by the sort of audience DNE has, but also the 
editorial agenda, guided by the social circles of the team. 
5.2.2. Broadcast 
 
5.2.2.1. Ten PM 
 
 
Table 5.17: Ten PM’s framing of bloggers in 2011 
 
The fact that Ten PM never framed bloggers as such in either 2010 or 2011 
shows that even though they might have been hosted for being prominent 
activists and bloggers, to the audience of the show, their status as activists is 
more prominent and familiar than their status as bloggers. Accordingly, the 
presenter did not feel the need to acknowledge the fact that the guest is a 
blogger, even when he is a prominent one like Mostafa El Naggar.  The 
presenter also presents the bloggers hosted mostly as representatives of the 
youth, but never the streets. She also frames them more as political analysts 
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than eyewitnesses, meaning their expertise of the protests, protestors and the 
Square transcend the role of simple eyewitnesses.  
El Shazly framed bloggers twice as defendants, being neutral towards 
charges against them, when covering the arrest of Michael Adel and the 
detention of Alaa Abdel Fattah. She has, however, framed Abdel Fattah once 
as a victim, rather than a defendant, when she expressed how news of his 
renewed detention came as a disappointment to many. This shows that while El 
Shazly maintains a relatively neutral tone when covering bloggers news of 
detention, she shows some sympathy towards Abdel Fattah, a star blogger, but 
not the lesser-prominent Adel.  While Adel was introduced as “defendant,” not 
activist or blogger, Abdel Fattah was always introduced as activist even though 
they are both facing charges and have not received verdicts yet. She also re-
opens the issue of Abdel Fattah a week after and talks about how depressed all 
fellow activists were with the court decision to renew his detention but has no 
mention throughout the month of Adel. 
One segment especially stands out in the analysis of the 21st of November, 
2011 episode where El Shazly calls her guest blogger, Mohamed El Kassas, 
“Ya ‘am” a slang expression that is the equivalent of “man.” This shows a 
great deal of familiarity with him. She repeatedly asks him about what the 
square and the revolutionary forces have to say about this and that, what their 
demands are, what they have to say to the people at home, what they are 
looking to see happen so the crisis is over. She then says she will ask him a 
question that expresses “our fears and confusion,” referring to herself and the 
general public, and asks him to assess whether it is too late to act now or if 
there is still hope. This question is very important because she’s looking for an 
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assessment from him that might reassure the public that the revolution is still 
okay or that there’s still hope. Here she asks him to play the role of the analysts 
as well as a revolutionary leader who can reassure the public about the path of 
the revolution. The segment is also titled a conversation with the 
“Revolutionary Youth Coalition” signifying the two guests represent the 
revolutionary youth. 
The only times El Shazly adopted a Professional Frame with a guest 
blogger were with Ahmed El Eish and one of the two times she hosted Mostafa 
El Naggar—even though the second time she hosted El Naggar was largely 
informal and strongly framed as familiar.  
A significant segment is a 28-minute one dedicated to the parliamentary 
win of El Naggar. The tone of Shazly’s introduction and her speech throughout 
the segment signifies a highly familiar tone, she never refers or addresses him 
as Dr. Mostafa and is also rather casual in her address, laughs often and makes 
an emotional introduction that portrays familiarity and also heroism: 
“Mostafa El Naggar […] was one of the most important and first 
faces who appeared on the media to speak of Tahrir Square and 
defend it and defend the martyrs. From the first moment Mostafa El 
Naggar appeared on screens, people could feel his sincerity, as 
opposed to many others who were rather controversial. But his 
attitude, which was maybe sometimes emotional or his way of 
speech that could sometimes be romantic, made him one of the 
most sincere faces. […] this sincere, familiar face surprised us all 
and won very aggressive elections in Nasr City.”  
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Her emphasis on his “sincere face” and how people came to trust him shows a 
great degree of familiarity and bias towards him. She jokes about how he is 
single and ladies might have supported him for that reason and makes several 
other casual jokes. She maintains the tone of glorifying his win as the youngest 
member of the Parliament and one of the very few revolutionary youth to 
secure a seat in the parliament. She even concludes the segment saying “A 
million congratulations and long live the youth.”  
When Malek Mostafa was covered, his identity or what his injury exactly 
was often not introduced. This indicates that the guest or presenter assumes his 
injury and identity are known to the reader that he does not need introductions.  
And while bloggers were framed as political analysts three times, El Eish—



















Table 5.18: Baladna Bel Masry’s framing of bloggers in 2011 
 
In November 2010, there were no mentions of bloggers. 
 
Bloggers were also mostly framed as heroes and victims rather than 
defendants. They were never framed as only bloggers, the times their blogging 
identity came up was always along their identity as activists. When speaking of 
the detained bloggers Alaa Abdel Fattah, Nabil or Bahaa Saber, Magued never 
referred to them as defendant, even when reading out their charges, but always 
as bloggers or activists.  
Bloggers were also mostly interviewed to be asked about the revolutionary 
youth’s stand and only three times for their personal opinion. Wael Khalil was 
framed once to present a personal opinion and another revolutionary youth’s 
opinion. What’s significant, is that Abdel Rahman Fares was framed to 
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represent the voice of the street. Bassem Fathy, Mohamed Marei and Lobna 
Darwish are all lesser-known bloggers, and were all framed as eyewitnesses 
rather than political analysts. It is also worth noting that Fathy was one of the 
three to be framed to represent a personal opinion as well.  
Magued also adopted a rather familiar tone with them, except three 
times when she was interviewing Malek Adly, Mostafa El Naggar and 
Mohamed Marei. The formal tone adopted with Marei and Adly might be 
because they are less known or less familiar to her.  
The formal tone adopted with blogger and then-parliamentary member 
El Naggar came in a 30-minutes segment about new members’ opinions of the 
new cabinet of ministers. He is hosted alongside other parliamentary members. 
He is not identified as a blogger but rather as a member of the parliament and 
member of Al Adl Party. She addresses him as Dr. Mostafa and only asks him 
about his own, personal opinion. Hence, he is framed as a party member, 
political analyst and representing his personal opinion only. Magued also 
adopts a professional tone talking to him. He is never asked about the youth, 
the demonstrators or similar questions often posed to activists. It is worth 
mentioning that even though El Naggar is a prolific blogger and one of the 
oldest ones, he came to be known as the founder of Al Adl party and a 
candidate during the parliamentary elections of 2011. The framing used with 
him was rather that of a political player, not a blogger or an activist. This 
means that his status as a prominent political player overrode his status as a 
blogger once he became mainstreamed into the public space. So once he 
became a part of the historical bloc, the treatment he received and his status 
changed from an activist or blogger to a more formal political player.  
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Magued often introduces Alaa Abdel Fattah as the activist Alaa Abdel 
Fattah but does not mention any background on his case or arrest when 
discussing updates.  
When blogger and activist Mona Seif was featured for an interview in a 
conference, producers chose to identify her as Alaa Abdel Fattah’s sister, 
despite the fact that the conference was about the movement she founded to 
oppose military trials of civilians. This further shows the status Abdel Fattah 
has as a blogger and the fame he achieved that took over his sister’s identity, 
even when it’s in coverage of a movement she founded. 
An interesting quote by Alaa Al Aswany in Baladna Bel Masry’s 3rd of 
November 2011 episode mentions Alaa Abdel Fattah and another detained 
blogger, Bahaa Saber, at a conference against military trials of civilians shows 
the status of heroes some of those bloggers have achieved. “This phenomenon 
will not end unless we all act like Alaa and Bahaa; you practice your right, and 
this is what they did.” These words were echoed by a clergyman at the 
conference as well. This shows two things; how they perceive the bloggers and 
how familiar they feel with them, referring to them with their first names only. 
Al Aswany and the clergyman both portrayed Abdel Fattah and Saber’s 
reactions to the military prosecutors (both refusing to answer questions posed 
by military prosecutors) as the role model of how we should all act. This puts 
them at a heroic stand; risking prison to show a stand.  
Portraying Abdel Fattah as a hero was the most prominent frame used in 
the show’s coverage of him. His stance of refusing to answer military 
prosecutor’s questioning as well as his appeal for the right to vote in the 
parliamentary elections because he was not convicted yet were often 
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highlighted over the charges against him. This also shows, not only sympathy 
with the blogger, but also admiration and a heroic frame. “He asserted his 
initial stand to refuse questioning any citizen by any military entity even if the 
price was his freedom and remaining in jail,” Magued said.  
Magued also covered Abdel Fattah’s news much more intensively than any 
other media outlet, dedicating three segments solely to Abdel Fattah’s case.  
The Victim Frame was much more prominent than the Defendant Frame 
when covering Maikel Nabil. Often his hunger strike was much more 
highlighted than the charges against him or his case, showing sympathy with 
Nabil.  
Like other media outlets, Malek Mostafa was covered along with Ahmed 
Harara and an Al-Masry Al-Youm photographer when speaking of those who 
lost an eye during the November 19th events. Yousry Fouda even told Magued 
in a phone interview that the first thing he insisted on doing that day, even 
before heading to Tahrir Square, was to visit those who lost their eyes during 
the events. “They are all in good spirit even though they lost the light of their 
eye and the most precious thing a person can possess, physically,” he says, in a 
reference to their strength and resilience.  It is also worth noting that even on 
such an eventful night, Fouda led his interview with the news of Harara, 
Mostafa and the photographer before going into the events of the night before 
or the political implications. 
At one instance, Magued did a phone interview with Malek Adel, who is a 
lawyer at the Center for Economic and Social Rights and an activist. She 
addressed him as Mr. Malek and posed him questions that were only about the 
autopsy process of those killed during the November 19th events, as he was 
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present at the morgue. It is interesting to notice here how different frames are 
applied when the bloggers are of less famous status. For instance, all questions 
posed to Adel were in his capacity as a lawyer present at the morgue and so 
only an eyewitness. He was not asked about the implications of events, his 
view, the revolutionary’s view or questions of that sort. The presenter also 
adopts a more formal tone with him than that used with other more prominent 
bloggers. This is an indication that the more famous the blogger is, the more 
the presenter framed him as a political analyst rather than an eyewitness and 
the more familiar she gets with him. 
A telephone interview with Malek Mostafa brings about an interesting 
finding. Magued asks Mostafa whether he is saying he is lucky because his eye 
will recover, because his medical report was written correctly, unlike that of 
Harara’s, or because he reached the media and he answers, “all of that.” This is 
important in indicating that the presenter and the blogger both realize how 
Mostafa is luckier than others who were injured because his case was covered 
on the media, which is not necessarily the case with others injured.  
An interview with member of the Revolutionary Youth Coalition, Abdel 
Rahman Fares, shows a strong indication that the guest is considered the pulse 
of the street. Lilian Daoud, who was co-hosting the show with Magued for 
special coverage of the events, asks Fares, “The question is to you, specifically, 
Abdel Rahman, you were in the streets and know the overall atmosphere. Is it 
possible that this speech has a positive effect with some people especially with 
the talks about the economy falling and the production wheel and that some of 
the demands are being fulfilled? What did the speech present?” This raises the 
issue of representation; to know the pulse of the square, she asked Fares and 
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not the older guest, a professional journalist. She is clearly framing him as a 
representation of the street. Similarly, Magued tells Fares: 
“There is a responsibility that falls on those who made this revolution 
happen and your fate is that you are the youth of the revolution and it 
is as if you are the only party who made this revolution. […] You are 
now criticized of [being] dictatorial […] how will you overcome this?”  
This strongly indicates a Street Representation Frame, but also a strong 
preference to know or predict the pulse of the street from the younger activist 
present, rather than the older professional journalist. 
Similarly, in many cases, the bloggers are asked about the pulse of the 
street, but also about their predictions of the effect certain events might have 
on the public or the political situation. Accordingly, they were often framed to 
be more than eyewitnesses and often transcend to the Political Analysts Frame. 
Leftist blogger Mohamed El Agaty was hosted speaking of colleagues who 
were injured, killed or detained. He only mentioned the names of the 
prominent bloggers Alaa Abdel Fattah, Malek Mostafa and Mina Daniel, 
whom he calls members of his political direction. The only non-blogger 
mentioned was Harara who lost both eyes during the uprising.  
Wael Khalil is hosted alone in a 30-minutes segment to speak in a segment 
titled “Tahrir Square’s Position from the Elections.” The title of the segment as 
well as the questions she poses strongly imply that he is hosted to represent the 
views of the revolutionary youth. She poses questions such as “What does the 
revolutionary legitimacy see?” 
In the same interview with Khalil, Reem’s tone is familiar and she calls 
him by his first name. Even more strikingly, when Aida Seif El Dawla, a 
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prominent activist, human rights activist and mother of Alaa Abdel Fattah, is 
interviewed by telephone during the same segment, she and Khalil adopt the 
same familiar tone with each other. Khalil calls Seif El Dawla by her first name 
and they both laugh, implicating a certain degree of familiarity, despite the fact 
that Magued calls her Dr. Aida. This shows that not only is the presenter often 
familiar with bloggers interviewed—more so than other guests—bloggers are 
also often familiar with other activists and bloggers. This is also apparent when 
bloggers speak about each other or shed light on each other’s cases, like the 
case with those speaking of Alaa Abdel Fattah’s detention or Mostafa’s injury. 
A three-minute segment covering the news of the birth of Alaa Abdel 
Fattah’s son, Khaled, amidst coverage of elections shows strong feelings by the 
presenter towards the blogger. It shows strong references to the heroic role 
Abdel Fattah plays and uses an emotional tone that shows admiration, 
sympathy and support of Abdel Fattah. Magued calls the newborn the youngest 
revolutionary in Egypt and a “revolutionary by birth like his father, 
grandfather, mother and aunt” and comes from solid roots. She goes on to say 
that he comes from a line of strong and free men and that she wishes he would 
have been born in a world that is remotely similar to that his mother and father 
imagine. She dubs Khaled and his parents “more famous than fire on a flag,” 
and goes on to say how unfairly his father is being detained and how his family 
members are all freedom fighters that even his aunt, Mona Seif, was born to an 
imprisoned father “paying the price of his freedom and resilience.” She 
concludes saying “Alaa made us all proud and to all those who deprived Alaa 
to look at his son’s face when he is opening his eyes to the world and deprived 
Khaled to open his eyes and see his father: Let the flowers flourish.” This 
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segment shows the degree of support, sympathy and admiration Magued has 
for Abdel Fattah. He is framed as a hero who fought all injustices and endured 
the pain of being locked up as his son sees the world. It also shows a high 
degree of familiarity between the presenter, Abdel Fattah and his family.  
A segment titled “The Rights of those Like Alaa Abdel Fattah to Vote” 
is dedicated to using Abdel Fattah as a case study of the rights of those 
detained without verdict in voting. Even though at this point there were about 
12,000 under military trial and many others under normal trials, she mentions 
Abdel Fattah as the case study, which says a lot about his status. 
5.2.2.3. Reflections and total statistics for framing analysis of broadcast 
 
 
Table 5.19: Comparing total broadcast’s framing of bloggers in 2010 and 2011 
 
The figures in table 5.19 signify that bloggers came to be hosted to analyze the 
political scene and represent the revolutionary youth. Their hardships—be it 
injuries or arrest—were highlighted and often sympathized with and they were 
often portrayed as heroes who set role models of strength, resilience and strong 
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beliefs and victims of the violent and unjust regimes. The more prominent the 
blogger is, the more likely his charges will be dismissed by the presenter who 
shows sympathy and admiration of the blogger. Their identity as bloggers often 
goes hand in hand with their identity as activists and they are never portrayed 
as bloggers alone. This shows that even if the show itself realizes their identity 
as bloggers, they need to add the ‘activist’ identity to show importance and 
status to the general audience. Also, the more prominent the blogger, the more 
familiar the tone the presenter adopts when speaking with him or of him.  
There is a large discrepancy between the space given to coverage of 
Alaa Abdel Fattah’s by El Shazly and Magued. Magued also shows strong 
sympathy towards Abdel Fattah while El Shazly maintains a more neutral tone. 
For instance, Abdel Fattah was never identified by Magued as a defendant, but 
Shazly identifies him once as a defendant and once as an activist.  
It is also interesting that while Magued introduced some of the bloggers 
as “bloggers and activists” 8 times, El Shazly never introduced any of her 
guests as a blogger; rather always an activist or a party member.  This shows a 
difference in the importance each presenter puts on the guest’s identity as a 
blogger. While El Shazly prioritizes bloggers’ identity as activists or party 
member, an identification frame that might be more familiar to her audience, 
Magued uses both frames. This might indicate that Magued places a bigger 
importance on their identity as bloggers than El Shazly does. But it also might 
signal that El Shazly’s audience is more familiar with the term activist than 
they are with the term blogger while Magued’s might be familiar with both. 
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Both shows adopt the same Familiar Frame most of the times when 
bloggers are hosted even though other guests in the same segments are 
normally addressed with more formality.  
Both shows also mostly frame bloggers are revolutionary youth 
representatives but Magued framed a blogger once as a representative of the 
street while El Shazly never did; showing more weight given by Magued to 
bloggers.  
Magued framed bloggers more often as eyewitnesses (7 times) but she 
also framed them as political analysts (5 times). El Shazly only framed 
bloggers as eyewitnesses once and they were most often framed as political 
analysts (3 times).  
While Magued never framed bloggers as defendants, El Shazly twice 
maintained a neutral tone to charges against bloggers and framed them as 
defendants. This shows that Magued often shows more sympathy towards 
bloggers in her coverage while El Shazly maintains more neutrality.  
5.2.3. Comparing and reflecting on print and broadcast framing analysis 
findings 
 




It was apparent in the analysis of both print and broadcast that even though 
more than 40 were arrested during the Maspero events, only Alaa Abdel 
Fattah’s arrest took the spotlight and was consistently covered by the media. In 
the same events 27 died, but only Mina Daniel’s death was publicized and of 
all the martyrs dying that day, Daniel is the only name that came up in the 
media. Even in the report by the official committee appointed to investigate the 
events, Daniel’s name is the sole name mentioned of the 27 martyrs. Both 
Abdel Fattah and Daniel are prominent bloggers and so the focus on their news 
took far more space than the news of other martyrs and detainees.  
Similarly, even though 800 were injured and 10 were killed during the 
November 19th Tahrir events, only Malek Mostafa, Ahmed Harara and an Al-
Masry Al-Youm photographer were intensively covered and mentioned by 
name. The photographer is one of the press’ own, and so was naturally 
highlighted. Harara also came to be an icon of those injured in the revolution as 
he had lost one eye during the January 25th events and the other during the 
November 19th events. The focus on Mostafa, however, can be explained by 
the fact that he is a rather prominent blogger and well-known in the circles of 
revolutionaries and bloggers. This was an interesting finding in the analysis as 
it shows the status of bloggers and how different they came to be from other 
activists on the scene.  
Often bloggers were hosted with prominent political analysts, senior 
journalists, leading party members and people holding top positions in human 
rights organizations. This shows the status bloggers were given that put them in 
the same importance as key figures in the public space.  
Overall, both print and broadcast referred to bloggers as activists the 
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most on the Identification Frame (13 times in broadcast and 40 in print). But 
while the second most used Identification Frame in broadcast was the “blogger 
and activist” frame (8 times), it was the bloggers frame in print (23 times). 
“Bloggers and activist” frame came in fifth in print (4 times) and while the 
blogger frame was second most used in print (23 times) it was never used in 
broadcast. This indicates that while the activist frame reigns over any other 
identification frame the media uses for bloggers, the blogger frame is not used 
in media as mainstream as television channels. This also shows in the fact that 
DNE was the newspaper that framed bloggers as bloggers the most; which 
indicates a certain tendency to use the bloggers frame in more targeted, less 
mainstream media channels. When the programs did mention their identities as 
bloggers, it came in parallel with their identities as activists, the second most 
used Identification Frame. This, however, shows that even mainstream media 




Table 5.21: Comparing total broadcast and print’s framing of bloggers in 2011 
Both broadcast and print often framed bloggers as revolutionary youth 
representatives (7 and 24 respectively). Bloggers were framed 4 times to 
represent their personal opinions on talk shows and only once to represent the 
opinion of the street. It is worth mentioning, however, that they were never 
framed to represent their personal opinion or the street in print. This 
discrepancy might be due to the fact that while on talk shows we can hear the 
question being asked and how it’s being framed, the same is not true for print 
where not only do we not know of the question asked to get the answers 
published, but the editorial process also includes much more filtering than that 
involved in live talk shows.  
Both print and broadcast framed bloggers mostly as heroes (13 and 31 
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respectively), followed by the victim frame (12 times in broadcast and 22 times 
in print). But while print framed bloggers as criminals 9 times (mostly in Al-
Ahram), broadcast never framed them as criminals. It is important to note here, 
however, that Al-Ahram skewed this rank significantly, framing bloggers 6 
times as criminals.  
5.3. Findings from Interviews with Media Professionals 
Interviews were conducted with five media professionals from each media 
platform studied; Rania El Malky, managing editor of the Daily News Egypt at 
the time the newspaper was studied, Ehab El Zelaky, managing editor of Al-
Masry Al-Youm, Hesham Younes, a journalist at Al-Ahram and the executive 
managing editor of its website, Reem Magued, Baladna Bel Masry’s presenter 
and Salma Rostom, producer of Ten PM at the time the show was studied. 
5.3.1. Increasing coverage of bloggers after January 25th  
All media professionals interviewed agreed that the increase in coverage of 
bloggers was due to the fact that those bloggers were now the story and the 
news itself and because they were able to cover events on the ground better 
than any professional media platform could.  
 Rostom believes the initial attention to bloggers came because the 
uprising was called for online through the We Are All Khaled Said Facebook 
page and so people and the media started becoming interested in online 
activists. One of the page’s founders, Wael Ghoneim, appeared for the first 
time on Ten PM in a moving episode on February 7th, 2011, immediately 
following his release after 11 days of detainment by the police. “So people 
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started seeing that there are people behind those pages and who aren’t getting 
paid but spend lots of effort to push towards the general good, not a personal 
benefit,” (Rostom, 2014). 
Because at certain events during the uprising the protestors were wary 
of mainstream media, bloggers were able to cover the events on their own 
platforms as well as give out interviews for mainstream media about them at a 
time when the mainstream media was not even allowed in Tahrir Square. 
“They were providing me with something, professionally, that I couldn’t do. 
Sometimes we couldn’t be on the ground, or we would have been beaten if we 
got inside [the square] because at a time television cameras weren’t even 
accepted in. But they [bloggers] were there, they were part of the events,” 
(Magued, 2014). Similarly, Younes called them “a main source of information 
that is accessible anytime without restrictions because they aren’t like official 
spokespeople who can only speak at certain times. They have no limits and no 
restrictions and they don’t adopt that diplomatic tone,” (2014). DNE, for 
instance, used social media to see what people are talking about and as a source 
for story ideas to compensate for the small team they had, El Malky explained. 
“When you don’t have like a 100 reporters everywhere, this, to you, is a 
resource to you,” (El Malky, 2014) but she stresses that because there are a lot 
of rumors floating online, they always had to double check and get back to the 
source before reporting on something they read on social media.  
 An interest in what those bloggers were doing, the role they played 
during the uprising and what they thought of the events also arose. El Malky 
calls them “the movers and shakers” at that time, (2014). El Zelaky says 
bloggers moved from opinion writers to news makers and public figures and 
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icons of the revolution and so were covered in those capacities. “It was a 
mixture between the political change that took place and the re-introduction of 
the old players of blogs in a new image,” (El Zelaky, 2014). He compares the 
media coverage of bloggers to those of politicians; he says he would cover 
their political activities just like he would cover those of political parties 
because they became political powers. Magued agrees, “They were a big part 
of what happened and played a big role…So the initial interest in them was 
what happened on the ground and then at a later phase the interest was in what 
they themselves were doing…Instead of going to them to compensate for the 
shortage we had in coverage, they became the stories” Maged (2014) said.  
 Only Magued and El Malky, however, gave violations against bloggers 
as one of the reasons why their coverage increased and both expressed their 
media platform’s interest in human rights cases. “After this phase they became 
more exposed and so more subject to oppression and so the stories became 
about the violations happening against them; be it against their freedom of 
expressions or ones that actually limit their freedom like cases against them, 
detaining some of them and so others would take stands to support them and so 
they became the news again,” (Magued, 2014). El Malky says the DNE was 
focused on human rights, democratization efforts, street protests and labor 
rights and bloggers were involved in al of those issues. “They weren’t just 
theorizers sitting around their laptops just typing away, they were out there on 
the street…	what they were doing fell perfectly in line with our agenda as a 
newspaper,” (El Malky, 2014).  
On why the DNE gave the most space to bloggers and put them on their 
front page and headlines, El Malky says it was the composition of DNE’s team, 
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all young journalists, made the newspaper interested in shedding light on the 
perspective of the youth who initiated the political change the country was 
going through. “These people are the news makers, they were young, fit the 
profile, were very good speakers and they are accessible…They represented a 
voice, an attitude and a way of thinking about the future of the country that we 
felt we wanted to amplify and give voice to,” (El Malky, 2014). 
5.3.2. Choosing which bloggers to host 
Bloggers, media professionals interviewed agreed, were not hosted only 
because they were blogging, but because they were bloggers and part of the 
revolution. “The main frame was the revolution; it was the origin of the 
story…So he would be hosted to tell his account of what happened or tell us 
about a post he wrote about an event that took place or a post him that got him 
threats from the authorities,” (Magued, 2014).  El Zelaky says it’s the value of 
the news itself that matters and not their identities as bloggers or otherwise. 
“You will see that most bloggers who were in the front page were mainly there 
for their identities as political activists not bloggers,” El Zelaky (2014). 
For media outlets, some bloggers were easier to host than others; be it 
because they were more accessible to the media, more credible and trusted 
because they’re known or because their names were famous and so people 
were interested in them over others. “If there are many people to choose from I 
will surely choose the person I know and trust because at this point there was a 
large number of people claiming to be activists and part of the Revolutionary 
Youth Coalition and so on. So for the sake of my credibility and to make sure I 
don’t host someone who turns out to be a liar, I choose the person I know and 
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know and was present at that event,” (Magued, 2014). She adds that she would 
not host someone “who isn’t known” unless they are the heroes behind the 
story she’s covering.  El Zelaky echoed similar feelings saying that the fame 
bloggers received after the uprising made them “figures I can interview,” (El 
Zelaky, 2014). Likewise, Rostom says they would not host someone who is not 
known on the blogosphere. “We chose those who had documents they 
published, those who were most viewed and had the most participation on their 
pages, those who were able to mobilize people in protests,” (Rostom (2014). 
Magued says it was easier to cover the story of a famous bloggers’ 
detention because the buzz created around it was bigger, his circle of friends 
had a wide reach and could easily access the media and because it was easier 
for them to trust news coming from this blogger or his entourage than from 
people they did not know. “Maybe if that person wasn’t famous and his friends 
knew he was kidnapped [detained without a warrant] they wouldn’t have been 
able to reach us. They might not have had the access to reach the media…This 
isn’t humane, but it’s the truth; if a group of people of people called me telling 
me our friend was kidnaped I will have a hard time publishing the story until I 
check that it’s true and then find a way to attract people to the story. But when 
they call me telling me Amr Gharbeya was kidnapped, I have a story and it’s 
ready. In other cases I will still have to form the story,” (Magued, 2014). So at 
a period where events were happening fast and the media was overwhelmed 
with news to cover, Magued believes the media made the mistake of shedding 
light on some figures and ignoring others. “It was unintentional and wasn’t 
only limited to bloggers, some names got famous and others didn’t. The events 
were happening too fast the last three years to the point where you didn’t have 
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time to look for stories; they imposed themselves. So despite of Alaa [Abdel 
Fattah] he became the story,” (Magued, 2014).  Magued adds that “Those 
whose court cases were alongside famous people didn’t necessarily receive any 
personal exposure, but their cases have.” 
5.3.3. Frames used with bloggers 
Magued and El Malky believe the frame used for every blogger depended on 
the context they were hosted in; be it in his capacity as an activist, a blogger, a 
political party member or a detainee in a military court case. Rostom agrees 
adding that they always asked their guests how they would like to be 
introduced. Younes, on the other hand, says once the blogger becomes active 
on the ground, they would use the term activist, and not blogger, to introduce 
them. But El Malky says they would normally identify a blogger as such 
because the word was familiar to their readers, which is not necessarily the 
case with other newspapers.  
El Zelaky comments on the different frames used for different bloggers 
saying “This is a sad topic,” (2014). He explains that the vision of the person in 
charge editorially and his evaluation of the person he’s covering is what mostly 
set whether the frame used for that person is positive or negative. “We can talk 
about guidelines, but in practice, it unfortunately isn’t entirely applied, 
especially if this particular story is coming from sections that have certain 
editorial styles,” (El Zelaky, 2014). He explains that some sections, like crime 
sections, are more sympathetic to the state than others and so might frame 
bloggers more negatively in news covering their court cases. He adds, 
however, that more famous bloggers “have gained a certain image or frame” 
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that can only change slightly from one reporter or editor to the other, but the 
frames might change drastically for others who do not have a set frame and 
image with the readers or the reporters, (El Zelaky, 2014). Younes, on the other 
hand, believes bloggers like Mahfouz and other prominent ones have 
connections and friends in the media and so receive more sympathetic 
coverage than others. 
When it came to familiarity, Magued says she adopts a formal or a 
familiar tone depending on the guest’s age and the way he wants to portray 
himself. This is why she will, for instance, adopt a more formal tone with 
prominent blogger Mostafa El Naggar if she’s hosting him, not as an activist or 
blogger, but as a parliamentary candidate alongside other candidates. 
When asked whether they were hosting bloggers as representatives of 
the revolution, Rostom starts off saying nobody is a representative of the 
revolution but some bloggers have the legitimacy to speak on behalf of the 
revolutionary youth, including bloggers like El Naggar who was a member of 
the parliament. “There are some who people trust to speak on their behalf,” 
(Rostom, 2014). 
5.4. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
It is clear that the media coverage of bloggers in both print and broadcast has 
seen dramatic shifts in editorial direction and increases in space given to 
coverage of bloggers and their opinions. Media professionals interviewed 
explained that increase saying bloggers were the movers and shakers at that 
time, they were able to cover events on the ground that the media could not 
cover and they started taking on more roles on the ground after the uprising, 
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including forming political parties and movements. Their coverage increased 
from a total of 9 mentions in 2010 to 118 mentions in 2011 across all three 
newspapers although Al-Ahram gave them the least space while the DNE gave 
them the biggest space. They were making headlines and, especially on the 
DNE, their coverage was often placed in front pages. This was an intentional 
editorial policy by DNE as they wanted to give voice to the youth who were 
making the news.  Al-Ahram, however, never put bloggers on the front page, 
showing that although the editorial direction changed across the board, it 
remained true that the state-owned newspaper showed less support of bloggers 
than the other two. DNE remained favorable towards bloggers, covering less-
prominent and English-language bloggers that other newspapers did not cover. 
It is worth noting that the two newspapers have different audience; while Al-
Ahram is more mainstream and reaches a wider audience, DNE’s readers are 
English-spoken, more middle and upper class and more familiar with bloggers 
than others. Broadcast also showed a significant increase in the space given to 
bloggers from 18 minutes in 2010 to 253 minutes in 2011,with Baladna Bel 
Masry covering bloggers the most extensively. Baladna Bel Masry also hosted 
a wide range of bloggers while Ten PM hosted the more mainstreamed 
bloggers. Both Maged and El Malky also expressed interest in bloggers 
because they were being targeted and oppressed at the time, something that no 
other media outlets expressed and so showing that the DNE and Baladna Bel 
Masry have different editorial directions than the other platforms studied. 
More importantly, the tone and frames used have changed in 2011. The 
frames used to portray bloggers were overwhelmingly positive with a few 
exceptions mostly in Al-Ahram and with less prominent bloggers. In print, the 
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leading identification frame was their activism, followed by their blogging 
identity. On broadcast, they were framed less as bloggers and more as activists 
and often received positive frames, especially the more prominent ones, 
possibly because television targets a wider audience that might not necessarily 
be familiar with the term blogger. The media highlighted their credibility, 
importance, heroism and expertise rather than using neutral frames that did not 
necessarily reflect what they did in terms of activism or blogging. They are 
framed to represent the youth, to be heroes or victims and they are quoted and 
hosted as political analysts. Talk shows hosted them to speak on behalf of 
revolutionaries on several occasions. During the parliamentary elections, 
bloggers were hosted alongside political analysts. They were normally asked to 
analyze the situation, predict the development of the events and speak on 
behalf of the youth. There was also an obvious familiar tone between the 
presenter and the blogger hosted on talk shows studied, especially when the 
blogger was more prominent. In print, they were quoted to comment on hot 
topics like Khaled Said’s case, for instance. Their pictures were often featured 
and news of their accomplishments, arrests and activities they took part in were 
also covered across all media studied.  
All five media people interviewed agreed that the frame differed 
according to the context the blogger was hosted or quoted in. Some expressed 
that the identity frame differed according to the blogger’s will. Commenting on 
the positivity or negativity of the frame used for different bloggers, El Zelaky 
argues that this largely depends on the reporter’s own view of the blogger but 
that the ore prominent bloggers who have a set image in the minds of the 
readers are normally portrayed in a more consistent frame. Similarly, Younes 
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argues that prominent bloggers’ connections with the media mean they are 
covered more positively than others. Finally, Rostom believes that some 
prominent bloggers have earned the right to speak on behalf of the 
revolutionary youth and so they are often framed as representatives of this 
segment. 
This reflects a dramatic change in status of bloggers in the span of one 
year that made them not only the center and maker of news, but also experts on 
current events and sources that give the article or segment certain revolutionary 
credibility. They became more trusted than mainstream reporters and their 
social media accounts became sources for credible coverage and analysis that 
represents a key sector of the political scene at the moment; the revolutionaries. 
News of their wins, and more importantly, their arrests became hard to ignore, 
especially with more prominent bloggers. An example of that, for instance, is 
Alaa Abdel Fattah’s arrest, which received large media attention and 
overwhelmingly positive media framing in 2011 but he did not receive a 
friction of this attention and positive framing when he was arrested in 2006.  
This gives prominent bloggers a certain immunity that is drawn from 
the notion that their arrests or detentions are now cases of public opinion and 
acknowledged by the now-sympathizing mainstream media. It is this fame that 
drove many media outlets to solicit columns from prominent bloggers who 
established audience credibility. In the period studied Mostafa El Naggar wrote 
a column for Al-Masry Al-Youm and Abdel Fattah wrote one for Al-Shorouk, 
which is also a shift in the relationship dynamics between mainstream media 
and the prominent bloggers that has its own implications.  
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But it is also important to note that with this immunity and fame, come 
risks. Bloggers covered by the media have more to lose now as they become 
more familiar to the public and the media and so are put more into the 
mainstream light. Their mistakes and opinions will be far more visible than 
before. They grew to establish credibility with members of the offline public 
that they will now be concerned with maintaining.  
It is important to differentiate here between the coverage of prominent 
bloggers, which is mostly positive, and others less prominent, who might not 
receive the same attention or similar framing.  
Media professionals interviewed agreed that they preferred popular 
bloggers who were active during the uprising over lesser known ones. The 
popular bloggers who are prominent, at least on the blogosphere, have more 
credibility than others and are more trusted by both, the media, and the 
audience. Those bloggers are also more interesting to the audience, which 
means that the media covered them more intensely and used them as case 
studies to represent general issues, Magued believes. Others might not have the 
same reach or connections the prominent bloggers have and so might not be 
able to get their stories across to the media.   
Less prominent bloggers like Maikel Nabil and Ayman Mansour were 
portrayed in a less positive light than cases involving star bloggers like Abdel 
Fattah. And while DNE often quoted less prominent bloggers, newspapers like 
Al-Ahram and Al-Masry Al-Youm ignored less prominent bloggers and only 
covered star bloggers. Prominent bloggers were often framed as political 
analysts, revolutionary youth representatives and heroes by print and broadcast 
while lesser prominent ones were often framed as eyewitnesses and defendants.  
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It is also important to note that although 40 were arrested during the 
2011 Maspero events, only prominent blogger Abdel Fattah was covered 
intensely by the shows studied. Similarly, although 800 were injured and 10 
killed during the November 19th Tahrir events, only prominent blogger Malek 
Mostafa, Ahmed Harara — who lost an eye during the uprising and another 
during those events — and Al-Masry Al-Youmn photographer were intensively 
covered by the media.  
Bloggers have also shown tendencies to support each other’s cases and 
bring it to the media spotlight when they’re interviewed. This is an indication 
of them running in the same circles, but also of them promoting one another.  
The findings suggest that in the process of reproducing hegemony in 
the new social order under the political situation in Egypt, bloggers are being 
coopted into the historical bloc, (Gramsci, 1971). Because elements of the 
previous historical bloc had peeled off, namely individuals leading an uprising 
and the mainstream media, civil society and some political parties following 
suit, hegemony had to be renewed. In the reproduction of the new social order 
after the uprising, consent had to be renewed through coopting 
counterhegemonic elements that have become influential players. A main 
component of the elements used to manufacture consent is collaboration with 
cultural institutions and the mainstream media (Hall, 1977), which, based on 
the findings, have started including elements of counter-hegemony that they 
were not paying attention to before, possibly to gain legitimacy. As Gramsci 
argues, civil society rules through achieving consent and propagating the ruling 
class ideology through influencing people to adopt dominating classes’ values 
and ideas as the general interest. Looking at the frames used with bloggers, we 
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can instantly see that bloggers, especially the prominent ones, are often framed 
to represent the revolution and the youth. They are often asked to analyze and 
comment, not as individual activists, but rather as representatives of the 
revolution itself. This means that the interests they represent, although not 
necessarily in-line with the previous regime’s interests, are framed as the 
general interests of the public. The priorities they present are then presented as 
the priorities of the public.  
The above-mentioned findings of mainstream media concluded analysis 
reflect on an increasing readership and followership of prominent bloggers, and 
so ultimately the domination of those few bloggers over blogosphere as the 
majority of other bloggers struggle to get heard. This support previous Arab 
bloggers theorists, like David Faris’, findings. Faris argues that only star 
bloggers are able to set mainstream media agenda and push stories onto the 
media (2008), which is proving true with the choice of bloggers hosted. Most 
media hosted the more popular, star bloggers and only covered their issues and 
cases. This proves that “some bloggers are vastly more influential than others, 
continue to gain further influence, and make it harder for newer bloggers to 
crack the scene,” (Faris, 2008: 3). Lotan et al argues that those star bloggers 
and Tweeps become influential and their prominence and influence are 
amplified due to an information cascades effect whereby it’s easier for people 
to adopt influential, credible people’s opinions rather than forming their own 
(2011). This adds to the possible polarization of the blogosphere and the micro-
blogosphere in the Egyptian context as users cluster around prominent bloggers 
whose beliefs coincide with their own and turn to those bloggers to form 
further opinions on current issues. The more prominent bloggers are also 
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gaining more influence and popularity, online and offline, while others struggle 


























Chapter VI: Comparative profiles of prominent and 
less prominent political bloggers interviewed. 
 
This chapter looks at the findings from bloggers’ interviews as well as the 
quantitative content analysis of their respective blogs to compare prominent 
bloggers to less prominent ones as well as the nature and frequency of their 
blogs’ content before and after January 25th. It mainly serves to see who the 
most prominent bloggers are and compare their profiles to other bloggers 
studied as well as see the effects of prominence and their post-January 25th 
status on their blogs’ content. 
6.1. Blogger profiles in blog statistics, background and education  
 
6.1.1. Prominent: Esraa Abdel Fattah 
 
Twitter Followers: 456,000 
Number of Tweets: 67,100 
Joined Twitter in: July 2009 
Started blogging in: N/A 
Times mentioned in the media: 11 (4 by Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2 by Al-Ahram, 
3 by DNE and 2 by TenPM) 
Followers/Likes on Facebook: 18,527 
First Facebook note showing: Notes not showing 
Blog mentioned on Facebook: None 
Blog mentioned on Twitter: None 
Description on Twitter: Journalist and digital marketing specialist at Youm7 
Description on Facebook: “Civil society consultant, a columnist and social 
media specialist at Youm7 and political activist.” On her personal page, the 
description is “digital and social media consultant at Youm7.” 
 
Framed as: 
 Activist: 6  
 Blogger: 2 
 Revolutionary Youth Representative: 4 
 Political Analyst: 3 
 Hero: 6 
Familiar: 1 
Personal Representative: 1 
 
The interview with Esraa was held at her regular restaurant in Mohandessin, a 
relatively smart area of Cairo. She was dressed formally in readiness for 
attending the inauguration of a library to which she had been invited. Although 
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the interview was conducted in Arabic, she often used English terms and 
expressions showing an average command of English although with an accent. 
She had with her an iPhone, a Samsung smart phone and an iPad. 
Abdel Fattah is a journalist and describes herself as digital and social 
media consultant at Youm7 newspaper. She was born on July 10th, 1978 and 
moved to Oman with her father, a mechanical engineer, and mother, a teacher, 
before returning to Egypt and graduating from the Faculty of Languages in Ain 
Shams University (one of the two main public universities in Cairo) in 2000.  
Five years after graduation, Abdel Fattah started getting politically 
involved when Ayman Nour was arrested during the presidential elections in 
2005, after which she became active in Nour’s Al-Ghad Party. Three years 
later, she founded a Facebook group in 2008 to support textile workers and call 
for the April 6th strike. The group attracted 74,000 followers and was the first 
Facebook group calling for a general strike and the group and Abdel Fattah 
subsequently gained a lot of media and state attention. She was then dubbed 
Facebook Girl, becoming the first Egyptian woman to gain media popularity as 
a social media activist.  
She was soon after arrested and detained in prison for more than two 
weeks before getting released and maintaining a low-profile for subsequent 
months. She worked with multinational companies in the field of human 
resources and says she was harassed into quitting after her arrest in 2008. She 
was not able to find a job in the same field afterwards due to the publicity 
surrounding her arrest and made a career shift into civil society. A few months 
later, she became active again with Mohamed El Baradei’s presidential 
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campaign before founding the Egyptian Democratic Academy in 2009 and 
becoming active in several other NGOs and initiatives.  
During the 2011 uprising she became active in covering and Tweeting 
the events as well as speaking to the mainstream media. She publicized the 
January 25th protests on Facebook through an Al-Jazeera forum and other 
social media tools and then fundraised for the logistics of the event. After the 
uprising, she won the New Generation Democratic Activist Award from 
Freedom House, was named one of the Arabian Business Magazine’s 100 most 
powerful Arab women and was rumored by the media to have been nominated 
for the Nobel Peace Prize.  
She remained the deputy chairman of the Democratic Academy she 
founded until she left in June 2014 to join Youm7 newspaper. She was a regular 
columnist for Al-Masry Al-Youm after the uprising but was stopped from 
writing at the newspaper under the new management in 2012. She was then 
approached by Youm7 in March 2013 to become a consultant and was asked 
back in by Al-Masry Al-Youm but refused the latter. Following the uprising, 
she had pitched a television program idea to Egyptian business tycoon and 
media owner Naguib Sawiris, whom she refers to by his first name. Sawiris’s 
channel, OTV, called her later and she presented the program for a short span. 
At the time of the interview, she was planning to run in the parliamentary 
elections that were to take place by the end of 2014. 
Abdel-Fattah describes herself as upper-middle class. She says she was 
financially independent since being a university student, had her own computer 
since 2004 and never had a problem accessing computers, smart phones or the 
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internet. She had a smartphone during the 2011 uprising and used it to cover 
the events.  
6.1.2. Prominent: Loai Nagati 
 
Twitter Followers: 107K 
Number of Tweets: 47.3K 
Joined Twitter in: May 2008 
Started blogging in: 2008 
Last blog post: January 2011 
Times mentioned in the media: 4 (all by DNE) 
Followers/Likes on Facebook: 4,281 
First Facebook note showing:  April 2010 
Number of Facebook notes: 8 
Blog mentioned on Twitter: None (in August 2014 it mentioned two satirical 
websites/blogs he ran) 
Blog mentioned on Facebook: None (in August 2014 it mentioned two 
satirical websites/blogs he ran) 
Description on Twitter: “Freelance web developer” (used to mention two 
satirical websites he ran) 
Description on Facebook: “Freelance web designer and developer” 
 
Framed as: N/A 
The interview was held at Nagati’s office in Maadi. He used a lot of technical 
and professional English terms with a good accent. Born in 1990, Nagati lived 
with his family in Minya, Upper Egypt, before moving to Cairo to study 
computer science at the private Shorouk Academy. His father is a doctor. He 
has owned a private business, Abajora (Lampshade) Productions, in the field of 
media and web development and design since October 2013. He also founded 
and managed Abolhol (Sphinx) News, an online satirical news website, in 
December 2013.        
He blogged in the technical fields as well as political and social fields, 
forming several blogs, the first of which was in 2008.    
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Nagati was detained in June 2011 during the Tahrir clashes he was 
Tweeting about, but was released due to health concerns and pressure from 
social media activists who created a Facebook in his support, stressing that 
Nagati is a blogger and an activist not a thug. Bloggers also called for a 
blogging day to demand the release of Nagati. Three similar days were held 
during that time to oppose SCAF, military trials and sexual harassment.   
He then became a social media editor at Al-Shorouk newspaper in 
November2011 and then moved in May 2012 to become a digital marketeer at 
Al-Masry Al-Youm after the newspaper approached him to join their team. He 
left a year later in May 2013.     
Although Nagati uses social media for his work and free time, unlike 
other bloggers interviewed, he mainly uses his laptop for his blogging and 
social media. He says he never had an issue connecting to the internet, even in 
Minya.           
Content Analysis of Blogs: Loaispeaks.blogspot.com 
Topics discussed in October 2010: (10 posts) 
Philosophy (5 posts) 
Society (2 posts) 
Literature (2 posts) 
Topics discussed in October 2011: N/A (no posts in October 2011) 
The only post in 2011 was in January and it was a poem called “Get Angry”  
 
Literature (1 post) 
 
Number of posts by year: 
2010: 10 posts 
2011: 1 post 
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Blogs in: Arabic 
Ads: Google ads 
Links: No 
 
6.1.3. Prominent: Sandmonkey 
 
Twitter Followers: 15K 
Number of Tweets: 100K 
Joined Twitter in: April 2007 
Started blogging in: 2004 
Last blog post: January 2015 
Times mentioned in the media: 2 (1 on Baladna Bel Masry and 1 on DNE) 
Followers/Likes on Facebook: 3,291 
First Facebook note showing:  February 2009 
Number of Facebook notes: 118 
Blog mentioned on Twitter: None 
Blog mentioned on Facebook: None 
Description on Twitter: “Award winning Blogger (Best ME blog in 2006, 
BOB Best English Blog in 2011), Daily News columnist, Social Media 
strategist, & occasionally topples governments.” 




The interview was held at Sandmonkey’s office in Zamalek. He spoke 
excellent English. He identifies himself on his blog as a “micro-celebrity, 
blogger, activist, new media d-bag, pain in the ass.” 
Born in 1981 in Heliopolis, Cairo, Sandmonkey comes from an upper 
class family and has attended one of the most expensive English-language 
private schools in Cairo before living for five years in the U.S. to study. He has 
a dual master’s degree in business administration and accounting. He was an 
investment banker and consultant for two years in Cairo and Qatar before 
quitting to focus on the revolution, as he puts it. During this time, he worked 
with a company dealing with luxury brands and freelanced on projects with 
several of the leading companies in Egypt. He now has a private business in 
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digital consultancy and social media and an office in the upscale area of 
Zamalek. Sandmonkey’s mother was a member of Mubarak’s now-defunct 
ruling party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), and the reason he became a 
blogger. He says he started blogging because he “had a personal vendetta with 
the NDP,” (Sandmonkey 2014) which, he says “ruined” his mother. This 
shows the family’s political affiliations affected Sandmonkey and got him 
interested in the field of writing and politics, much like many other prominent 
bloggers interviewed.  
He was one of the first Egyptian bloggers, starting in 2004, and was 
frequently quoted by international media as he spoke fluent English. He is a 
bridge-blogger (Lynch, 2007) who mainly blogs in English and targets 
English-speakers locally and an international audience. Unlike most first-wave 
bloggers who are leftists, Sandmonkey is a libertarian. He showed pride in 
being one of the “30 old-guard” bloggers in Egypt, a term he uses to describe 
the founding generation of the Egyptian blogosphere. He believes those 30 
bloggers used blogs and Twitter before anyone else and in a different way from 
the majority of users. Although has a large English-reading following, an 
article he wrote in Arabic and published on Tumblr in January 2014 was read 
two million times and shared 10,000 times.  
Despite this prominence, he only revealed his identity for the first time 
in February 2011. He was active during the 2011 uprising, covering events on 
social media and giving interviews to local and international media. He then 
joined El Masreyin El Ahrar party, founded by businessman Naguib Sawiris, 
and ran on its lists for the parliamentary elections of 2011-12. Afterwards he 
started writing regular columns for Daily News Egypt under its new 
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management, from April 2012 until March 2014. He also writes for Al-Monitor 
and several others and appeared in a scene of a popular Ramadan sitcom in 
2014 playing himself as the ‘famous blogger Sandmonkey’. 
Sandmonkey calls himself an upper-class blogger and has always had 



























6.1.4. Prominent: Mostafa El Naggar 
 
Twitter Followers: 775K 
Number of Tweets: 18.2K 
Joined Twitter in: March 2008 
Started blogging in: 2007 
Last blog post:  03 July 2014 (the one before it was in November 2010) 
Times mentioned in the media: 4 (2 by TenPm, 1 by Baladna Bel Masry and 
1 by Al Masry Al Youm) 
Followers/Likes on Facebook: 153K 
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Started writing Facebook notes in:  October 2008 
Number of Facebook notes: 244 
Blog mentioned on Twitter: None 
Blog mentioned on Facebook: http://anam3ahom.blogspot.com/ and 
http://wenekdar.blogspot.com/ 
Description on Twitter: “Dentist, Writer and former MP” 




The interview with El Naggar was held at his dentistry clinic, which he co-
owns with two colleagues, in the middle-class area of Nasr City. He spoke 
Arabic mainly but knew conversational English.  
 Born in 1980, El Naggar graduated the faculty of dentistry at the public 
Cairo University, one of the two major state universities in Egypt. But he also 
got a scholarship to study Mass Communication at the elite private American 
University in Cairo. He then worked for a year as a researcher in the political 
science department before he quit to join Baradei’s presidential campaign after 
January 25th. El Naggar was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood until 2005, 
when he left after disagreeing on core ideals and became an active member of 
the Baradei National Association for Change. He was very active during the 
January 25th uprising, afterward helping to found Al Adl Party and was a 
general coordinator in Baradei’s presidential bid. He stirred controversy when 
he signed a statement, along with 13 other parties, that allowed SCAF to 
uphold the extension of emergency law but later retracted the endorsement. He 
then ran in the 2011-12 parliamentary elections and won for the Nasr City 
district despite limited funds having been available for his campaign. He was 
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the only Al Adl member to win a seat in the elections and one of very few of 
the revolutionary youth. El	 Naggar	 writes	 regular	 columns	 at	 Al-Shorouk,	 Al-Dostour,	 Al-
Masry	Al-Youm	and	Youm7.	Although	he	only	wrote	for	mainstream	media	twice	before	January	25th,	both	times	for	Al-Shorouk,	he	was	asked	by	Al-
Masry	 Al-Youm	 and	 Youm7	 to	 contribute	 to	 them	 regularly	 after	 the	uprising.	He	has	been	arrested	four	times;	in	2000,	2003	and	twice	in	2010	but	was	never	convicted	or	imprisoned.		
El Naggar comes from a certain elite as he comes from a highly 
educated and cultured family and most of his family members are politically 
engaged. Half his family members are members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the other half leftists and socialists, El Naggar said, and so he was always 
encouraged by them to become involved in politics. In fact, his grandfather 
was a Brotherhood leader. “I was raised joining the social activities of the 
Brotherhood,” he says (2014) indicating his family’s political orientation 
shaped his interests. His whole family, he says, are either engineers or doctors, 
showing a certain financial elite as well. El Naggar, he maintained his dentistry 
practice because he wanted to be financially independent and did not want 
money to be a tool to pressurize him. 
 He has had a smart phone since 2009 and used it to post on social 
media but blogged from his laptop. He now mainly uses his tablet. He said he 




























6.1.5. Prominent: Asmaa Mahfouz 
 
Twitter Followers: 419K 
Number of Tweets: 38.7K 
Joined Twitter in: December 2008 
Started blogging in: January 2009 
Last blog post: July 2012 
Times mentioned in the media: 13 
Followers/Likes on Facebook: 213.2K 
Started writing Facebook notes in:  2011 
Number of Facebook notes: 207 but only 4 show 
Blog mentioned on Twitter: None 
Blog mentioned on Facebook: http://wolf-inside.blogpost.com  
Description on Twitter: Her Facebook profile 







Revolutionary Youth Representative: 3 
Criminal: 1 
Political Analyst: 2 
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The interview with Asmaa Mahfouz took place at her house in a middle class 
area of Ain Shams. She spoke mainly Arabic but used a few English words. 
 Born in 1985, Mahfouz studied business administration at the private 
university of Modern Academy Maadi and worked for international companies 
and locally renowned ones like LinkDOTNet. She started working in her first 
year of university as an office manager in the field of sales in call centers and 
then got gradually promoted. Although she worked for five years in 
LinkDOTNet, she left as she needed time off to focus on politics. “I was 
making good money; I was making LE3,000 a month and about LE6,000 every 
three months in commission,” Mahfouz said during the interview. She then 
joined a documentary-making company, handling their public relations but left 
as they could no longer pay her. After that she lived off her savings as well as 
television appearances and occasional freelance contributions to newspapers. 
 Although not previously a follower of the news or engaged in politics, 
Mahfouz started developing an interest in 2008 through Facebook groups and 
forums. She co-founded the April 6th movement and it was her experience and 
training in sales and marketing at those companies that equipped her to become 
the group’s media coordinator, communicating with the people on the street, 
using plain language to get the movement’s message across to the maximum 
number of ordinary people.  
 Mahfouz’s name became famous when she posted a video on YouTube 
a week before the January 25th uprising, calling for everyone to join the 
protests against a corrupt regime. She sought to shame men into taking part, 
saying she, a woman, would take the risk and take to the streets and not be 
afraid. Egyptian media have since talked of her as one of the sparks of the 
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uprising. During the uprising she was very active speaking to the media and 
covering the events and became a leading member of the Revolutionary Youth 
Coalition. 
 After the uprising she became one of the five people to receive the 
Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought awarded by the European Parliament 
and was ranked number 381 of the World’s 500 Most Influential Arabs by 
Arabian Business magazine. With her name and that of her April 6th co-
founders were among names considered eligible to win the Nobel Peace Prize 
in 2011, which went to Yemeni activist Tawakol Kirman. Mahfouz was 
arrested in 2011 for defaming SCAF and underwent a military trial that stirred 
support from various activists and political leaders, including Ayman Nour and 
Mohammed Baradei. She was released on a bail of LE20,000 and acquitted 
later, along with blogger Loai Nagati. Fellow activists had collected her bail 
money. In 2012 she was tried in absentia on charges of assaulting and 
slandering a man. She was sentenced to a year in prison and a LE2,000 fine, a 
sentence that was appealed and revoked three months later. 
 Mahfouz is now married with a child and so is focusing more on her 
family life. She says she would love to work for a newspaper or have regular 
columns but she was never offered this opportunity except with newly-
launched websites that often have no budget to pay her. She does not consider 
herself a professional writer, saying there are others who can do the job better. 
Aside from occasional online news outlets, she wrote only once, for Al Badil 
newspaper 
She uses her laptop and her smart phone to write but her smart phone to 




















6.1.6. Prominent: Amr Ezzat 
 
Twitter Followers: 188K 
Number of Tweets: 40.9K 
Joined Twitter in: January 2008 
Started blogging in:  2005 
Last blog post: June 2013 
Times mentioned in the media: N/A 
Followers/Likes on Facebook: 35.6K 
Started writing Facebook notes in:  July 2007 
Number of Facebook notes: 93 
Blog mentioned on Twitter: Mabadali.blogspot.com 
Blog mentioned on Facebook: None 
Description on Twitter: His blog and page on Al-Masry Al-Youm 
Description on Facebook: Researcher at EIPR and writer at Al-Masry Al-
Youm 
 
The interview with Amr Ezzat took place at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal 
Rights (EIPR) head office where Ezzat works as a researcher and is in charge 
of the religious freedom program. 
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 He studied at a state school in Cairo and studied engineering in Cairo 
University, graduating in 2002. He then studied for a degree in philosophy at 
the same university and graduated in 2010. His father is an engineer and was 
the director of the then-newly privatized chain department stores Omar 
Effendi. Before that his father was an employee in the ministry of investment 
and his mother works in tourism. He says his parents are well-educated and 
cultured and his brother was a doctor then became a documentary and film 
director. 
 Ezzat’s involvement with politics started when he was a member of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s media committee, where he had a network of media 
contacts. He started writing for Islamist media platforms, including the 
Brotherhood’s Islam Online, before writing on arts and culture at the local Al 
Mawwkef Al Arabi magazine, which he describes as “of low quality.” Although 
the magazine was not mainstream, it was more liberal than the platforms he 
used to write for before then. His online writing started in 2004 with online 
forums and then in 2005 he separated from the Brotherhood, joined Kifaya 
movement and started his blog, writing about a diversity of topics. In 2007 he 
decided to leave the field of engineering and focus on writing and journalism, 
joining Al Badil newspaper in its start-up year. He then started writing for Al-
Shorouk from 2008 to December 2010. During those two years he was not a 
columnist, but rather a reporter in the society section, covering cultural and 
social issues. He then left for Al-Masry Al-Youm where he was supposed to be 
a reporter, also for the society section. But a month later the uprising took 
place and he became a columnist at the newspaper. After the uprising, Ezzat 
started getting more space in mainstream media platforms, writing regularly for 
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Al-Masry Al-Youm and contributing to Mada Masr, Jadaliyya and Al Arabiya, 
among others. At the end of 2011 he joined the EIPR but continued writing 
columns until April 2014 when he stopped writing anywhere due to what he 
called a “general state of depression,” and a need to focus on his research 
work. 
 Ezzat was never arrested but was threatened by the state security 
several times. He says his father was “known” so the security apparatus called 
his father to warn his son. This might also be one of the reasons he was safer 
from arrests than other bloggers who did not have the same connections as 
Ezzat’s father. 
 Ezzat has two blogs, one studied here and the other, amr-
ezzat.blogspot.com, is a journalistic archive for what he wrote in Al-Shorouk 
from 2008 to 2010.  





















Links: Yes (Include Malek Mostafa, Mona Seif, Hossam El Hamalawy and 
Wael Abbas)	
 
6.1.7. Less-Prominent: Mohamed Abo-elgheit 
 
Twitter Followers: 6,374 
Number of Tweets: 3,320 
Joined Twitter in: April 2011 
Started blogging in: 2010 
Last blog post: 2012 
Followers/Likes on Facebook: 30.2K 
Started writing Facebook notes in:  June 2008 
Number of Facebook notes: 27 
Blog mentioned on Twitter: None 
Blog mentioned on Facebook: http://gedarea.blogspot.com 
Description on Twitter: Trying to be a human, then a blogger then a doctor. 
Description on Facebook: Researcher/Editor at Al Hurra 
 
The interview with Abo-elgheit took place at a coffee shop in the middle-class 
area of Bab El Louk, by his home.  
Abo-elgheit studied at a school founded by the Brotherhood and went 
on to study medicine at the public Assiut University, later moving to Cairo to 
work at Imbaba Hospital. He says political science did not seem to offer a 
viable livelihood but nevertheless quit medicine to focus on journalism. His 
family members are affiliated with the Brotherhood and his father is a doctor 
and his mother a teacher. He says his family’s political interest affected him as 
they raised him to object to the regime and not be afraid of the state. His 
parents participated in Brotherhood protests and his father was often arrested 
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and “his prison bag was always prepared,” said Abo-elgheit (2014) “so this 
ambiance isn’t strange to me.” 
He was involved in online forums, reading groups and cultural salons 
and moved in the same circles as some of the now-prominent bloggers who 
were once affiliated with the Brotherhood, although he did not necessarily 
receive the same attention they have. He was coordinator of the Islamist 
presidential candidate Mohamed Abo El Fottouh’s campaign in Assiut.  
Abo-elgheit contributed to Aswat Arabiya and worked for Al-Shorouk 
newspaper. Unlike more prominent bloggers who were invited to write 
columns, Abo-elgheit asked an acquaintance who was then the managing editor 
of Al-Shorouk to help him get a job there and he started out as a non-paid 
trainee in the last page of the newspaper. Because he was the only one who 
spoke a little English, he was asked to cover Salman Rushdie in 2012 and it 
was because of this coverage that his skills were appreciated and he was able to 
finally start writing in the newspaper. From then he worked his way up and 
proved himself before he started writing opinion pieces in the newspaper in 
2013. He was also asked by blogger and journalist Nora Younes to write for 
Al-Masry Al-Youm’s website. It has to be mentioned, however, that Younes’ 
attitude is favorable towards bloggers and at this time she invited many 
bloggers to write for the portal, but not the print edition. 
Abo-elgheit made a few media appearances with the BBC, Tahrir TV, 
ONTV and Jazeera Mubashir. The media coverage he received was generated 
mainly by a blog post he wrote after the uprising, talking about the rights of the 
poor. The post went viral and was soon picked up by a popular satellite show 
El	Sayed,					214	
and then the media started contacting him. He believes it was his connections 
with prominent bloggers and writers that gave his article this attention.  
He is now a producer for Al Hurra channel, a US public diplomacy 


















6.1.8. Less-Prominent: Ahmed Badawy 
 
Twitter Followers: 48K 
Number of Tweets: 125K 
Joined Twitter in: October 2009 
Started blogging in: 2006 
Last blog post: February 2015 
Followers/Likes on Facebook:  2,175 
Started writing Facebook notes in:  2007 
Number of Facebook notes: 755 
Blog mentioned on Twitter: bad-way.blogspot.com 
Blog mentioned on Facebook: bad-way.blogspot.com 
Description on Twitter: “I can’t find words to describe myself even though 
my hobby is writing, I am lonely and trying not to be depressed, I believe in 
freedom and I am active in public work.” 
Description on Facebook: Teaching Assistant at Physics Academy. 
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The interview with Ahmed Badawy took place at his office at the Egyptian 
Democratic Academy, where he was an instructor and a project manager from 
December 2013 to November 2014.  
Born in 1984, Badawy went to a private Islamic school in Cairo and 
then studied electrical power engineering at Helwan University in Greater 
Cairo, graduating in 2007.  Badawy’s father is a lawyer and a former member 
of the NDP and his mother is a director at the Police Academy. He was 
working at the local business tycoon Sewedy and “getting paid four times 
more” than his current job but left it to make politics his work and so he can be 
sustainably active and engaged. He also published a book in Arabic titled 
Thoughts of a Modern Egyptian Prophet.  
Before January 25th, Badawy was a member of the higher committee of 
Ayman Nour’s Al Ghad party, and was in charge of handling his presidential 
campaign’s social media. He co-founded Abol Fottouh’s Masr Al Qaweya 
party in October 2012 and has been a leading member since then and was a 
member in his presidential campaign, handling social media. 
Despite the fact that he was in two presidential campaigns (those of 
Nour and Aboul-Futtouh) and an important civil organization in Egypt, 
Badawy was hosted only three times on mainstream media after the uprising 
and only wrote one article for Al-Shorouk although he had approached 
publications before but received no response. One of those times was on a 
show with Esraa Abdel Fattah as presenter —he worked with Abdel Fattah at 
the EDA, which she had co-founded. He believes his limited media 
appearances are due to him attacking the former president’s son, Gamal 
Mubarak. 
El	Sayed,					216	
He does not have a DSL connection at home but has internet on his 





























6.1.9. Less-Prominent: Mahmoud Saber 
 
Twitter Followers: 12.3K 
Number of Tweets: 40.9K 
Joined Twitter in: September 2007 
Started blogging in: 2005 
Last blog post: 2011 
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Blog mentioned on Twitter: None 
Description on Twitter: “Everyday counts, unfortunately” 
 
The interview took place at a coffee shop in Zamalek. Saber spoke Arabic and 
used several English expressions. 
 He studied sociology at Ain Shams University and now works as the 
MENA coordinator for an American civil society for advocacy and video. 
Saber was part of Youth for Change movement and several others and was 
politically active since 2005 and took part in major protests and sit-ins. 
 Born in 1987, Saber was one of the early bloggers, starting in 2005 at 
the age of 17 under a pseudonym. Although he moved in the same circles as 
the most prominent bloggers, Saber believes he had neither the emotional 
capacity nor the support of activist bloggers like Alaa Abdel Fattah. Although 
he was present with Wael Abbas, Malek Mostafa and the bloggers who 
covered the sexual harassment incident in 2006, he never wrote about it 
because he was too depressed to do so. He says he has an issue with fame as he 
always wanted to maintain his privacy; so whenever a blog became famous he 
would shut it down and start another. He adopted a more personal and 
emotional attitude towards blogging that was not shared by other bloggers 
interviewed. He stopped blogging in 2011 and was inactive on social media 
during the uprising and during Morsi’s presidency; two crucial times for social 
media.  
 Saber wrote for Al Badil once and one blog post to Huffington Post in 
2008 when he was in a workshop in the U.S. 




6.1.10. Less-Prominent: Bassem Fathy 
 
Twitter Followers: 36.2K 
Number of Tweets: 41.5K 
Joined Twitter in: June 2009 
Started blogging in: May 2014 
Last blog post: April 2010 
Times mentioned in the media: 2 
Followers/Likes on Facebook: 366 
Started writing Facebook notes in:  April 2010 
Number of Facebook notes: 50 
Blog mentioned on Twitter: 4democracy.wordpress.com 
Blog mentioned on Facebook: 4democracy.wordpress.com 
Description on Twitter: “Vive moi, pas le roi. Patriotism is the virtue of the 
vicious. Dolce far niente.” 
Description on Facebook: Former Program officer at Freedom House. 
 
The interview took place at a coffee shop in Heliopolis. Fathy spoke mainly 
Arabic but is fluent in English, French and German. 
 He graduated the faculty of sciences at Cairo University in 2006 and 
studied Mass Communication at the university’s Open Education Center. His 
parents are both Arabic teachers and he describes his family as middle class. 
 Fathy worked as an assistant program officer at Wadi Environmental 
Science Center from July 2007 to March 2009 before switching to a civil 
society career, interning at Mobilize.org Network in Washington and training 
in the field of human rights. He says he left engineering to work in politics and 
civil society because he wanted the work he gets paid for to be in sync with his 
interests and to have more time to dedicate to those fields. He also co-founded 
and worked with several initiatives advocating democracy, including EDA, 
April 6th, the Baradei presidential campaign, One World Foundation, Fredrich 
Naumann Foundation and Freedom House, where he worked as a program 
officer from July 2011 to October 2013. He also served a consultant 
monitoring the Egyptian elections in 2011 using a software called U-Shahid. 
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He is a member of the Revolution Youth Coalition and was also the editor in 
chief of Elma7rosa.com radio.  
 Fathy was detained in January 2008 and July and November 2009. He 
received a one-year suspended jail sentence in 2013 and Freedom House’s 
office in Cairo was shut down so he went back to engineering until making 
plans to travel to the UK to study conflict and security. He writes for Fikra 
Forum, sponsored by Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He said he 
tried writing for newspapers but was only given an opportunity at Al-Masry Al-
Youm online. He calls this ‘internet writing’ and says it did not meet his 
objective of writing  columns. 
He reported never having an issue connecting to the internet at home or 
on the go and said money was no issue to him. 
   
Content	Analysis	of	Blog:	4democracy.wordpress.com 




















6.1.11. Less-Prominent: Ali Hisham 
 
Twitter Followers: 20K 
Number of Tweets: 77.3K 
Joined Twitter in: February 2011 
Started blogging in: 2008 
Last blog post: January 2015 
Followers/Likes on Facebook: 361 
Started writing Facebook notes in:  February 2011 
Number of Facebook notes: 2 
Blog mentioned on Twitter: kobbaya.com 
Blog mentioned on Facebook: kobbaya.com 
Description on Twitter: An Egyptian writer and blogger 
Description on Facebook: Freelance writer 	Born	 in	 1997,	Hisham	 is	 the	 youngest	 blogger	 interviewed.	We	met	 at	 a	coffee	shop	 in	Heliopolis	as	he	was	visiting	Cairo	 from	the	Delta	 town	of	Tanta,	 where	 he	 lives.	 He	 says	 his	 family	 is	 not	 politically	 active,	 being	mostly	made	up	of	doctors	but	they	apparently	encouraged	his	writing.	His	great	 uncle	 was	 Salah	 Gahin,	 one	 of	 Egypt’s	 most	 renowned	 poets,	 a		lyricist,	playwright	and	cartoonist.		 Hisham	is	in	his	final	year	of	high	school	but	has	been	writing	since	2007	 and	blogging	 since	 2008.	He	 published	 a	 book	 in	April	 2014	 titled	
Nakl	‘Am	(Public	Transport),	now	in	its	fourth	edition,	which	is	a	collection	of	 short	 stories	 reflecting	 current	 events.	 He	 wrote	 two	 articles	 for	 Al-
Dostour	 newspaper	 in	 2010,	 at	 the	 age	 of	 12,	 in	 a	 column	 targeting	younger	readers.	He	also	published	articles	in	several	other	online	portals.	Ten	 of	 the	 short	 stories	 in	 his	 book	 that	 received	 particularly	 positive	online	feedback	were	picked	up	by	Al-Ahram	newspaper	and	re-published.	His	blog	is	a	political	and	social	satire.		
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6.1.12. Less-Prominent: Mohamed Sherief 
 
Twitter Followers: 345 
Number of Tweets: 8,159 
Joined Twitter in: May 2009 
Started blogging in: 2007 
Last blog post: January 2013 
Followers/Likes on Facebook: 1,262 
Started writing Facebook notes in:  February 2009 
Number of Facebook notes: 27 
Blog mentioned on Twitter: Kelmawildwing.blogspot.com 
Blog mentioned on Facebook: Kelmawildwing.blogspot.com 
Description on Twitter: “If I knew who I was I would say” 
Description on Facebook: None 
 
The interview took place at a coffee shop in Heliopolis.  
Born in 1986, Sherief studied law but never practiced it, turning to 
teaching instead. He then joined the Military Production, although as a civilian 
employee, before getting a job with Egypt Air. 
Sherief started writing in forums before moving on to a blog in order to 
have more freedom to write very short posts that are to the point. He says that 
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there was little interaction at first, but soon he started interacting and meeting 
other bloggers through his posts and then started being active on the ground 
with them. He remembers writing daily at a time of intense interaction with his 
blog, from 2007 to 2009, but then “the curve went down,” he said (2014). 
One of his blog posts in late 2011 was picked up by Al-Shorouk 
magazine and Al-Ahram. He was interviewed once by New York Times in 2009 
in an article about political bloggers in Egypt. 
He says he is most concerned with human rights, followed by politics. 

























6.2. Comparative study of bloggers’ prominence, blog content and social 
status  
 
6.2.1 Twitter follower, Twitter activity and media prominence 
 
 











Table 6.3: Bloggers interviewed ranked by Twitter popularity compared to 
their Twitter activity 
 
Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 show that the ranking of bloggers in terms of popularity 
is vastly different than their ranking in terms of activity on Twitter. A blogger 
like Wael Ghoneim has almost double the followers of the next most popular 
person in the ranking and yet has the least activity on Twitter out of the 15 
prominent bloggers. Alaa Abdel Fattah, who has the most media coverage, 
ranks third in terms of popularity. El Naggar ranks first in terms of Twitter 
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his Twitter activity. Similarly, Hisham ranks third in terms of activity but 10th 
in terms of popularity. 
The tables show, however, that while the frequency of their Tweeting 
seems inconsistent with their popularity, the media coverage seems more 
consistent. Whether the media coverage was negative or positive seems not to 
affect their social media popularity. El Naggar says his followers increased by 
100,000 in just a few weeks after television host Abdel Rahman Aly launched 
a character assassination campaign against him. Similarly, Nagati reported 
seeing dramatic increases in his followers after his detention. “Military prison 
is the best way to increase your Twitter followers,” (Nagati, 2014). 
 Only 3 of the 12 bloggers interviewed noticed no increase in their 
followership after media appearances. It is worth noting, however, that because 
popular bloggers already have large numbers of followers, the change 
occurring after media appearances probably presents small percentages 
compared to the less-popular bloggers. Bloggers like El Naggar and Abdel 
Fattah, for instance, are used to receiving 750 to 1,000 new followers every 
week anyway and so there is no significant percentage increase post media 
appearances. On the other hand, Hisham reported dramatic increase in his 
followers; after he appeared on Fouda’s show his followers increased by 3,000 
immediately afterwards. Although the boost of 3,000 is significant as a 
proportion of Hisham’s 20,000 followers, it would be barely noticeable to 
those who have hundreds of thousands of followers, like Abdel Fattah 
(456,000) or El Naggar (775,000). 
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Table 6.4: Bloggers interviewed ranked by Twitter popularity compared to 
Facebook popularity 
Table 6.4 shows, however, that their Facebook popularity is relatively 
consistent with their Twitter popularity, with the exception of Mohamed Abo-
elgheit who ranks third in terms of his Facebook popularity but 11th in terms of 
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Table 6.5: Bloggers interviewed ranked by their activity on Facebook, 
compared to their popularity on Facebook 
Consistent with the findings in tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, table 6.5 shows 
that, much like Twitter, it seems that bloggers’ activity on Facebook is 
inconsistent with their popularity.  While Asmaa Mahfouz ranked first in terms 
of Facebook followership, she ranked 9th in terms of her activity on Facebook. 
Similarly, Ahmed Badawy ranked 8th in terms of his popularity on Facebook 
but first in terms of his activity. It is important to note, however, that activity 
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frequency of posting statuses on Facebook cannot be measured. Therefore, the 
degree of activity measured here is only partially reliable as an indicator of 
their use of the platform.  
It seems there is no necessary correlation between popularity and the 
date of joining social media or starting blogging. 
 




Table 6.6: Content analysis of blogs: Blog posts by year  
 
Looking at table 6.6, one can see that bloggers were most active before 2011. 
After 2011, the curve went down for all the blogs studied. By 2014, half of the 
blogs studied were inactive and two of them had only one post throughout the 
year. El Naggar’s had 3 posts, Hisham’s had 8 and Badawy’s had the highest 
number of posts, at 54.  By March 2015, only 3 out of the 10 bloggers studied 
were posting: Hisham once, Sandmonkey twice and Badawy seven times. Out 
of the 6 prominent blogs studied, only one blog was still active in 2015  (that of 
Sandmonkey), compared to 2 out of the 6 less-prominent ones. Similarly, 2 of 
the 6 prominent ones were active in 2013, compared to 4 out of the 6 less-
prominent ones. So while the frequency of blogging is dwindling across both 
prominent and less-prominent bloggers, the trend seems stronger among more 
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outlets to express themselves, including through mainstream media, than less 



































































Table 6.7: Content analysis of blogs: Topics discussed in 2010 compared to 
2011 
 
It is apparent from 6. 7 that blog posts went down from 63 in the month studied 
in 2010 to 14 in the month studied in 2011 across all blogs, which is consistent 
with the finding from the number of posts over the years. 
Although in 2010 blog posts studied were of mixed nature, covering 
society, philosophy, literature, economics, human rights, history and other 
issues, those studied in 2011 were overwhelmingly about politics due to the 
state of the country at the time. With the exception of Nagati, Abo-elgheit and 
Sherief who had non-political posts, all blogs studied posted only about politics 
in the month studied in 2011. This means that 11 out of the 14 posts studied in 
2011 were political. 
 While only 1 of the 5 prominent bloggers studied did not discuss 
politics in the month studied in 2011, the number doubled to 2 out of the 4 less-
prominent bloggers interviewed. This shows that the more prominent bloggers 
were keener on discussing politics and current events than other bloggers, who 
reported writing about whichever subject they were in the mood for, and not 
necessarily in line with what the readers wanted to read at the moment, or what 
others were writing. In 2010 things were different. While the more popular 
bloggers discussed subjects like philosophy and culture and only 1 out of the 5 
popular bloggers discussed politics in the months studied, their less prominent 
counterparts were more concerned with politics, with 3 out of the 4 studied 
writing on politics. This translates as 2 out of 18 blogposts for the total of 
prominent bloggers compared to 14 out of 45 blogposts for the total of less-
prominent bloggers. This could either indicate that the more popular bloggers 
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were more politically active in that period and so blogged more about politics 
than the less-prominent ones, or that the more prominent ones are keener on 
staying in tune with the hot topics of the period and giving the readers what 
they want to read about. 
Of the less-prominent bloggers, Abo-elgheit seemed consistently concerned 
with issues of poverty during the interview. His two biggest hits were articles 
about the poor and the issues they face. He realizes this and says everything he 
writes he ties into this issue. Sherief prioritized human rights in our interview. 
It is fair to say there is a core difference in the issues a less-prominent blogger 
like Abo-elgheit covers compared to other more philosophical or theoretical 
issues or calls for actions that the more prominent bloggers seem to be 
interested in. This shows up in both the interviews and the content analysis: 
while the more prominent bloggers discussed more philosophical issues, the 
less prominent ones were consistently looking at human rights. None of the 
prominent bloggers discussed human rights in the month studied in 2010 while 
all the less-prominent bloggers studied discussed human rights; this means 11 
out of the 45 posts on less prominent blogs in 2010 compared to 0 out of 63 
posts on prominent blogs. 
 
6.2.3. Prominence, networks and social immunity  
 
The content analysis of blogs shows that few bloggers carried links to other 
blogs. The exceptions were two prominent blogs (Mahfouz’s and Ezzat’s) and 
a less-prominent one (Sherief’s). Those who carried links to others carried 
links to prominent blogs like those of Hossam El Hamalawy, Wael Abbas, 
Manal and Alaa Abdel Fattah and Malek Moustafa.  
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Although the bloggers tend not to promote one another, Twitter plays 
into the networking effects through making the prominent users more 
prominent. “Twitter suggests whom to follow,” (Fathy 2014), “and those are 
users with the most followers.” 
 The effect of networks, however, can be strongly seen in the bloggers’ 
social and professional circles. Prominent bloggers seem to be moving in more 
influential circles that give them certain degree of immunity against 
prosecution. Therefore, the network effect manifests itself, not in prominent 
bloggers promoting one another, but in prominent bloggers being supported by 
fellow prominent bloggers when they get arrested or are subjected to any 
harassment. Their colleagues, who have large followerships, then widely 
defend them on social and mainstream media, creating pressure on the state 
authorities. This sort of solidarity is not seen with the lesser-known bloggers 
because they may not have the same family or celebrity blogger connections.  
 Most bloggers interviewed believed the mainstream and social media 
cover the arrests of prominent bloggers more intensively than those of less-
popular bloggers, creating pressure on the authorities. Sherief believes 
prominent bloggers get that attention because they are already famous and 
known to the media, and have a network of friends who have better reach. 
Nagati’s arrest sparked a wide uproar from fellow bloggers calling for his 
release and they even arranged a blogging day dedicated to call for the release 
of Nagati; at that time only three similar days were held to oppose SCAF, 
military trials and gender violence. Soon after the charges against him and 
Mahfouz were dropped. Although thousands of others were arrested during the 
same period, only few received the same attention as Nagati. Blogger and 
El	Sayed,					234	
activist Mona Seif told the LA Times on July 2011 that the military authorities 
tend to release well-known social media activists like Nagati on suspended 
sentences to avoid unwelcome publicity. Nagati (2014) realizes the influence 
of the support he received; “I had friends and connections who spoke out; 
people like Wael Ghoneim and others,” (Abdel Fattah, 2014). Esraa Abdel 
Fattah said she knows if she gets arrested she will be supported by fellow 
activists and so she is not scared of state crackdowns. “I am sure everyone 
outside [prison] will make a huge fuss to get me out,” she said (2014). 
Similarly, Mahfouz believes the arrests of more famous revolutionaries who 
ran in the same social circles, like fellow April 6th founder and blogger Ahmed 
Maher, would cause a bigger uproar in social and mainstream media and 
trigger more support than the arrest of others. Mahfouz added that the lesser-
known revolutionaries who get arrested are often portrayed as thugs by the 
media and attacked by the public; which is not the case with more prominent 
ones. Sandmonkey believes there are many who are very active but not as 
prominent on the scene, despite their efforts, because “they do the dirty work” 
for more prominent activists who take the credit. Those, Sandmonkey argues, 
often get killed or arrested but are never heard of.  
Sandmonkey argues that this solidarity with arrested bloggers and 
activists creates an issue for the authorities in dealing with these bloggers 
because their arrests become widely publicized by local and international 
media.  Indeed, El Naggar sees his media appearances and political work as 
personal protection against security crash downs. “People like Alaa Abdel 
Fattah, Asmaa Mahfouz and Mostafa El Naggar — the layman in the street 
knows them, but he doesn’t know me,” says Abo-elgheit (2014). “The 
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revolution was personified by them, so if they want to praise the revolution 
they praise them. If they want to attack it, they attack them.”  
Prominent bloggers often have family connections that the less-
prominent ones lack, which means they might be freer in what they post as 
they know they are less likely to be arrested. Saber believes that Abdel Fattah’s 
“father and family support him and he has the psychological capacity [to 
handle arrests,]” Saber (2014). “I am not that way.” This is one aspect where 
elite backgrounds give prominent bloggers immunity and so an advantage over 
less-prominent ones. Abdel Fattah’s family is politically active and influential 
in cultural and activists’ circles - his two sisters, his mother and his aunt are all 
politically engaged activists and his father was one of the most renowned 
human rights lawyers in Egypt; not all activists have this moral support. It is 
worth noting, however, that although Abdel Fattah has a wide network 
supporting him and receives large media attention, he was recently sentences to 
five years in prison. Sandmonkey’s mother was a member of the defunct NDP 
and Ezzat’s father worked with the Ministry of Investment; both activists were 
never arrested despite being widely engaged on the ground. Ezzat explains that 
although he has been threatened by state security apparatus several times, they 
always called his father to warn him if Ezzat crosses a line.  
Their family connections as well as their own social circles that secure 
them a degree of immunity against state oppression puts the more prominent 
bloggers’ freedom of expression ceiling at a higher level than the less-
prominent ones. Saber, for instance, was always in fear for his security, making 
him use a penname, change blogs often and ultimately shying away from the 
spotlight or uploading content that might put him to risk. This made him 
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refrain from uploading content like cases of police violence that other bloggers 
uploaded and received wide popularity for, even though he was present when 
the other bloggers received the footage.  
The networks also help them secure jobs and get a wider reach. Esraa 
Abdel Fattah had secured a television show on ONTV. Many of them were 
invited by mainstream media to write either because of their name or because 
they had personal connections with the outlets, like the case with Nora Younes 
who invited many fellow bloggers to join Al-Masry Al-Youm’s online portal as 
seen in the profiles. These connections are not achieved by the less-prominent 
ones.  
The less prominent bloggers, however, make more effort to widen their 
reach. A strong case is Abo-elgheit who showed a conscious effort to reach out 
to “other circles,” he said, referring to the circles of blogs as he moved from 
writing notes on Facebook to starting a blog in 2010. Throughout the 
interview, Abo-elgheit spoke of his efforts to network and reach out to circles 
other than those in his city through joining forums and attending debate and 
reading circles. The effect of this intensive networking showed when he wrote 
an article that was well-written and came at the right time. He lacked the tools 
to promote it online but his friends had them. “I only had around 1,000 friends. 
But from those 1,000 friends there were many journalists and writers and so 
on, because whenever I came across a journalist or a writer I would add him or 
try to get to know him. So this is one of the reasons why this article was a huge 
hit like that,” (Abo-elgheit, 2014). So while he may have had the talents, had 
he not had the right connections of prominent bloggers and social media 
makers, he would have never been able to reach out virtually or in the 
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mainstream media. This is also something that does not apply to prominent 
bloggers who are in and by themselves the movers and shakers of the online 
world. They are the stars of the online sphere and they control whether a 
blogger like Abo-elgheit would get noticed in that sphere or whether his post 
would only be seen by the 1,000 friends on his list.  
 
6.2.4. Prominence, class, access to technology and activity during January 
25th  
 
All the bloggers interviewed have always lived in the capital except for two 
prominent ones who moved to Cairo to attend university and a less-prominent 
one who moved there after graduation. They all have university degrees and 
speak English with varying degrees of fluency. The more prominent ones 
seemed to have better command of the language and sometimes blogged in 
English. They also all had constant access to the internet at home and on the 
move and all had smart phones and laptops. Some also had tablets. Although 
Saber said he always had internet connection, he believes that with data plans 
becoming cheaper, it allowed him more live coverage that he was not 
necessarily able to do before. Cheaper data plans allowed him, for instance, to 
live-stream the Mostafa Mahmoud events on November 19th, 2011. 
Bloggers who had politically active families also seem to be affected – 
at the earliest stages of their writings – by their families’ political interests. El 
Naggar and Abo-elgheit, for instance followed their families in becoming  
members of the Muslim Brotherhood but broke away from it later on. Abo-
elgheit’s parents participated in protests and his father was even arrested 
several times so he was “used to this ambiance” and was interested in politics 
at an early age and not afraid to oppose and criticize. Those whose families 
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were not politically active, seem to believe they were affected by one or more 
family members who encouraged them to read and kept a rich library at home, 
like Fathy and Nagati.  
The striking pattern in table 6.5 is that all of the prominent bloggers 
interviewed have been actively covering the January 25th events on social 
media while none of the less-prominent ones have. Those who were more 
popular before the uprising but did not cover the actual events did not achieve 
the same following as those who reported live on social media, often also 
collaborating with mainstream media, reporting on the events they were part 
of. Sandmonkey argues that “those who became famous and became symbols 
of the revolution were those who were covering it and so people started 
following them,” (2014). Ezzat says that his followership on social media 
increased dramatically after the uprising as he was always covering the events. 
This, Ezzat adds, gave him and his fellow bloggers and micro-bloggers more 
influence and allowed them the ability to move the masses because people 
came to trust them as a source of credible news on current events at a time 




Table 6.8: Comparative profiles of bloggers interviewed 
 
 Table 6.8 shows that the more prominent bloggers interviewed mostly 
do not include their blogs on their Twitter accounts while the less prominent 
ones do. Only 1 in the 6 prominent bloggers interviewed has his blog listed on 
Twitter, compared to 4 out of the 6 less-prominent bloggers. This shows that 
while the more prominent bloggers prioritize other identities, often journalism 
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 Four out of the 6 prominent bloggers studied at private universities 
while none of the less prominent ones have. Sandmonkey had a particularly 
privileged upbringing; studying in one of Cairo’s most expensive private 
schools and doing his post grad studies in the U.S. He has a dual master’s 
degrees in business administration and accounting and was an investment 
banker for two years. He calls himself an upper class blogger.  
Looking at their backgrounds — based on the data they gave during 
interviews about their families — it also seems that the more prominent 
bloggers are more likely to come from financial, political or intellectual elites 
and upper classes while most less-prominent ones are leaning more towards 
middle class. Intellectual elite refers to the family being well educated, cultured 
and politically active, political elite refers to the family having political 
influence and financial elite refers to the financial status of the family. Four out 
of the 6 prominent ones come from elite backgrounds compared to only 2 of 
the less prominent ones. The most striking of whom is Sandmonkey who 
comes from an upper class family who have both political and financial 
privileges. Similarly, while 5 out of the 6 prominent bloggers have worked at 
multinational companies, only 2 of the less-prominent ones have. Three of the 
more prominent bloggers have established their own private businesses in 
addition to Esraa Abdel Fattah who established a civil organization. 
Comparatively, none of the less prominent ones have private businesses. This 
shows that although all bloggers interviewed come from a privileged 
background, as shown by their language skills and access to technology, the 
more prominent ones seem to come from a more privileged background than 
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the less-prominent ones and seem to have a certain eliteness, although to 
varying degrees. 
 Prominent bloggers’ eliteness also allowed them the luxury to dedicate 
more time to writing and activism and even the ability to afford being jobless 
for periods of times. The bloggers seemed to realize they come from 
financially-stable backgrounds that allowed them to dedicate time to a cause 
without a permanent job for certain periods of time; including Sandmonkey 
who quit to focus on the causes of the uprising.  “It’s a luxury that is only 
available to very few people,” Nagati (2014) said on dedicating time to a cause. 
6.3. Conclusion and Discussion 
	
The findings show that bloggers’ popularity, measured by their followers on 
Twitter and Facebook, is inconsistent with their activity on both platforms but 
consistent with the media coverage they have received during the periods 
studied. Bloggers who are popular on Twitter are also mostly those who are 
popular on Facebook. Their popularity is also irrelevant to the date they joined 
Twitter but strongly related to whether they were covering events during 
January 25th, both on their social media accounts as well as mainstream media 
that quoted their coverage and interviewed them. This leads to a blogosphere 
where a small number of more prominent bloggers receive more media 
coverage and get more and more prominent while the less popular ones 
struggle for visibility and resources. And as the internet becomes overflowed 
with information and social media popularity increasing exponentially, users 
tend to follow social media makers suggested by Twitter, who are normally 
those with the most followers in the country of origin, or those whose names 
are familiar to them from their media appearances. This re-instates prominent 
El	Sayed,					242	
bloggers’ status as online media elite as well as causes a polarization of the 
blogosphere as users follow those their names their familiar with but also those 
whose beliefs are in line with their own.  
The analysis of blogs shows that by 2014, half of the blogs studied were 
inactive and 2 of them had only one post throughout the year. The frequency of 
posting decreased dramatically across all blogs after 2011. The decrease in 
frequency was generally seen more with the more prominent bloggers than the 
others but held true across both categories.  To achieve a plural public sphere, 
the public space for discourse need to have a diversity of topics, which stopped 
being true on blogs after January 25th.  While blogs used to discuss various 
topics before the uprising, the only topics discussed after were political, 
showing a lack of the content diversity needed to achieve a Habermasian 
public sphere.  Topics discussed on the blogs were diverse in 2010, ranging 
from philosophy and literature to economics and politics. But in 2011, 
however, posts were overwhelmingly about politics due to the state of the 
country are the time. And although prominent and less prominent blog posts 
were largely political, the less-prominent blogs had more non-political posts 
than their prominent counterparts in 2011. This shows that, after 2010, the 
more prominent bloggers are keener on discussing current events that are the 
hot topics of the moment and interest their readers the most while the less-
prominent ones reported writing about whichever subject they were in the 
mood for at the time. Another finding that appeared both in bloggers interviews 
as well as blogs content analysis is that the more prominent bloggers discussed 
and prioritized more philosophical issues while the less prominent ones were 
more interest in human rights and issues like poverty.   
El	Sayed,					243	
This could point to the more prominent bloggers being more concerned 
with more elite topics than that the majority of the public prioritizes. The 
blogosphere has also shown to be disengaged from the general public as 
Iskander argues commenting on the results of the first referendum after the 
uprising (2011). Iskander believes that the views and discourse on social media 
in Egypt does not represent the voice of the majority (2011, p.1235), which is 
evident in the findings of the bogs content analysis. So while the workers and 
mid-level employees were protesting and striking for things like minimum 
wages, the blogosphere at the time was buzzing with talks about freedom of 
expression and democracy. What Gramsci describes then as class struggle kept 
at bay through the ruling bloc presenting particular interests as general interests 
in which all classes have an equal stake is then evident in the findings of the 
blogs analysis. This is what Lukes describes as those holding power believing 
to know what is best for the majority that is not capable of truly knowing their 
wants and preferences (2005, p.38).  
 Only a few blogs carried links to other blogs, but those who did carried 
links to prominent blogs only.  The network effect, however, was manifested in 
the social and professional circles bloggers ran in. As prominent bloggers 
move in influential circles, it gave them a degree of immunity against 
prosecution as they enjoy the support of other prominent bloggers and activists 
and so, consequently, the mainstream. Because their arrests manage to gather 
wide virtual and media attention and support from civil society, it puts pressure 
on the authorities. This solidarity of the networks is not manifested with less-
prominent bloggers whose networks have less influence and less exposure. The 
more prominent bloggers have shown to come more elite backgrounds and in 
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many cases family connections that give them ore freedom to write without 
fear of prosecution than the less-prominent ones. Those networks also helped 
prominent bloggers secure jobs in more elite institutions and get wider reach 
than the less-prominent ones. 
 Bloggers studied all seem to come from privileged backgrounds than 
that of the majority of the population although the more prominent ones 
seemed to come from more elite backgrounds than the less-prominent ones. 
They all currently live in the capital, have university degrees and speak English 
with varying degrees of fluency with the more prominent ones having better 
command than the others. They also all have laptops and smart phones and 
never had issues accessing high-speed internet at home or on the go. The more 
prominent bloggers were also more likely to attend private universities and 
own private businesses or work in multinational companies than the other 
bloggers interviewed. It was evident that the more prominent bloggers are 
more likely to come from financial, political or intellectual elites and upper 
classes than the others. All bloggers have also reported realizing they have the 
luxury of dedicating time to writing and activism that others cannot necessarily 
afford. 
 Although education and access to technology might not be constituents 
of a power elite worldwide, one needs to look at bloggers’ profiles in 
comparison to the majority of the population. With an illiteracy rate of around 
26% and 40% of the population living under poverty line, university education 
and access to high-speed internet at home and on the go are considered luxuries 
to the majority of the population. Those bloggers are therefore what Mills 
describe as power elite; born into elites and possessing the tools to become 
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power elite of their own. As the interviews and the media findings show, the 
more prominent bloggers — who also happen to be the more elite ones — are 
evidently becoming power elite of their own, securing jobs at top media 
organizations and gaining more and more political and social influence. The 
findings from bloggers’ profiles are consistent with those Lichter et al (1986) 
published in their research of media elite in the US. The researchers conclude 
that the editors and writers of the US media elite are largely different from the 
general public in their backgrounds, status and political orientations; something 
that has proven true with the Egyptian bloggers, who are arguably Egypt’s own 
online media elite. Taki also found similar results in her research on bloggers 
in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, who are mostly males, well-educated and have 
at least a master’s degree (2005). As subsequent interviews with bloggers 
prove they are joining mainstream media, one could argue that not only are 
they the media elite of the online world, but they are also becoming the new 
media elite of the mainstream. 
Being born in elites and becoming elites of their own accord means that 
the Egyptian blogosphere bears resonance to the exclusive bourgeois public 
sphere Habermas painted and was heavily criticized for. One can see that for a 
blogger to become relatively heard online, even the less-prominent ones, they 
need to at least have one of the two elements Habermas described in his pre-
revised bourgeois public space; education. The more prominent bloggers also 
enjoyed the second element of the first Habermasian sphere; property 
ownership. This eliteness in their profiles compared to the majority of the 
population led to what Mouffe (2000) warns would be an exclusive and single-
voiced space that is not conductive to democracy as it lacks plurality. One of 
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the key elements to a revised Habermasian public sphere, disregard to status, is 
therefore also lacking. This is due to the fact that if someone is not university-
educated, does not have ready access to the internet allowing him to post live 
and frequently and cannot afford the time or cost of blogging, they cannot 
become active players of the blogosphere or social media. This also contradicts 
utopian theorists’ like Rash (1997), Grossman (1995) and James (1997) view 
of the internet as a place for everyone to express their opinions and influence 
the public opinion (cited in Papacharissi, 2004). The three aspects of online 
communication that Malina (1999), Papacharissi (2008 and 2002) and Sassi 
(2000) lay out for online communication to affect social and political benefits, 
access to information, reciprocity of information and commercialization of 
online space, are all at risk on the Egyptian blogosphere and social media, as 
findings have shown.  
Therefore, much like the bourgeois cultural salons of the past, the 
virtual public sphere is becoming dominated by a few who possess means of 
communication online and became inclusive in principle but not in practice. It 
is therefore becoming an exclusive counterpublic for elitist voices, rather than 











Chapter VII: Interviews Findings: Bloggers’ transition 
to mainstream and the sustainability of blogging  
 
This chapter looks at the findings from the interviews with bloggers in terms of 
the effects of mainstreaming on prominent and less prominent bloggers. It 
starts out looking at the effects of prominence on the content and the blogger 
himself then moves to the sustainability of blogging as it stands given 
bloggers’ ages, social media replacing blogs and the lack of sustainable 
revenue streams.  The second part of the chapter looks at some bloggers’ 
transition to mainstream media and how it affects their content and voices both 
online and offline. 
7.1 Effects of prominence on content and blogger 
 
Prominence and the change of bloggers’ status in the two years following 
January 25th had several implications on the nature of blogging in Egypt as 
well as bloggers themselves.  
 
7.1.1 The founding generation’s pride and newcomers 
 
During the interviews, several bloggers interviewed, especially the more 
prominent ones, showed certain pride in being the founding generation of 
bloggers who were blogging as early as 2004. They were the same ones who 
have shown disdain for newcomers to the blogosphere and social media 
platforms, or for those who started using those platforms for opposition after 
January 25th and after the founding generation of bloggers had already paved 
the way for them. These feelings were echoed primarily amongst prominent 
bloggers but also among some of those who are not as prominent but have been 
blogging for a few years before 2011; like Fathy and Saber. 
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Sandmonkey, for instance, boasts that the 30 founding generation 
bloggers were the first to use Twitter at a time nobody knew of it and were the 
same ones using Facebook “very differently from the majority of users who 
used it to post pictures.” He shows pride in being an “old-guard blogger” and 
speaks sarcastically of newcomers.      
Similarly, El Naggar argues that the first wave of bloggers all know that 
the struggle for freedom and democracy has a price and have mostly been 
detained at some point. “Unlike those who appeared after the revolution when 
there was no state security and so no price to pay for opposition or political 
struggle,” says El Naggar. He adds that it was those who appeared after 
January 25th who toned their writings down or started to hail the regime instead 
of opposing it when the security situation went back to normal and they could 
face detention for what they wrote, unlike the first wave of bloggers who held 
on to their stances and their voices.  
Esraa Abdel Fattah also expressed annoyance with the newcomers on 
social media who were not active or famous like her and her colleagues before 
January 25th but were trying to steal the spotlight after 2011 and become 
famous. 
Mahfouz echoes similar feelings as she argues that the media would 
host people they never heard of as “representatives of the revolution” and when 
she or others opposed they would be accused of monopolizing the revolution. 
“Yes, everyone participated in the revolution, but when they meet or interview 
people who are supposed to speak on behalf of the revolution they need to at 
least have experience and a history,” says Mahfouz.  
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Although other bloggers spoke strictly of the earlier bloggers and 
Mahfouz was speaking about activists in general, she echoes the same feelings 
of eliteness of the earlier bloggers who have the right to speak on behalf of the 
people and revolutionaries. This is a right that they do not believe others who 
are not famous have earned.  
These feelings also led bloggers to look for other, more exclusive, 
platforms such as mainstream media, as social media and the blogosphere 
became too crowded. Some bloggers explained that they have resorted to 
Twitter when Facebook became too mainstream, but that even Twitter is 
becoming too mainstream. Fathy, for instance, says he started writing far less 
when he started feeling that “the market was saturated” and started having 
“content chaos” leading to the “dilution of revolutionary ideology online, 
which was not the case during our days.” He argues that in 2007 and 2008, the 
discourse on Facebook represented “elitist revolutionary ideology” and 
everyone using it were against the regime. Then when Facebook became 
popular, those “old-guard bloggers” resorted to Twitter and it was the “crème 
de la crème of politics,” says Fathy. “Now there’s an influx of users.” 
Nagati sums it up saying “the trade is now open for every Tom, Dick 
and Harry.” 
7.1.2 Altering voices 
 
All of the prominent bloggers interviewed realize they’re under more scrutiny. 
They realize their words are often read and used by the press and they will be 
held accountable for what they write. Those who have become famous, like El 
Naggar, have also shown that they have to express certain opinions or speak in 
certain tones to fit an image the audience has for them. Some, like Esraa Abdel 
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Fattah, have adjusted their tones, while others, most noticeably those who are 
not as prominent have not.  
Some bloggers have expressed fears for their security that leads them to 
toning their voices down. Nagati says he thinks several times before writing as 
he knows anything he writes will have repercussions and so calculates his steps 
far more than he did before. He has removed many posts he had published in 
fear for his life saying, “they were dangerous, some of them could really harm 
me.” He had also received threats asking him to tone down his writings. “In the 
past I said whatever I wanted and joked about whomever as I pleased and knew 
nothing would happen to me because I knew I was only followed by a few 
people. Now the pressure has increased, so I am now exerting more self-
censorship,” says Nagati adding he has toned down his voice after his exposure 
increased. Ezzat has also once deleted a Tweet that became very popular and 
widely shared as he feared it would lead to him getting charged with 
disrespecting religions. 
Similarly, Sandmonkey says he was “freer before the revolution,” speaking 
of the pressures and demands to tone his voice down. Esraa Abdel Fattah also 
says that she feels the pressures of fame, which make her monitor what she 
says on social media as she is a “figure the media takes news from,” and so has 
to be “more careful” when writing. “Some newspapers take what I say on 
social media as news and this is annoying because sometimes I am only 
joking,” says Abdel Fattah. “That made me realize I can’t just write anything 
on social media.” She realizes as a prominent figure, there are pressures on 
how she writes; “You have to be objective, you can’t write anything that would 
be taken against you and you have to take care of each word you say,” says 
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Abdel Fattah. She believes that news outlets will use her Tweets out of context 
according to their own agendas.  This made her especially wary of Twitter and 
so more careful on it. 
Less prominent bloggers did not express the same concern over a certain 
mold, or a public image. Saber, for instance, says he does not feel any 
pressures to alter his language or voice on social media “I never worried what I 
would say; it was always about venting and speaking my mind and I don’t 
make any calculations before doing so,” says Saber. “I don’t get paid; just un-
follow me if you don’t like what I say.” 
7.1.3 Interaction with followers 
 
The discourse is becoming different on blogs and social media, instead of elite 
ideologies discussing among one another, with the infusion of different 
ideologies and users, it’s become more and more a one-way-conversation. 
“Instead of going back home to stay up late and answer people, I now simply 
block them,” Fathy says. Esraa Abdel Fattah also said she stopped arguing with 
followers and would block users, especially those insulting her. Sandmonkey 
said he was happier with 10,000 followers than he is now and says when 
someone recognizes him and expresses that he loves him he is not happy, but 
rather annoyed.  
7.1.4 Losing jobs 
 
Many prominent activists had lost or quit their jobs after January 25th. Activist 
Samira Ibrahim said in an interview with What Women Want magazine in 
December 2012 that she got fired from work for being “against SCAF [the 
Supreme Council of Armed Forces]” and that she works in marketing where “it 
is all about capitalism and no one wants their interests to be threatened by a 
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superior power.” She added that she doesn’t think she can work in that field 
anymore. These cases suggest that although bloggers might have moved into 
the field of mainstream media or human rights organizations willingly, they 
might have also been left with no other choices given their prior fields were no 
longer an option as they became more prominent. 
Mahfouz quit her work, which was paying about LE 5,000 a month, to 
focus on the revolution as she was in and out of meetings with the prime 
minister and SCAF and her supervisor refused to give her time off. “This is a 
crucial phase and I felt like I had a very important role to play,” says Mahfouz. 
Mahfouz’s salary was a decent one and she was on the verge of becoming a 
manager at a young age but she quit her job to focus on the causes of January 
25th, like several other activists and bloggers. This, she says, made people 
question whether she is profiteering from the revolution.  Abdel Fattah was 
harassed into quitting her job and then could not find another job in the same 
field after she got arrested. Sandmonkey also quit his job after January 25th. 
Fathy also lost his job after his 2008 arrest. 
Mahfouz believes that jobs outside the scope of public work or the media 
were impossible as companies would deem her a “troublemaker” and would 
not want to hire her.  
7.1.5 Fragmented and divided blogosphere due to prominence of some over 
others 
 
Bloggers have painted a rather fragmented blogosphere after January 25th. 
Although bloggers were once more united in their opposition of the regime, 
after January 25th, the media has caused them to be more divided. 
 Mahfouz spoke of how even the positive media coverage served to 
divide revolutionary ranks instead of working in their favor. Mahfouz argues 
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that they were united before the uprising but that did not last after as the media 
started highlighting some over the others. She recounted that her colleagues 
would be jealous that the media hosted her and not them and made her famous. 
“They would tell me ‘you don’t represent us, why do you get to appear on 
television and speak in the name of the revolution and we don’t? We all took to 
the streets,’” she says. She adds that divisions started happening as members of 
the same movements start accusing their colleagues of being no longer active 
on the street and falling behind on joining protests but still appearing on 
television and stealing the spotlight. “The media managed to create grudges,” 
says Mahfouz.  Nagati agrees with Mahfouz and Sandmonkey speaks 
sarcastically of how other activists rose to fame and heroism and are actively 
seeking popularity and fame. 
Mahfouz says that because her face is now familiar, she gets the 
spotlight whenever she joins a protest. “I got famous despite of me, so when I 
join a protest the cameras come to interview me,” she says. “Then people 
attack me saying I only join protests to take the credits.” She has then stopped 
accepting interviews when she’s in protests, only to start being attacked by 
journalists claiming she is arrogant even though the media made her.  
This state of jealousy is also aggravated by social media response to the 
arrests of more prominent activists. Because they run in influential circles 
online and on the streets, prominent activists get far more support than less 
prominent ones. The media uproar they get is often attacked by people, arguing 
that it’s unfair others get arrested without anyone raising a voice to defend 
them. Mahfouz adds that people would also start attacking the detainees 
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themselves, claiming that they’re trying to be martyrs and heroes and that the 
only merits they have is being arrested.  
The media, Mahfouz argues, would also look for figures to make into 
heroes. Mahfouz had posted the famous YouTube video to mobilize the masses 
on January 25th, which led to the media dubbing her “the woman who triggered 
the January 25th revolution. This, Mahfouz believes, worked against her favor 
as “all the effort that was exerted by all the movements was attributed to me, so 
people in the square were angry that I was taking all the credit and they started 
hating me,” she says. These divisions ultimately led to her quitting her position 
as April 6th media coordinator and shying away from the media. 
Fathy believes the media highlights those they want and those who go 
with their editorial agendas, this, in turn, affects alternative media. “The 
mainstream media helps form the anti-mainstream media by highlighting 
people who then start getting followed in alternative media arenas,” says Fathy. 
 “The media kept making us bigger and bigger and this ultimately 
caused our division,” concludes Mahfouz. “The media isn’t trying to destroy 
the revolution through attacking the revolution itself, but rather the people 
related to the revolution.” 
7.1.6 Oppressing the prominent ones after anonymity is gone  
 
The more prominent ones have all expressed concern over feeling they are now 
under attack by the media and the state more than they had been before January 
25th.  In fact out of the 21 possible bloggers to interview, 4 were in prison 
during the time the research was conducted and one was abroad in fear for his 
security. After interviewing Esraa Abdel Fattah, she was put on a travel ban by 
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the authorities. Seven out of the 12 bloggers interviewed have faced court cases 
at some point; of those 7, 4 were prominent bloggers.  
 El Naggar believes oppression is especially practiced now against 
pioneering activists, many of whom are of the most prominent bloggers, 
because they are “viewed as a danger by the regime.”  “[The state] sees us as 
those viruses that multiply and so can change the regime and this is why the 
degree of oppression practiced against those people is very high,” says El 
Naggar.   
 Sandmonkey has also expressed that he suffers lack of privacy now that 
he is no longer anonymous and people recognize him in the street. He says he 
did not want his blogging to affect his career and did not want anything he 
writes to be used against his mother as she was a member in the National 
Democratic Party (NDP) and “had enemies.”  
This feeling of being oppressed and targeted by the media or the regime 
has led some of them to refrain from writing on social media. El Naggar says 
he does not Tweet or write on Facebook as much anymore because of a general 
state of depression over the situation of the country, but also because the war 
against him was so strong, that he felt targeted whenever he wrote anything. 
He, however, continued publishing his articles.  
What’s significant in this is that while El Naggar felt a duty to publish 
in the mainstream where he has a space he is compelled and paid to fill every 
week, he did not feel the same need on his micro-blogging platforms. This was 
the same with other bloggers interviewed, like Abdel Fattah, who felt 
committed to their mainstream media writing but felt too targeted or depressed 
to write on blogs or social media. El Naggar felt he is targeted and refrained 
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from commenting as often on the political situation on his social media 
accounts, but continued to comment on them on mainstream media, 
nonetheless. It could either signify that he feels more personally invested in his 
social media accounts and so the attacks are taken more personally, or that he 
has an obligation towards his employer to write his weekly column even if he’s 
scared of being targeted or if he’s feeling depressed and passive. 
7.1.7 Influence, ego and expectations 
 
The growing popularity some of the more prominent bloggers have started 
gaining led them to achieve a growing influence on people. It also led to them 
being molded into certain images the public developed for them and so made it 
hard for them to stray from this persona or opinion their readers expect of 
them. 
Sandmonkey in particular saw an issue with bloggers rising to fame so 
quickly. “You’re also dealing with egos that expanded very quickly and people 
who each believe their ideologies made the revolution,” he said. He believes 
fame offers social capital, which has the potential to corrupt people. He argues 
that bloggers’ fame caused their words to be much stronger in effect, which 
caused more harm than good.  
Sandmonkey sees the dangers of prominence and popularity in that, he 
argues, those activists are starting to hold powers over people and influencing 
their opinions. He feels they might not realize the implications of now being a 
public persona. This makes him feel responsible for the dead and injured youth 
because he feels that him and his colleagues called for action and people were 
influenced by them and then were killed or injured. “We are starting to become 
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icons, which is catastrophic, persons shouldn’t be icons, they shouldn’t hold 
power over people.”  
Sandmonkey believes his own words had a huge impact at a time. When 
asked whether he feels his words have more weight now and so he became 
more conscious, he answers, “It’s worse than that, your words at a specific 
moment in time in Egypt meant the destiny of a country.” Sandmonkey shows 
obvious confidence in his fame and popularity. He believes his words can 
change the destiny of a country; he believes he made the op-ed area of the DNE 
a strong one and gave them presence online to compete against other online 
media outlets and feels a responsibility towards the fact that he is influential 
within a group of society. 
El Naggar says that he was a parliament member in late 2011 and had a 
certain image and influence among people. He believes this status was the 
reason why he was approached by the regime and political forces to tone down 
his opposition to Sisi. It was also the reason behind the threats he received, he 
adds, and the court case against him accusing him of insulting judges for 
something he said in the parliament when he still had immunity. This signifies 
that he believes his activity in the parliament gave him an importance that 
made the state try to level with him and then threaten him. He also believes this 
status saved him from getting imprisoned like other bloggers and activists.  
El Naggar says he was asked to join Sisi’s presidential campaign, endorse it 
and endorse the new constitution. This means that the state realizes the 
influence El Naggar has as a former blogger and alternative opposition figure 
and a current mainstream figure who has an influence over a segment of the 
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population they are looking to reach through him; namely the younger 
population and some of the revolutionaries.   
This growing influence that came with the move to the mainstream light 
meant that bloggers now have an image to maintain in the public arena and so 
need to maintain audience’s expectations of them behaving in certain ways and 
expressing certain opinions. El Naggar is aware of the pressures that came 
from moving from the blogosphere onto becoming a public figure. He says, for 
instance, he cannot use profanities or not be the serious, decent public persona 
his readers are used to because his readers have a certain image for him and 
will not accept otherwise. “It is very annoying because if I want to curse, I 
can’t because people have a certain image for me and I can’t, for instance, 
write the way Wael Abbas [a blogger who often uses profanities] writes,” says 
El Naggar. “I can’t even joke because I am molded in a certain mold and 
people will not accept me behaving otherwise.” He adds that although he can 
criticize and write at his will, he has to look at two things; the legality of his 
writings, as well as the political stand people might assume he is taking when 
he writes certain things and how acceptable they are. He says, “I have to assess 
every word so it isn’t used against me legally,” says El Naggar.  
“I also can’t write, for instance, about the complete freedom of religion 
even if I am convinced with it because it has its price, so even though it is my 
personal conviction, I can’t write it now and this is part of the terror that 
society imposes.”  
Similarly, Esraa Abdel Fattah feels she has to pick a certain direction and 
never stray away from it, otherwise people expect her to be critical of the 
regime no matter what. “Now, if you praise El Sisi once and criticize him once 
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then you are hesitant, you don’t know what you want, you’re a hypocrite, and 
you should settle on a stand,” says Abdel Fattah. “And at the same time when 
you praise something El Sisi did then I am attacked from the revolutionaries 
who say that I sold out on the revolution and my values. When I praise the 
revolution then I am attacked that I am a fifth line and a Muslim Brotherhood 
supporter.” She recounts a Tweet she wrote about El Sisi encouraging people 
to ride bicycles. She says she Tweeted that she bought a bicycle but can’t use it 
until the infrastructure is fixed. “So I got insulted from both sides; ‘Esraa is 
pledging allegiance to El Sisi and went and bought the bike to kiss his ass,’ and 
from the other side ‘Are you going to lay your terms? Are you humiliating the 
man? You buy a bike and shut up! Who are you to tell him what to do and 
what not to do?’” recounts Abdel Fattah. This pressure led her to deactivate her 
account for a month when she got too tired. 
Abdel Fattah said she considered her followers’ reactions before joining 
Youm7. El Naggar’s followers even criticize his media appearances if he 
appears with presenters who are not known to be strong supporters of the 
revolution.   
7.1.8 Electronic committees 
 
Most bloggers interviewed expressed concern over what is dubbed ‘electronic 
committees,’ which are normally fake accounts created by political parties or 
the state to attack prominent social media makers and comment on their 
Tweets.  These accounts often use standard answers to attack opposition 
bloggers and promote certain directions. Bloggers, including El Naggar, 
Mahfouz, Abdel Fattah and Saber, have expressed that electronic committees 
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are becoming one of the biggest challenges on social media as they target 
certain micro-bloggers and cause an overflow of information. 
Mahfouz, like most bloggers interviewed, mentioned electronic committees 
have repeated certain statements so frequently on social media that users are 
now echoing these statements after being over exposed to them.  
Fathy believes electronic committees played a big role in diluting the 
online information and causing information overload for readers and bloggers 
alike. This made it hard for micro-bloggers who do not have strong 
followership to get their voices heard on social media. 
7.2 Sustainability of blogging 
 
All bloggers interviewed have largely stopped blogging, either because they do 
not have enough time to do so as they’re busing making careers, or because 
they have resorted to writing on mainstream media or social media what they 
would normally write on their blogs.  
 
7.2.1 Social media replacing blogs 
  
All 12 bloggers interviewed believe social media is easier to use in terms of its 
interface than blogs and have a wider audience reach and so have all said they 
are now using Facebook and Twitter rather than blogs. El Naggar says his 
personal blog space moved onto Facebook notes. He actually believes social 
media is the second wave of blogging, replacing blogs altogether and 
introducing micro-blogging. “Blogging has an identity crisis now; why would I 
publish a picture on my blog and not on Instagram, Deviant Art or Tumblr?” 
says Nagati. Although Sherief blogged daily until 2009, he says his blogging 
decreased tremendously as social media replaced blogs. “Facebook and Twitter 
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are much more popular than blogs, they have wider reach, there’s a lot more 
interaction and they’re much quicker,” says Sherief. 
 Blogs are also deemed outdated by some of the bloggers interviewed. 
Ezzat believes the interface on WordPress and others have stopped improving 
since 2008, unlike social media, which is constantly updated. “Social media 
gives you more statistics on your followers and subscribers and so on. So this 
was a hit to blogs,” says Sherief. Nagati argues that it’s easier to set up social 
media accounts, from a technical point of view, than it is to create a blog. It 
also allows users to benefit from the database of social media subscribers as 
opposed to building their own databases to get traffic specifically for their 
platform. He adds that the Arabic names of some blogs are also creating an 
issue finding the blogs online due to the fact that the blogs’ addresses are 
written in Latin letters and so Arabic names could be spelled in different ways. 
 Because of its popularity, reach and ease of use, social media, bloggers 
argued, is also much easier in covering current events, calling for action and 
mobilizing the masses. They would use Twitter, for instance, to ask for medical 
aids during sit-ins or warn people that this certain area is under attack. 
 Social media is also easier for the readers who are on social media; on 
their internet browsers or their smart phone applications, this, bloggers believe, 
means more interaction with readers and a steadier followership. This means 
they do not have to go specifically to the bloggers’ websites to follow their 
content, they are already on social media and so can easily follow their Tweets, 
statuses and notes from the convenience of their smart phones on their personal 
accounts’ newsfeeds. “The audience changed, they became lazy,” says 
Sandmonkey. Sherief believes Facebook and Twitter save his and his readers’ 
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time and effort. Badawy says Facebook’s interactivity, engagement with the 
followers and the feedback he gets encouraged him to write more. Abdel 
Fattah, Fathy and Sherief all expressed similar opinions. Ezzat believes social 
media allows for instant interaction with people only a few seconds after an 
event takes place. This, he says, leaves little to blog about as social media 
“took away a large bit of that need-to –express-yourself energy and the energy 
to write.” Ezzat is now able to express himself and interact with followers, 
engaging in debates and so feels less need to blog. In fact, it’s this ease of 
reach and interactivity that made Abdel Fattah reluctant to create a blog and 
always use Facebook and Twitter to write. Facebook and Twitter also gave 
bloggers a steadier and wider readership base due to the fact that users are 
already on these platforms and they can make use of this aspect. A blog on the 
other hand does not have that sort of steady followership because, no matter 
how popular, they cannot always count on their regular readers checking the 
blog post. Users on social media, on the other hand, can see their posts once 
they open the social media platform in their news feeds. Ezzat explains that 
fellow bloggers and himself started getting unexpectedly influential; “we 
would call for a forum expecting 20 or 30 people then find the space full and 
lots of people standing, so we started thinking bigger, getting bigger spaces.” 
7.2.2 Overflow of information on social media  
 
Bloggers interviewed expressed concern over social media getting too popular 
and so leading to an information overload and diluting the founding generation 
of the Egyptian blogosphere’s voices in the process. This led some of them to 
feel like their voices are not needed on social media and led to them being far 
less active. 
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Saber, for instance, stopped blogging because he felt there was no longer a 
need for his voice as everyone resorted to social media, especially Twitter, as 
platforms for activism. Before 2011, he believed what he blogged about needed 
to be said, but now, he says everyone is saying what they want, so there’s no 
longer need for him to blog or micro-blog. Likewise, Nagati felt his social 
media activity had more impact in the past when micro-bloggers were few. 
Even younger generations of bloggers like Hisham expressed the same 
concern. “In 2011 and 2012 I was always on Twitter; it was like raising a 
kitten. I would follow it hour by hour and comment on the news on the spot,” 
Hisham says. “Now I would Tweet once every two weeks.” He also feels 
Twitter has become depressing due to the lack of interaction these days and the 
fact that he feels “Twitter no longer promotes you and this is why I am looking 
for another platform to write.” 
7.2.3 Social media losing momentum  
 
Those who managed to make a career of social media have maintained a 
presence online throughout the day more so than others who have not been as 
successful staying active on social media. Abo-elgheit, for instance, says he 
would not have been able to maintain the level of activity had he remained a 
doctor. Abdel Fattah argues that those whose careers are not related to the 
media or politics cannot be active on social media due to their schedule and 
work nature, even if they are active on the ground like Ahmed Maher, for 
instance, who’s an engineer.  Likewise, Nagati spends an average of four hours 
a day on social media because it’s now related to his work.  
 On the other hand, Fathy says he Tweets far less now that he is focused 
on his life and career and cannot afford the time for social media and blogs.  
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Although he used to spend 10 hours daily online until 2010, now he only 
spends two hours a week actively engaging on social media. In 2010, social 
media was relevant to his work and he used it and blogs to promote his work, 
but now this is no longer the case. 
 This means that the discourse online is limited in the sense that those 
who get heard because they’re the most active come from certain social and 
professional making that is not similar to the general public. Most of those are 
prominent bloggers, in fact, 4 of the 5 bloggers whose work is related to social 
media are prominent. 
 Due to prominent bloggers’ popularity on social media, they have 
managed to land jobs in the field or start their own. Sandmonkey, Abdel Fattah 
and Nagati, for instance, are all now in the field of social media. To Abdel 
Fattah, social media is now a career, not just a part-time activity.  
 “Despite yourself, you are more expert than all of the experts out there 
because you used those platforms in way they never thought of,” said 
Sandmonkey. “So what happened is that because of this huge followership, my 
name became influential and people started approaching me.” Sandmonkey has 
founded a digital consultancy firm and a social media agency. 
7.2.4 Founding generation growing older and focused on careers  
 
The interviews showed that the founding generation of bloggers were growing 
older and more focused on their careers and professional lives, leading to their 
bloggers identities taking a backseat as new identities took over. Those 
identities were forged as bloggers pursued mainstream media careers, careers 
in politics or in civil work. This, as shown above, left far less time for social 
media or blogs as seen from the blogs’ content analysis. 
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 “There is a difference between being in your 20’s and being in your 
30’s,” Sandmonkey said, “It has to do with business and your financial 
situation.” Sandmonkey now posts less than before because of his duties to 
mainstream media and the hours he puts into his private business. His 
mainstream writings get him a wider reach and financial reward that his blog 
does not. Fathy explains that although he could afford to be active and get 
arrested when he was younger, this is no longer a lifestyle he wants to live. “I 
was okay with losing an opportunity and leaving a job I have and not attending 
a job interview and so on; at a certain age it is nice and all. But after this age, it 
becomes difficult. When we’re young we are ready to do this, but not now,” 
says Fathy. He adds that younger people should take a few years to “take risks, 
run about and serve their causes,” but when they grow older, “we need to serve 
ourselves.” Similarly, Nagati was able to post more when he was a university 
student but once he got a job, it was no longer possible to maintain the same 
frequency. Mahfouz says she stopped posting as much when she got married 
and had a child. 
 Studying the blogs, one can see that it was around the time bloggers got 
involved with new careers that they stopped updating their blogs. For instance, 
El Naggar stopped blogging when he started becoming more active on the 
ground and joined then led the Baradei presidential campaign. Which he says 
left him no time to write as it was a period of political momentum. Similarly, 
Ezzat stopped blogging around the same time he started writing more intensely 
on mainstream media and so expressing himself on those platforms and having 
little time and content for blog posts. “I like the blogs’ style of writing and 
want to go back to it but practically, during the past period, my time became 
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very tight because it was all spent fulfilling my duties to newspapers. This 
affects blogging a lot; writing for Al-Masry Al-Youm and other; the audience 
base is very wide and so since I started in 2011, my articles had a lot of 
interaction and attention so it took a lot of my time,” says Ezzat. El Naggar 
believes blogging was a phase that a certain generation that is now in their 
thirties went through together to form an alternative sphere and practice public 
work but that this phase, and accordingly blogging, has ended now that this 
generation moved onto ground work and the mainstream sphere. This view is 
significant as it shows the bloggers are well aware of their shift from virtual to 
mainstream and that this particular blogger views his move onto the 
mainstream as an end to his virtual activity or a replacement of his virtual 
world, rather than a continuation or an addition to it.  
 These new identities are often conflicting with that of blogging; 
Hisham, and others like Sandmonkey and El Naggar, stopped publishing on 
their blogs what they write for newspapers or, in Hisham’s case, his book. 
Sandmonkey feels it’s unethical to drive traffic to his blog instead of the 
newspaper that paid him for this content while Hisham sees he has to make the 
book content exclusive to the book and not freely available online. 
As the previous chapter shows, many of those who used to identify 
themselves as bloggers now identify more with other identities like journalists 
and social media consultants, like Abdel Fattah, Abo-elgheit and Nagati. A 
blogger like El Naggar, for instance, went from an alternative voice of 
opposition to a party founder, a parliament member and now a public figure. 
Ezzat explains that until 2007 journalists put him in the mold of “the blogger 
who couldn’t find his voice but found it online.” After the uprising, however, 
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the identities he was hosted as on mainstream media became many; journalist, 
activist and lately researcher. His identity as a blogger then started receding 
and he started refusing to be hosted as a blogger because he felt it was 
overdone and it was only one aspect of his identity that is no longer significant 
now that everyone became a micro-blogger, he said. Similarly, El Naggar said 
his situation was different because he was not an activist “sitting all day on 
Twitter insulting people and so on,” which shows that he believes his status as 
a parliamentary member is more significant than his role as an online activist.  
7.2.5 Lack of sustainable revenue streams  
 
Although online advertisers interviewed said that the market has been 
expanding in the past years, this has not trickled down to political bloggers in 
particular. Most bloggers never considered monetizing their blogs although 
none of them objected to the concept.  
 Among the 12 bloggers interviewed, only Mahfouz, Sandmonkey, 
Nagati and Badawy considered monetization although only Sandmonkey has 
advertisements on his blogs. It is worth noting that of the 4 bloggers who 
considered monetization, 3 of them are prominent bloggers.  
 Sandmonkey had an interesting model where he had a few 
advertisements posted on his blog and a PayPal account that he used to ask his 
readers for help when he wanted. For instance, he would ask the readers to 
contribute towards a digital camera and the following day he would find 
“$1,000 and two cameras sent,” recounted Sandmonkey. His readers donated 
the money because they wanted him to go out and report for them and felt a 
sense of engagement and civil action. He never considered it a money-making 
platform, however, and believed money would come from other sources.  
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Similarly, all bloggers interviewed said they did not think blogs were 
financially rewarding. Nagati, for instance, says he cannot be successful in 
monetizing the satirical blog he founded because he believes the market is 
small and because he criticizes situations and people, which might cause an 
issue with advertiser. He does not believe the market is as rewarding as it is in 
Europe and the U.S. and argues that generating income through things like 
affiliation marketing is not suitable for Egyptian audience.  
Others, however, viewed blogs as their personal spaces and the thought 
of monetizing them never crossed their minds. El Naggar, for instance, never 
considered his blog as a tool to make money, but rather a way to express 
himself and work towards human rights and political reform. El Naggar, 
therefore, kept his main profession, dentistry, to be able to do all of that freely 
without financial pressures from entities wanting to shape him into certain 
molds. Ezzat also felt his blog is a space to express himself freely and said he 
was not consistent in the frequency and topics of his posts so felt that 
monetizing his blog would put pressure on him to fulfill his responsibility 
towards the readers and advertisers. Similarly, Saber says “If I post ads I might 
one day be forced to post a blog so I get more traffic and […] I write whenever 
I feel like it.” 
But interviews have shown that even if bloggers had attempted to 
generate revenue from their blogs, they wouldn’t be able to succeed without 
compromising their voices and directions to be less controversial and 
mellower. All three marketing experts interviewed have expressed that while 
they have seen a drastic increase in the online advertisement world, this did not 
apply to political bloggers. Mohamed El Mehairy, managing director of the 
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leading online advertisement agency, Connect Ads, says that in the past two 
years online advertisements market has picked up significantly. Noha El 
Sherbiny, group project manager at L’Oreal, says 20% of her marketing budget 
goes to online and she’s interested to promote her brands amongst bloggers. 
Sondos Effat, account director at FP7 Cairo, a leading advertising agency, says 
that while advertisers were spending around one percent of their budgets online 
before January 25th, they are now spending around seven percent. “This is a 
huge figure in terms of volume given the difference in prices between digital 
and traditional advertising, says Effat. She adds that online advertisements 
reach the major segment of consumers in Egypt; the youth. El Mehairy, 
however, says that while most companies are dedicating bigger and bigger 
chunks of their marketing budgets to online, they all shy away from association 
with political bloggers. He adds that brands do not want to be associated with 
one side over the other and political bloggers often represent a side of the 
argument, which alienates those disagreeing with opinions expressed. El 
Mehairy also sees the language used by some political bloggers as a major 
factor alienating advertisers who do not want their brands associated with 
profanities or extreme language. El Sherbiny also says she would not advertise 
with political bloggers because she would not want her brands to be associated 
with anyone whose content may alienate a chunk of society, which is the case 
with political bloggers who voice strong opinions. Effat agrees, “Most brands 
in Egypt are avoiding political connotations, so they wouldn’t go for bloggers 
or opinion leaders focused on politics.” Additionally, El Sherbiny prefers 
advertising with bloggers whose readers have an interest in her products, like 
fashion bloggers, although she might be associated with more mainstream, but 
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neutral, news platforms. Effat and El Sherbiny both say that social media are 
the bulk of where online advertising money is spent because of the platforms’ 
wide reach.   
 
7.2.6 Paid media appearances  
 
One revenue stream that was offered to bloggers after the uprising is paid 
television interviews. It is worth noting, however, that the policy for each 
channel and program differ when it came to whether or not they pay their 
guests as well as the amounts they pay them. The amount and whether they are 
paid or not also largely depended on who the guest is and his importance to the 
show. 
 Mahfouz, for instance, started getting small sums from her media 
appearances after January 25th; “I would appear on Al-Jazeera Qatar, for 
instance, and they would pay me $100, which would keep me for the week,” 
she said.  Although she was not consistently paid for appearances, depending 
on the medium’s policy, she now understands that it was a source of income 
she should’ve seized while still available. Abdel Fattah, Badawi and Abo-
elgheit are also comfortable with paid media appearances. 
 Some bloggers, however, refused to get paid for their appearances. 
Fathy, for instance, believes the media provides a platform to advocate and 
promote his cause and not earn a living off it. Nagati also said he does not 
believe in paid media appearances. El Naggar also viewed paid appearances as 







7.3. Editorial compromises and moving to mainstream 
 
 
Several bloggers have resorted to mainstream media, be it through being 
offered fixed opinion columns with leading newspapers, as was the case with 
several prominent bloggers, or through joining their teams as social media 
consultants or reporters, the latest being the case with the less prominent 
bloggers. Other bloggers were also offered occasional spaces on less popular 
newspaper portals.  
 Before January 25th, these opportunities were rarely available to even 
the most prominent bloggers. But after the uprising, newspapers like Al-Masry 
Al-Youm started providing space for online voices through their website and 
under the website’s managing editor, Nora Younes, who was a prolific blogger 
herself. This allowed a space for prominent and less prominent bloggers alike. 
But the space provided in print and other newspapers like Al-Shorouk remained 
more exclusive to the more prominent bloggers. Before the uprising the media 
often also used content from blogs without any accreditation. Nagati says that 
the online publishing market in Egypt was narrow before the uprising and so 
there were only a limited number of jobs offered, “There weren’t even online 
editors back then,” he adds. 
7.3.1. Transitioning to mainstream 
 
Many opportunities came to the bloggers due to, not only their fame and 
experience in online and social media and their strong presence in covering and 
reporting during the uprising, but also the expanding online job market and the 
boom that occurred in that field. Many online jobs were created during that 
period due to the interest that social media got after the uprising. Newspapers 
wanted their names associated with revolutionary figures. Mahfouz says “I 
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don’t think newspapers bother with what I write as much as they just want to 
have my name on their papers.” Many of those bloggers, therefore, found 
opportunities to join the mainstream media in their area of expertise. Abdel 
Fattah, for instance, was recruited as s social media consultant for Youm7 
because of her experience and popularity on social media. Similarly, Nagati 
was approached by Al-Masry Al-Youm to join their team based on his social 
media experience.  
“Most bloggers resorted to professional work; they joined channels and 
worked as producers and journalists,” said Saber adding that they still use 
social media but to promote their work in mainstream. Hisham agrees, saying 
that half of the bloggers he knows are now writing for newspapers. Ezzat, for 
example, used to publish articles on some online Islamist portals and what he 
describes as “low quality” magazines followed by a reporter position at the 
prestigious Al-Shorouk newspaper, But after the uprising, he started writing 
regular columns for several newspapers and news websites, including Al-
Shorouk, Al-Masry Al-Youm, Mada Masr, Jadaliyya and Al-Arabiya. His status 
in Al-Masry Al-Youm from a society column reporter to being asked to become 
one of the newspaper’s most prominent columnists in the period of one month 
is a reflection of the change that happened in that period in the status of 
prominent bloggers like Ezzat. He adds that “blogging opened all the doors” 
for him in journalism and elsewhere.  
Sandmonkey believes that one of the main changes that occurred to 
bloggers is that all of a sudden people like him started getting paid to write 
instead of their writings being solely for themselves. Mahfouz echoed a similar 
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opinion saying she used to write for newspapers online and some portals but 
was never paid for it; “after the revolution, I discovered this was an income,” 
 Although Sandmonkey and a few other prominent bloggers wrote 
occasionally for publications abroad or less popular online publications before 
the uprising, such opportunities locally with popular newspapers did not come 
until after January 2011. One key change in bloggers’ relationship with 
newspapers as well is that although they might have been able to publish one 
or two articles on mainstream media before the uprising through approaching 
them and asking them to publish their writing, after the uprising it was those 
newspapers that approached bloggers and offered them space. El Naggar, for 
instance, had only been able to publish two articles for Al-Shorouk newspaper 
before the uprising, but afterwards, the newspaper approached him offering 
him a fixed column and so did Al-Masry Al-Youm and Youm7. “Before the 
revolution it was very difficult for our generation to write in newspapers like 
this,” he said. 
 Bloggers are often tempted by the promise mainstream media holds to 
connect them to a wider audience base. El Naggar expresses that being well-
read and reaching a large audience is valuable to him and it’s a goal for many 
writers.  Abo-elgheit believes that a breakthrough that bloggers achieved after 
the uprising was being taken from the alternative spheres and into the 
mainstream journalism. “A huge breakthrough Nora Younis achieved was 
taking us [bloggers] out of the mold of ‘you’re the bloggers read only by a few’ 
to ‘you are opinion writers and journalists,’” he said. 
 This wider audience base, as well as financial rewards achieved from 
mainstream media, might therefore be worth sacrificing some of the 
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advantages the blogosphere provides; including complete autonomy over 
content. 
 Sandmonkey, however, sees an issue with bloggers transitioning to 
journalists and going beyond opinion-writing as they do not necessarily adhere 
to the professional codes journalists adhere to. He believes bloggers tend to be 
opinionated and so cannot function well in non-column writing. He adds that 
this gave way to rumors spreading when the press takes content from blogs 
without verifying the source of validity of the information. “So when anyone 
called me a primary source of news I said no, I am not news, I am biased. Look 
for news elsewhere,” he adds.  
 
7.3.2. Comparing prominent and. non-prominent bloggers’ transitions 
 
What was apparent during the interviews is that while the more prominent 
bloggers were more willing to collaborate with mainstream media and had 
more chances to do so, the less prominent bloggers often could not make that 
transition; either because they did not want to undergo pressures of mainstream 
media or because they did not have the right opportunity. Nagati believes it 
was only the elite who managed to make it into mainstream media, adding that 
some of those writing now do not have the required talent but they are famous 
so were approached by the media.  
While prominent bloggers like Abdel Fattah, Ezzat, El Naggar and 
Sandmonkey made their way to mainstream in popular publications, getting 
regular column spaces, the less prominent ones have either been unable to do 
so or have joined mainstream media in less prestigious positions. The less 
prominent ones were also able to get editorial space but in less popular or less 
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prestigious newspapers or on less popular online portals. Hisham, for instance, 
got turned down by several publications he approached. 
So while Abdel Fattah became a columnist and a social media 
consultant, Abo-elgheit, for instance, became a television producer. This means 
that while Abdel Fattah and others of her prominence are on the forefront of 
mainstream media, less prominent bloggers are on board but in less prominent 
positions. And while Ezzat and El Naggar were offered one of the few, 
exclusive editorial space in Al-Shorouk, Abo-elgheit was one of many 
reporters. Hisham’s editorials, on the other hand, got published but in less 
popular newspapers like Al-Mougaz and Al-Badil. 
 Other less-prominent bloggers were not able to land opportunities in 
mainstream media at all or refused to yield to the pressures of mainstream. 
Less-prominent bloggers showed a more emotional approach compared to the 
practical approach prominent bloggers took to their writings. El Naggar, like 
several other prominent bloggers who made it into mainstream, believes he can 
be flexible in his writing to be able to publish and get the biggest number of 
readers instead of abstaining and not getting his voice across. So while El 
Naggar and others expressed they are aware of the limitations of mainstream 
media and often tweak their content to fit it without forsaking the integrity of 
their opinions, less prominent ones felt strongly against tweaking or toning 
down content. Fathy, Saber and Badawy expressed frustration with mainstream 
media’s demands when it came to writing. “I don’t like imposing censorship on 
myself or changing my style,” said Badawy, “this is probably why I am not 
successful at this [publishing in mainstream.]”  Saber also says he could not 
tailor his style to fit mainstream; “I write how I speak. I can write in classical 
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Arabic, but it’s not really me.” He adds that his writing is what he calls “brain 
farting,” and venting about whatever is on his mind, a style that cannot 
compete with professional journalism. Unlike El Naggar who sees that one 
should fit his voice into what the mainstream allows instead of abstaining from 
writing, Fathy left a publication he was writing for when they did not want him 
to write about a certain topic he was interested in.  
 Less prominent bloggers also seemed more lax with their writings and 
did not want to have to write under the pressures of deadlines. Saber, for 
instance, says he cannot abide to writing schedules and might not want to write 
for long periods and then write intensively for others. He also says he needs to 
be “poked and teased” to write about something. Hisham feels the same adding 
he cannot feel compelled to write.  
Sherief did not want to reach out to mainstream media because he felt it 
would impose restrictions on him on what to write or not to write, the length of 
the articles and the deadlines. He preferred having his own, private space; “I 
find many who change [after collaborating with mainstream],” he says. “I want 
to be free. I often consider it, especially that many of the bloggers I know and 
started writing with are now writing in mainstream, but then I change my mind 
because I want to be free.” 
 The last difference is that while prominent bloggers are approached by 
the media with job offers, less-prominent ones said they had to seek out the 
media to get opportunities. 
7.3.3. Restrictions of the media in prominent versus non-prominent 
bloggers 
 
All bloggers interviewed realize mainstream media is more restrictive than 
social media and blogs because they require more structure, they have to 
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follow certain editorial guidelines and style and they are subjected to 
censorship that blogs are not subjected to. They are also more conscious to 
adapt their writings to fit the audience of the publication and generally a less 
elite and a more diverse and wider audience. 
Some bloggers have faced issues with censorships, asking them to 
either publish the article on the newspaper’s online edition only, or tone down 
their voices. The most prominent ones who continue to write for mainstream 
media have agreed to do that believing it’s best to reach the audience, even in a 
subtler way, than not to reach them at all. Ezzat had issues with Al-Masry Al-
Youm when they changed a sentence in his column for being too strong to 
publish. Abdel Fattah and Ezzat were allowed to publish an article online but 
not in print as the online ceiling of freedom is generally higher than that of the 
print editions. The less-prominent Fathy refused to accept those restrictions and 
left the publication he was working for after being banned to write about an 
issue. 
Some of them, however, were banned from writing for certain 
newspapers, like Abdel Fattah who was stopped from writing for Al-Masry Al-
Youm. Others opted out of writing for mainstream due to these pressures. 
Nagati says he did not want to join mainstream because he cannot be objective 
and adhere to the editorial styles and directions or compromise his writing 
according to the publication’s own ceiling of freedom.  
Someone like Abo-elgheit, for instance, realizes the pressures of 
mainstream but chooses to stay in it because it allows him wider reach, 
especially a segment that might disagree with his political directions, and so 
tones down his voice to get through to them. “I tend to tone it down a bit; I 
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can’t tell people ‘you’re slaves,’ even if I believe that … I can’t insult them if I 
want them to listen to me,” he says. “Even though there are pressures [from 
mainstream publications], we [voices of opposition] are adamant to maintain 
our positions in mainstream because it reaches a larger number of people and I, 
personally, feel a responsibility to deliver my voice to the people,” says Abo-
elgheit.  
What is striking about Abo-elgheit is that he explains he now makes a 
conscious effort to write articles that would be well-read by every category, 
direction and background of the society’s strata and that would be widely liked 
and shared by these categories. This conscious mass-writing style was not 
necessarily one he used before writing for mainstream. He started simplifying 
and shortening his articles when he moved from writing to the “elite” on his 
blog, as he calls them, onto the mainstream. “I now know that when I write in a 
certain way it will bring more people and readership and what buttons will 
resonate more with people,” explains Abo-elgheit. “So I now play 
psychological games with people. What will make people read all the article 
and press like and share? I will fool you into doing this.”  
Ezzat echoes a similar style; he recognizes that each platform he writes 
for has a different audience than the other and customizes his writings 
according to the readers of each. He recounts how he uses a different style in 
writing for Al-Masry Al-Youm and two other newspapers he writes for. The 
complexity, voice and persona he has differs with each of these.  
This shows one of the biggest effects of mainstreaming bloggers after 
the revolution; they not only realize what will work well on alternative media 
will not necessarily succeed on mainstream, but they are also far more 
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conscious of how to write to make their article interesting and attractive to the 
wider audience to get the most readership and likes. They are also more willing 
to adapt to publications’ ceilings of freedom, editorial and style guide and to 
what the general, not the elite, reader will accept to appeal to the widest 
audience possible. This could be attributed to feeling the pressure of 
mainstreaming writings into a now more commercial platform that requires 
catering to each reader’s needs and not just the blogger’s own wishes and 
styles. 
 
7.4. Coverage by the media before and after January 25th, 2011 
 
Bloggers relationship with mainstream media, in terms of the media hosting, 
quoting and covering them, has gone through drastic changes before and after 
January 25th, as shown from the content analysis performed and the interviews 
with both prominent and less-prominent bloggers. The interviews also show 
that a further change took place in this relationship after June 30th, 2013 when 
the Brotherhood regime was ousted.  
 The findings from bloggers’ interviews were consistent with those of 
the content analysis conducted. All bloggers interviewed said the media 
covered bloggers more intensely and favorable after the uprising but added that 
they’ve gone back to their old habits after June 30th, 2013. Bloggers have also 
said that international and English-language newspapers were different in their 
editorial policies than most local newspapers. 
 El Naggar, for instance, believes his relationship with the media has 
gone through different stages whereas the media quoted him as a former 
member of the Brotherhood, then an official at the Baradei presidential 
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campaign before January 25th, then as a representative of the revolutionary 
youth, parliament member, party founder and then politician after the uprising. 
This highlights the changes that happened in the relationship between bloggers 
and the media during the past few years. Before the revolution, bloggers were 
rarely quoted or covered by local media and if they were, it was not for their 
own personal opinions but rather their affiliation with certain political powers. 
This is manifested in the media using El Naggar as a source from the 
Brotherhood or Baradei’s campaign. After the uprising, however, they started 
getting hosted for their own personal opinions and political stances, rather than 
certain affiliations, which is shown in the media hosting El Naggar to speak of 
the revolution or his political activity and to analyze the current events. This 
shows a shift in the media’s perception of him and the weight given to his 
opinions.  
 Bloggers interviewed also argue that editorial policies of newspapers 
differed when it came to the media coverage of bloggers and it was the 
English-language publications that was interested the most in them, as the 
content analysis has proven. Fathy argues that online portals also tend to cover 
bloggers more so than the publications’ print editions; something the content 
analysis of Al-Ahram newspaper has also shown.  
7.4.1. Before January 25th 
 
The local media, bloggers said, rarely covered them before the uprising and 
when they quoted them they often did so through copying content off their 
blogs without accrediting them. The media rarely, however, gave them space in 
print or in broadcast. 
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 Mahfouz, for instance, said she has decided to upload the video 
mobilizing people before January 25th on her personal YouTube account 
because the media had refused to host her or her colleagues or cover news of 
the protests at all. 
 Ezzat, like many others interviewed, said the media would copy his 
posts without his permission or any accreditation and that happened the most 
around 2007.  
It was also during this period that international media paid special 
attention to Egyptian bloggers, portraying them as the activists who could not 
find their voices and resorted to alternative platforms, said Ezzat. Similarly, 
Fathy said that before the uprising it was mainly foreign and English-language 
media that quoted him. Nagati explains that saying social media and blogs 
were not widespread among the majority of people in Egypt, but were much 
more popular in the West. This is why, Nagati argues, Western media paid 
attention to Egyptian bloggers whereas the local media did not. 
  Once this initial interest in bloggers, mostly by international media, 
dwindled so did the space given to bloggers in mainstream media coverage.  
7.4.2. After and during January 25th 
 
Bloggers agree that the media was most actively and favorably covering and 
hosting them during and right after January 25th. Abdel Fattah argues the 
frequency of coverage and hosting bloggers was very high after the uprising 
immediately.  It was around this period, Ezzat believes, that the idea of 
“famous bloggers” started coming about.  
 Mahfouz believes the media became most favorable towards bloggers 
right after the uprising; “You couldn’t even sleep from the number of 
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journalists coming in and out of the house and calling us,” she says. Ezzat 
agrees, adding that the press at the time did not represent the voices of the 
revolution as prominent bloggers and revolutionaries had not started writing 
for mainstream portals yet. Therefore, Ezzat adds, the media resorted to 
bloggers who were active on the ground and represented the voices of the 
youth to reflect on current events and voice their opinions. 
 Badawy argues that bloggers were covered during the uprising because 
they were influential in the street, and not due to their identities as bloggers. 
Nagati, however, argues that it was because people started realizing the 
importance of social media and how effective it can be, “naturally, the media 
covered what was important to the people,” he says. “Then the social media 
stars and big players started appearing on television and people started to try to 
understand who they are and what they do.” 
 Abo-elgheit believes some people during this period became the “one-
scene hero” as the media covered them intensively for a day or two for 
something that they have done and then they’re forgotten about. These are not, 
he adds, the faces of bloggers that are recognized by laymen but were covered 
amidst the frenzy of media coverage during that period. So while laymen know 
bloggers like Esraa Abdel Fattah and Alaa Abdel Fattah, only a certain 
intellectual and educational elite recognize certain bloggers like Abo-elgheit 
and others. The more prominent bloggers were those who are covered over and 
over by the media and not only for a day or two, unlike others who might have 
gotten their one-minute of fame but disappeared after. 
Bloggers and social media makers were also sometimes the only 
reporters able and accepted on the ground to report on what’s happening not 
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only on social media but also to the mainstream channels that were not able to 
get in or could not get reporters in quickly or were simply rejected from 
covering on the ground by protestors there.  “There were days when I was the 
only one reporting, just me in Egypt, with only two other reporters sending 
stuff from their phones later. So a day like April 8th, 2011, ONTV was reporting 
after me,” says Nagati. “We are individuals, we move easily, our costs are low, 
and we are at the heart of things, we move quickly and we have been doing that 
for long and we are doing it for free.”   
 Abdel Fattah and Mahfouz, however, both believe that this frequent and 
favorable coverage has gone down around 2012; around a year after the 
uprising. 
7.4.3. After June 30th, 2013 
 
A few months before June 30th, Abdel Fattah argues, their coverage started 
picking up again as Morsi announced constitutional declarations that were 
opposed by many. But after June 30th – when protests broke out calling for the 
end of the Brotherhood regime and the army detaining then-president 
Mohamed Morsi – bloggers agreed, their coverage and hosting have gone 
down tremendously. When they were covered, Mahfouz, El Naggar and others 
added, they were mainly portrayed in a negative light. Fathy adds that when 
they do quote bloggers now they quote the lighter side of micro-blogging; 
namely the jokes they post on social media in the form of satire. 
 Saber believes that the media coverage of bloggers changed because the 
media directions have. He argues that when bloggers’ agendas aligned with 
that of mainstream media, their coverage was favorable; as in the case during 
January 25th and right before June 30th. Saber adds that when their agendas did 
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not align, it was either no coverage at all or negative coverage. This aligns with 
what Mahfouz believes as she says the only times the media calls her are when 
she Tweets things that are in favor of the particular media platform’s direction. 
Nagati also believes their coverage decreased after June 30th because their 
importance has. 
 The media also started attacking some activists after June 30th, 
including prominent bloggers like Mahfouz and El Naggar who were attacked 
by a certain television show that claimed they were profiteering from activism 
and paid by foreign countries. “The media is almost destroying my life,” says 
Mahfouz. She also believes the media was banned from hosting her. 
Sandmonkey believes that this scrutiny and attack is due to their new positions 
as public personas and key political players. 
El Naggar believes the negative media coverage actually makes people 
trust him and his colleagues more as honest revolutionaries who do not waver 
or compromise their positions. This means that he realizes their portrayals as 
the opposition underdogs, or the anti-hegemonic elements who must be 
defending the general good, is actually beneficial for their popularity, even if 
they’re speaking to this public through hegemonic or mainstream platforms. 
 “Islamists electronic portals, for instance, would want to speak to me 
because they know I am against El Sisi. If I write a Tweet against Islamists, 
you find pro-Sisi and pro-regime media outlets calling me to hear what they 
want to hear,” says Mahfouz. “They don’t want my opinion, they want to have 
this person, who was a revolutionary, say this particular thing.” She adds that 
they often twist her Tweets and take them out of context to fit their own 
directions. 
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“In 2011 and 2012 we were stronger, we set the mainstream media agenda. 
This is regressing now,” Fathy concludes. 
7.5. Conclusion and Discussion: 
 
7.5.1. Summary of findings and reflecting on theoretical grounding  
 
The media prominence bloggers received after January 25th, 2011 had several 
effects on mainstreaming what was previously a counterpublic, as described by 
Fraser (1992) that changed the very nature of the online sphere and ultimately 
led to the demise of the blogosphere.  
 
7.5.1.1. Intellectuals’ superior attitudes 
The effects of this mainstreaming were not only apparent in how bloggers 
altered their voices to fit their new status in mainstream media but also in the 
way they spoke of the founding generation of bloggers, their readers and of 
newcomers. 
Bloggers, and especially the more prominent ones, showed reluctance 
to accommodate different opinions among their readers and interact with them 
as they used to after the increase in popularity of social media. This not only 
eliminates the reciprocity element of the online communication that Malina 
(1999), Papacharissi (2008 and 2002) and Sassi (2000) argued is necessary to 
affect social and political benefits from online media, but also turns the online 
sphere into a space of one-way communication. This one-way communication 
is dominated by a few popular micro-bloggers who have the most visibility 
online and offline who might be “excommunicating those who disagree and 
demonizing outsiders to enforce internal unity,” as Lynch (2006, p.3-4) puts it. 
This phenomenon of conversing only with the like-minded is what Coleman 
(2004) calls social herding and leads to the polarization of the online sphere. 
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The founding generation of bloggers view themselves as having earned the 
right for this spotlight and status through sacrificing their personal security and 
risking state scrutiny and jail. This right they feel newcomers to the online 
sphere have not earned and so have no right to steal the spotlights or speak on 
behalf of online activists.  
Those feelings of eliteness resonate with some definitions of 
intellectuals. These feelings of being a group of intellectually superior heroes 
risking security and more bears resemblance to what Benda describes as 
intellectuals. It is then relevant to look at how the bloggers’ move to 
mainstream media affected the type of intellectuals they were. The interviews 
show that the less prominent bloggers seemed to view their role as intellectuals 
the same way Benda does; romantically and ideally with a total disregard for 
modern society pressures and practical pursuits. They do not all, however, live 
up to his condition that intellectuals are ready to sacrifice their lives for their 
cause. So while several less-prominent bloggers refused to join the mainstream 
or alter their voices to fit it, implying that their view of their role is 
theoretically aligned with that of Benda’s, the fact that they stopped blogging 
altogether and minimized their activity on social media, opting for more 
practically rewarding careers and activities, means they do not practically fit 
that definition. Bloggers’ interviews also show they embody the struggle Said 
depicts in balancing pressures such as shaping a career and finding financial 
sustainability and self-achievement through reaching wider audience bases and 
maintaining a level of independence. And even though they do fit Said’s 
definition of intellectuals in various ways — for example, they are endowed 
with the faculty to influence and articulate arguments and opinions and defy 
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the orthodox — contrary Said’s definition, many of the more prominent 
bloggers have been coopted by media institutions. That does not mean, 
however, that they are not intellectuals, but it might mean that a more practical 
theory of intellectuals is needed to account for an answer to the struggle Said 
describes. Gramsci’s view of organic intellectuals is the closest to bloggers’ 
reality here; they had once been traditional intellectuals detaching themselves 
from society and more concerned with conceptual matters but have turned into 
organic intellectuals who are part of organizations in the historical bloc; 
namely the media.  
 7.5.1.2. The demise of the blogosphere 
The findings have shown that four factors led to the demise of the Egyptian 
blogosphere; the changing situation in Egypt, bloggers’ failure to make 
blogging financially sustainable, the founding generation of the blogosphere 
growing older and more career-oriented, and social media replacing blogs.  
 Many bloggers expressed depression over the state of affairs in Egypt 
post-January 25th that led them to not wanting to blog anymore. But those 
feelings only kept the more prominent ones from writing online. They did not 
stop writing in mainstream media because they felt a sense of obligation to the 
newspaper or website they write for. This indicates that, while bloggers view 
their blog as a personal space and attach more feelings to it, mainstream 
writing is more of an obligation or a responsibility that cannot be affected by 
personal feelings.  
 The founding generation of bloggers have expressed that they were 
growing older and so more focused on their professional lives. This led them to 
develop identities other than bloggers and so blogging took a backseat to their 
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new responsibilities. Those whose identities were forged as bloggers pursued 
careers in mainstream media, politics or civil society work. This has left them 
far less time and energy to write online, as seen from the content analysis of 
blogs and the interviews. Mainstream media provided them with sustainable 
revenues and a wider reach that the blogs could not achieve. Looking at the 
blogs’ content analysis, one can see that the frequency of the posts started 
going down around the same time bloggers started new careers. Bloggers 
interviewed also felt online platforms’ rising popularity led to content chaos 
and the dilution of revolutionary ideology, or as Nagati says, “the trade is now 
open for every Tom, Dick and Harry.” In fact, 5 out of the 12 bloggers said 
they felt their roles online are much less important than in the past due to the 
information overload on social media. This information overload was further 
amplified by electronic committees, fake accounts set up to propagate an idea 
or harass prominent micro-bloggers through flooding newsfeeds with similar 
posts or Tweets. Prominent bloggers then started looking for more exclusive 
platforms, like mainstream media. In return, the media wanted to have 
revolutionary legitimacy through having voices from the revolution on their 
pages and increase their traffic online through publishing columns by popular 
social media makers and bloggers. Their new positions in mainstream, be it 
media or politics, also give them a sense of pride that they expressed during 
interviews, that blogging alone did not. They transitioned from opposition 
writers to getting paid to write in well-esteemed newspapers. It is important to 
note, however, that out of the 7 bloggers interviewed collaborating with or in 
the field of mainstream media, 6 were prominent. It was also evident that the 
more prominent the blogger, the larger and more prestigious space they 
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received. The less prominent bloggers were seemingly unable to transition to 
mainstream, not only because they lacked opportunity, but also because they 
felt more emotionally attached to their writing and could not adapt to 
restrictions of mainstream media and adhere to deadlines, censorship and 
editorial styles and agendas. This means that those prominent bloggers – who 
are arguably power elites (Mills, 1956) – are not only becoming power elites of 
their own accords, influencing the public in their influential posts in the media, 
civil society and politics, but they are also becoming online and offline media 
elites. Joining mainstream media or other elements of the historical bloc means 
that the once counterhegemonic elements, or the déclassé (Ayubi, 2011: 3-5), 
have been coopted (Gramsci, 1971) and incorporated in the process of re-
manufacturing consent (Herman and Chomsky, 1988) during the political 
transition Egypt went through. Although they remain opposition voices, their 
coopting into the historical bloc had significant effects on their content and the 
severity and direction of their voices as they became more institutionalized. 
Bloggers could not achieve a sustainable revenue stream off their blogs 
and most bloggers interviewed never considered monetizing their blogs 
although none of them objected to the concept of doing so. The marketeers 
argued that while advertisers are looking to spend more money in online 
advertisements to reach the widest consumer segment in Egypt, the youth, 
they are not willing to be associated with political bloggers because they 
often represent a side of the argument, which alienates those disagreeing with 
opinions expressed. They added that language used by some political 
bloggers was a major factor alienating advertisers who do not want their 
brands associated with profanities or extreme language. Advertisers then look 
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for more neutral platforms to represent their products. These findings are 
consistent with Herman and Chomsky argument that the private sector whose 
interests often intertwine with that of the state shies away from advertising 
with media outlets that strongly oppose the state and corporate policies, 
(1988). 
All 12 bloggers interviewed believe social media is easier to use and 
has a wider audience and so have all almost stopped posting on their blogs 
and resorted to social media instead.  
7.5.1.3. Limiting the plurality of the online sphere 
There are several factors that make for a revised Habermasian public sphere, 
taking into account Mouffe’s revisions of the concept (2000); those are namely 
inclusivity, liberal exchange of views, disregard of status and plurality and 
diversity of voices.  The findings suggest that the blogosphere is losing some 
of those key factors given the changes that occurred to the online sphere after 
January 25th as well as the nature of the population in Egypt. 
In theory, the blogosphere and the micro-blogosphere have become 
more inclusive, given the rise in internet penetration rates after 2011. But the 
reality is that the less-prominent bloggers still struggle to get followership in an 
overloaded online sphere and the chaos of content. On the other hand, the more 
prominent bloggers gain more followers as they become even more prominent 
online and offline. This hinders the inclusivity of the online sphere because 
while it is in theory inclusive, in practicality, the newcomers or those who 
didn’t receive as much media attention still struggle to get heard and the online 
discourse is dominated by only a select few. It also eliminates the argument 
some made in favor of the internet’s merit in the democratic process; its ability 
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to take us into an era of communication of the many to the many instead of 
small numbers of people enjoying privileged positions as speakers (Kapr, 
1994). This prominence is amplified by the effects of search engines, which 
promote certain platforms over others and Twitter suggesting the most popular 
micro-bloggers to follow, further limiting the plurality of voices online. Faris 
describes this as the network effect online that leads to a few, star bloggers 
dominating the online sphere and influencing the offline agenda. He argues 
that the Egyptian blogosphere is a scale-free network, which means that most 
nodes will be relatively poorly connected, “while a select minority of hubs be 
very highly connected,” (2010, p.28). This was evident in the findings as 
prominent bloggers seem to run in the same circle.   
Prominent bloggers’ attitude towards newcomers online also hinders 
the ‘disregard of status factor’ that is necessary to form a plural public sphere. 
Another factor hindering the ‘disregard of status’ and plurality of the online 
sphere is prominent bloggers’ profiles that indicate their elite backgrounds. 
This means that the online discourse is not only dominated by a few, but that 
those few come from elite backgrounds that allow them the tools to become 
influential online. This factor is even at stronger play as those dominating the 
discourse online express their intolerance of newcomers and of disagreeing 
voices. This means that the online sphere – a once counterpublic for the 
marginalized, unfamiliar voices – is becoming the exclusive sphere that led to 
its formation in the first place, marginalizing newcomers and different voices. 
 Bloggers’ move to mainstream means that the once-counterpublic that is 
the online sphere is no longer independent from the state and economy, an 
aspect that constitutes a strong public sphere. The switch to mainstream media 
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not only led them to blogging far less than before, but it also led them to alter 
and tone down their voices online as they became subject to more scrutiny due 
to their growing prominence. The wider audience base and the financial 
rewards achieved from mainstream meant sacrificing a key advantage the 
blogosphere provided; complete autonomy over content. All bloggers 
interviewed see traditional media as more restrictive than online platforms. 
Those who joined mainstream media also expressed that they had to alter their 
voices offline given the political, editorial and advertorial pressures of 
mainstream media. Becoming renowned public figures in the political arena or 
renowned column writers also meant they had a certain image in the eyes of 
the public that they had to adhere to and so had to tweak their voices 
accordingly. They realized their words can be used against them by the press, 
the audience of the state. They also wanted to appeal to a wider audience base 
in the platforms they started writing for and so had to use certain tones and 
simplify their arguments or writing according to the readers of that specific 
platform now that they were no longer writing for an elite online audience. Six 
out of the 12 bloggers interviewed explicitly said they felt the pressures of 
being in the mainstream sphere. Unlike the more prominent bloggers, however, 
the less prominent ones did not express concern over fitting a certain public 
image or mold. These findings resonate with Morozov’s theory that the internet 
is not emancipatory in nature (2011) as well as Papacharissi’s argument that 
online discourse is an “orchestrated performance with the Other in mind,” 
(2008). 
Although bloggers do not directly monetize their blogs, this does not 
negate the effects of commercializing online space that dystopian theories of 
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the internet warn about. The move into mainstream then eliminates a merit that 
authors like Beacham (1995, cited in McChesney, 1995) and others argued the 
internet carries; its freedom from government and corporate constraints. Even 
though the blogs themselves are not monetized, the bloggers have still 
capitalized on their online popularity and commercialized, not their spaces, but 
their status and fame. This is a revenue stream that online organization authors 
call “personal revenue.” The media realizes bloggers and social media makers 
are gateway to a lucrative audience segment of upper and middle class youth 
and so they want to include them onboard to reach out to that segment. So 
while they may not post an ad on their blog that would subject them to 
pressures of the media economics, they are still influenced by political 
economy of the media as they join mainstream media and become aware of 
those pressures and thus altering their content on social media platforms and 
blogs accordingly. Herman and Chomsky argue that market dynamics, media 
economics and availability of sources lead to self-censorship in favor of the 
state (1988). As Golding and Murdock argue, “the premium prices are 
commanded by shows that can attract and hold the greatest number of 
viewers,” (2000, p.75).  This side effect of commercializing bloggers is evident 
in bloggers reportedly wanting to reach out to the largest number of readers 
and altering their content to achieve that. The counterpublic then now 
indirectly intertwines with the mainstream as a spill-over effect from the main 
players in the counterpublic joining the mainstream. This fusion brought this 
counterpublic into the spotlight of not only mainstream media, which became 
more involved online, but also the state, leading to bloggers and micro-
bloggers becoming increasingly under the authorities’ radar and subjected to 
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various crackdowns. In fact, 7 out of the 12 bloggers interviewed have faced 
court cases at some point, and of those 7, 4 were prominent. The attention they 
received in the mainstream also caused the blogosphere to become fragmented 
after the uprising. Mahfouz, for instance, stressed on how the media attention 
she received made many jealous of her and led to her quitting the April 6th 
movement after people would question why she appears on the media and they 
do not and accusing her of stealing the spotlight. Sandmonkey also paints a 
divided picture of the blogosphere. This fragmentation of a once united online 
sphere is a possible side effect of the commercialization of the online space as 
dystopian theories of the internet argue. 
 
7.5.2. Difference between discourse and content on social media platforms 
and mainstream media 
 
7.5.2.1. Social Media vs. Blogs 
 
Although social media provides easier interface and a wider reach, interviews 
have shown that they have quite a few limitations given the technology and 
that the quality of content on social media is drastically lower than that on 
blogs.  
- Technical Issues: Five of the major different aspects of social media and 
blogs is that social media has limited archives while blogs do not, social media 
content is not searchable on search engines, there is no way to tell the traffic on 
social media, the user has to allow followers and comments and there is no way 
to post advertisements on one’s profile.  
  Social media does not archive posts well, the notes on Facebook are 
sometimes only shown to friends and not followers and posts on social media 
do not appear on search engines. This makes bloggers feel like their content is 
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lost. Twitter does not go back in archives beyond 3,200 Tweets and 
Facebook’s archiving methods are difficult to navigate and not always 
thorough. Facebook also does not automatically show notes and some are 
hidden to friends only and so more difficult to navigate than blogs.  
 Ezzat sees Facebook notes as a good alternative to blogs but is bothered 
by how the archives are not easily accessible and how the notes would not 
appear on Google searches. This made several bloggers interviewed view their 
blogs as archives for their writings. Although Badawy says he now uses social 
media rather than blogs, his blog serves as an archive. Ezzat is also planning on 
moving his notes onto the archives to be able to go back to them and so that 
they’re accessible through search engines but he has not done so yet. 
Sandmonkey believes it is laziness that made the 30 “old-guard” bloggers turn 
to platforms like Twitter rather than blog as it’s easier and faster. 
 Furthermore, there is no way to tell traffic to a note written on 
Facebook or a Tweet, as opposed to the many softwares that allow bloggers to 
know how many people visited their blog and read certain posts. Although a 
micro-blogger can tell how interactive readers were on notes or Tweets he 
wrote from likes, shares and comments, he cannot tell how many of his 
followers actually read what he wrote. The function that allows users to track 
who read their content on Facebook is only available to pages, and not personal 
accounts that most bloggers use. 
 Lastly, although users can constantly monitor how many people are 
following them, Facebook and Twitter do not allow users to profiteer from 
their accounts’ popularity or audience through ad placements. Users could still 
monetize their content on social media through sponsorship; endorsing certain 
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brands in return of monthly fees, but this form of revenue stream may not be 
favorable to bloggers as they might view it as a threat to their credibility and it 
is not as easy or as straightforward as simply posting advertisements on blogs. 
- Easier Writing: Bloggers interviewed, both prominent and less-prominent, 
have all expressed that they do not feel the same pressure to research ideas 
well, think about them, develop them and structure them before writing on 
social media like they did with blogs. Ezzat says that around 2013 he started 
focusing on social media and mainstream media and his blog posts all became 
archives of articles he wrote for mainstream media. He explains that blogs 
require more time and effort to prepare for, write and upload while he could be 
more lax on social media with what he writes. So while he spends a couple of 
minutes to post on social media, he used to spend days thinking, researching 
and writing blog posts.   
 “On blogs you had to sit and prepare for what you write, add links and 
pictures, write in a specific structure with conclusions and all. You also had to 
use a certain style. The blogosphere’s entourage made you want to write in a 
certain way. But Facebook is simpler; you sometimes write blog-like posts and 
add a picture and a link and other times you write quicker, shorter posts in two 
or three lines about something you want to get out there…I don’t have the 
time,” says Ezzat. “Personally, I feel greater responsibility when writing on my 
blog than I do on Twitter.” 
 This has a significant meaning on the quality of discourse on social 
media compared to the quality of discourse on blogs; while bloggers used to 
research their posts well and spend hours and days writing it, they admit that 
Tweeting only takes a couple of minutes and not nearly the same effort that 
El	Sayed,					297	
goes behind a post. This signifies that while it’s a place to make a statement 
and vent, the deeper, more thought-out and researched posts have now 
vanished.  
 “I am no longer waiting to think of the idea, develop it and research it to 
post it on my blog. I can now write it in 140 characters on Twitter and it 
reaches people and it’s more effective because people don’t have to visit your 
page and they will re-Tweet it,” says Saber. “Social networks now take the 
ideas immediately.” 
- Easy access: Facebook and Twitter’s interactions mean that if a user is 
following a micro-blogger, anything this micro-blogger posts will appear on 
the user’s newsfeed whenever they log in. This provides a steady followership 
and makes it easier for users to follow bloggers without leaving the platform 
they are already on, be it Facebook or Twitter, like they would have to do to 
check a certain blogger’s blog. Unlike blogs, they do not have to go to a 
specific website to read what a specific blogger wrote. Therefore, bloggers can 
make use of the wide popularity of social media and of people already being on 
them and not going specifically to read them. 
 Furthermore, people who own smartphones are able to get bloggers’ 
updates right on their mobiles as they would most likely have Facebook and 
Twitter applications on their phones. They can also set up these applications so 
they can get notified whenever someone they’re following updates their 
profiles. This makes for a much easier interface. 
- Freedom and followers: Some bloggers felt freer on Facebook than they did 
on Twitter while others felt more restricted but they all felt freer on their blogs 
than they do on social media, which are often more monitored by the media 
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and often have acquaintances, friends and families amongst the followers. 
Abdel Fattah, for instance, feels that because the media monitors Twitter more 
so than Facebook, she is freer on the latter. Meanwhile, Badawi feels that 
Facebook is more restrictive than Twitter because all his family and friends are 
following what he writes and so may be offended, leading to personal issues 
and disputes. 
 On social media, family and friends are always seeing whatever they 
post, even if they only followed or added bloggers to stay connected, and the 
mainstream media has easy access to their posts because the channels and 
newspapers are already on social media and get instant feeds. Those who read 
their blogs, however, will be going specifically onto their unique domain for 
the sole purpose of reading their blog posts; unlike social media. Therefore, the 
fact that people on social media are more diverse and are on these platforms for 
purposes more than solely reading a blog post, and that the content is more 
exposed than blogs mean social media serves might prove more restrictive than 
the blogs. 
- Different uses: Interviews with bloggers show that Twitter is used more like 
news agencies to update followers about news on the ground and current 
events or call for action to mobilize people for protests or warn them about 
violence in certain areas.  
 Meanwhile, Facebook is used more like newspapers whereby users can 
write longer posts about current events that are often more timely than blogs 
but less brief than Tweets. Mahfouz believes Facebook is a safer environment 
as she can control who she speaks with and who can comment or see posts; 
something she’s not able to do on Twitter. Ezzat also believes that Facebook is 
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now more dynamic than Twitter, although this was not the case before, as 
people can interact more. 
 Lastly, blogs are used like archives for bloggers to archive either social 
media content they deem important because social media does not archive 
content well, or to archive their writings on mainstream.  
 Therefore, while Twitter allows for brief comments and breaking news, 
Facebook allows for more commentary and the blog is more about researched, 
well-planned articles. This means that if one of these forms dies, it leaves a gap 
in the type of readings available online and in the public sphere in general that 
the other platform does not necessarily fulfill. It was apparent from interviews 
that the quality of discourse on social media is lower than that on blogs as 
bloggers do not research or think the content through before posting like they 
did with blogs.  
7.5.2.2. Blogs and Micro-blogs Vs. Mainstream media 
 
Bloggers interviewed all see the difference between writing on their social 
media and their blogs and the style and voice they need to adopt to write for 
mainstream media. In addition to the restrictions that are imposed on them in 
mainstream media, and adapting their tone, style and direction to fit wider 
audiences and editorial agendas, bloggers also felt freer as they considered 
blogs their own personal spaces. A major difference is writing to meet 
deadlines and not just when the bloggers feels like it; in fact, Ezzat believes his 
blogger background made him unable to write to meet his deadline obligation 
if he’s not in the mood to do so. 
 Sandmonkey, for instance, feels restricted on mainstream media 
because he cannot write freely and use the same profanities he used in his blog. 
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He also says he misses the freedom to experiment with more creative styles of 
writing. “I was freer before the revolution,” he adds speaking of pressures to 
tone down his writing. Abdel Fattah and Mahfouz also say she was freer on 
social media than she is in mainstream media to take whichever direction and 
tone she wanted to use. Mahfouz often shies away from traditional media as 
they try to direct her articles in certain directions and because she says she 
cannot adapt to the classic Arabic and journalism rules newspapers ask her to 
abide by. She has now resorted to writing to two online portals that publish 
blog-like articles so she does not feel restrained. 
 Saber believes bloggers write on social media and their platforms in a 
more emotional voice. He believes their accounts are more biased, their voices 
more sensational and their language more casual than that used in mainstream 
media, which can sound detached to maintain objectivity and neutrality. Ezzat 
agrees, adding that as a blogger he was often involved in events and not just 
reporting or analyzing them and so his background as a blogger made it 
impossible to separate between his mood and his writing, which is one of the 
main reasons he stopped contributing columns. 
 El Naggar also says writing for mainstream meant changing his writing 
to make it simpler and easier for a wider audience to read. He also keeps his 
readers in mind when writing and changes his style and the complexity of his 
articles according to the readers of each platform he writes for.  
 Blogs have started losing what defined them as blogs to start with, “It’s 
updated regularly … It doesn’t patronized the end user, dumbing things down 
too much…. It even has somewhat of a community, maintained by repeat 
visitors and list members who contribute many of the links,” (Barrett, 1999). 
El	Sayed,					301	
Bloggers have stopped updating regularly, if it all, they have started being 
more conscious of their audience and believing they are no longer followed by 
the elite they once thought read their blogs and so started simplifying their 
content and their blogs no longer represent communities where bloggers and 
readers interact and share regularly. Winer even defined blogs as the unedited 
voices of author, collectively representing an amalgam of many voices. As 
findings have shown, the blogs no longer represent unedited voices as the 
authors have mostly expressed conscious editing and censorship of their 
content. It is also no longer an amalgam of many voices as the blogosphere and 
even micro-blogosphere become dominated by certain elite bloggers and 
micro-bloggers whose voices are the only ones successfully getting across to 
users as others struggle to find time to post or followership to engage with. 
And while blogging carried elements of Habermas’ revised public sphere, 
taking into account plurality and diversity introduced by Fraser and Mouffe, 
the new face of the online sphere does not. The new online space for discourse 
does not have the same two-way discussions that were once present on blogs 
and social media and so eliminates the “liberal exchange of views” aspect 
needed to achieve a public sphere. It also does not have the elements of 
inclusivity, diversity and disregard of status necessary for a plural space for 
discourse, especially with bloggers’ move to mainstream media. And even 
though those same counterhegemonic elements that formed the counterpublic 
are still voicing their opinions, they are now doing so on platforms that are part 
of the historical bloc and so subject them to the pressures and limitations of it. 
This also spills over onto their presence online, thus making what could have 
El	Sayed,					302	
been a diverse, plural online public sphere into an exclusive mainstream sphere 
that echoes censored and controlled voices of the elite only. 
Calhoun argues that, “a public sphere adequate to a democratic polity 
depends upon both quality of discourse and quantity of participation,” (1992: 
2). Findings show that both the quality of online discourse as well as its 
quantity are now being hindered by the online sphere intertwining with 
mainstream.    
“Blogging is free: When you write a blog entry, it’s your personal space 
and you can write whatever you want and you’re not tied to the rules of 
writing. When you write an article you need an introduction and a certain style 
and so on. Blogging is like personal thoughts and so it’s easier; you write 
whatever is on your mind. But when you’re writing an article you’re tied to a 
certain image the reader has for you and the standard of writing you do so you 
can’t write everything. Also, my work in politics made my writing more 
disciplined than before because anything I write can be used against me and 
can add or subtract from my credit with people. Writing in newspapers in 
general is one restriction, but writing when you’re politically engaged is 
another restriction as well. One article can make a difference,” says El Naggar. 
“You can use your account to mobilize masses, you can’t do that in a 
column,” Abdel Fattah sums it up. 
“Blogs are freer than the media; I can do as I wish with it. I can speak 
about politics in a very personal way and discuss philosophy. But the 
newspaper controls your writing to a certain mold … On your blog you can 
write short or long posts, be sarcastic or serious and write about whatever 
subject you want,” concludes Ezzat.  
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Chapter VIII: Conclusion: The death of the Egyptian 
blogosphere and the rise of micro-blogging and column 
writers 
 
The further this research went, the clearer it became that while studying the 
social and political impacts of blogs and the internet, one has to look beyond 
the much-discussed narrative of how bloggers and micro-bloggers have driven 
change in authoritarian countries. While it was understandable that earlier 
studies of blogging look at the potential for the medium in the democratization 
process, one cannot look at blogs or micro-blogs today without acknowledging 
other less romantic and more practical aspects of the blogosphere and social 
media in different contexts. Discussing the financial and organizational aspects 
of the blogosphere and questioning the plurality it adds to the public space for 
discourse served for a more comprehensive at and a deeper understanding of 
blogs and micro-blogs that goes beyond solely the role the internet played in 
the Arab Spring.  
 This research started out attempting to bridge the gap in research and 
literature between the financial sustainability and organizational aspects of 
blogging and the degree of plurality they add to the public sphere after the 
January 25th 2011 uprising in Egypt’s authoritarian setting. The findings, 
however, do not reflect only the status quo of the Egyptian blogosphere and 
micro-blogosphere, but have wider, longer-run implications. The findings point 
to the importance of bloggers’ contribution to the plurality of the public space 
for discourse in a media environment like the Egyptian one, but they also point 
to how this plurality can easily be limited by various factors at play in 
developing countries like Egypt, but also by free market dynamics rather than 
the much-debated state coercion. Although coercion was often discussed as 
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limiting to the discourse in authoritarian countries, this research indicates that 
consensus and free market dynamics pose a bigger, more permanent threat on 
alternative media platforms like blogs and micro-blogs. This is evident in the 
current situation where the main Egyptian blogs are not updated regularly 
anymore and the bloggers are wary of their own readers. They started 
simplifying content for a mass audience, they no longer represent an amalgam 
of voices and they have stopped being unedited voices with the mainstreaming 
of their authors. Inactive blogs are taking up space on search engines and so 
users are still directed to the inactive, but famous blogs, which became familiar 
to the general audience either through the media, search engines or 
endorsements from other star bloggers and micro-bloggers.  This then leaves 
little opportunity for other rising, but much more active bloggers, to find space 
and readership in a crowded virtual sphere. The findings also point towards a 
certain eliteness of social media makers and bloggers that, given Egypt’s socio-
economic structure, mean that the internet may be inclusive in principle, but it 
is as exclusive as elite media in practice as the discourse gets dominated by a 
few possessing the tools to be heard.  
8.1. Romanticising bloggers and the demise of the blogosphere 
 
It is limiting to only consider blogs romantically without looking at them from 
an organizational standpoint and factoring in financial sustainability and this 
ultimately contributed to their demise. 
 When first contacted for interviews, bloggers were at first surprised that 
I included the financial aspect of blogging in my research. But as the 
interviews unfolded, they came to realize, through their own answers and 
narratives, that financial sustainability is key and that the lack of it was one of 
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the main factors in them drastically decreasing the frequency of blogging or 
quitting it altogether as they got older and more career-oriented. As the 
findings have shown, the blogosphere’s demise has resulted from bloggers’ 
failure, or unwillingness, to develop a hobby into a financially sustainable 
activity that would ensure the blogosphere’s survival. This led them to join 
mainstream establishments where they were subjected to pressures that 
affected the nature, quantity and quality of their content. The voices of 
bloggers who have been co-opted into the historical bloc mellowed down as 
their interests intertwined with those of cultural institutions of this bloc; 
namely mainstream media. The overtly romantic view of political blogging as 
solely activism, and not a media platform like any other that requires 
developing and a sustainable revenue stream, failed to envision the current 
scenario in which, by 2014, prominent bloggers switched their writing to the 
more sustainable mainstream media whereas less prominent ones simply 
stopped blogging. This had implications not only in terms of the content they 
stopped producing on their blogs, but also the content they produced on micro-
blogging platforms; namely Facebook and Twitter. The findings pointed to 
drastic differences between the nature of content that bloggers produce for 
blogs, social media and the mainstream media, indicating that the death of one 
of those forms creates a gap in the possible variety of content online.  
 These findings, therefore, indicated why it was important for me to look 
at bloggers, not in terms of what they contributed to the Egyptian uprising or 
the democratic process, but as micro-organizations that, much like mass media, 
can and were subjected to political and financial pressures that affected their 
voices.   
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8.2. How much is the blogosphere an alternative space for the 
marginalized?    
 
It isn’t comprehensive to look at blogs and micro-blogs as alternative spaces 
for the marginalized voices without looking at exactly who gets heard online as 
well as just who is online. It was studying those two elements that led to the 
conclusion that the Egyptian blogosphere is inclusive in principle but not in 
practice; a notion that can easily be applied to several cases in countries with 
similar socio-economic compositions. 
Much like elite media, only a handful of social media makers and 
bloggers are leading and influencing discourse online while others struggle to 
get heard. Those influencers are normally from more privileged social and 
economic backgrounds that are different from the vast majority. Although this 
trend was consistent across the board, it proved stronger among prominent 
bloggers than less-prominent ones. It is important to remember than in a 
context like the Egyptian one, the internet is not inclusive as access to 
technology and education are considered privileges not accessible to everyone. 
Internet penetration stands at 89.9% in the UK, 86.75% in the U.S. and 86.78% 
in Germany (Internet Live Stats) while the UK’s Office for National Statistics 
reported in 2012 that 34.4% of people aged between 16 and 64 and 40.2% of 
the workforce achieved at least a degree level qualification. Meanwhile, 
according to a 2012 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) report, 74% of the 34 OECD countries – which include 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Japan, the UK and the U.S. – 
have achieved upper secondary education and 38% of those aged between 25 
and 34 have finished tertiary education. So while education and access to 
technology might not be constituents of the power elite worldwide, one needs 
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to look at bloggers’ profiles in the Egyptian context and in comparison to the 
majority of the population. With an illiteracy rate of 26%, and 40% of the 
population living under the poverty line, university education and access to 
high-speed internet at home and on the go are considered luxuries to the 
majority of the population. Those bloggers are therefore what C. Wright Mills 
(1956) described as power elite; born into elites and possessing the tools to 
become a power elite of their own.  As interviews and media findings show, 
the more prominent bloggers – who also happen to be the more elite ones – are 
evidently becoming power elite of their own, securing jobs at top media 
organizations and gaining more and more political and social influence. The 
eliteness of prominent bloggers also allowed not only support from influential 
circles on occasions when they were subjected to state crack-downs, but it also 
allowed them access to the media that meant their stories got coverage and 
popular attention that was not available to other less-prominent bloggers or the 
general public.  This eliteness in their profiles, compared to the majority of the 
population, leads to an exclusive, single-voiced space that is not conductive to 
democracy as it lacks plurality. If a user is not university-educated, does not 
have ready access to the internet allowing them live and frequent posts and 
coverage, and cannot afford the time or cost of blogging or micro-blogging, 
they cannot be active players in the blogosphere or social media.  
Popular loggers have commandeered spotlight from other lesser-known 
bloggers, in a way monopolizing who gets to speak on behalf of the revolution. 
Even when it came to their arrests or injuries, popular bloggers have been 
given far more attention by the public and media as they publicize each other’s 
cases, while others didn’t enjoy the same attention and consequently the same 
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relative immunity against crackdowns. Looking beyond the Egyptian context, 
the case could be applied almost universally; certain social media makers will 
gain increasing fame and so increasing legitimacy to speak about their 
respective topics of interest — both online and in mainstream — while others 
increasingly struggle to get heard online or offline. 
8.3. Acknowledging the limited plurality of blogs’ discourse  
 
The discourse on social media’s influence on the democratic process in Egypt 
and other authoritarian countries needs to look at how the plurality the 
blogosphere and social media add to the public space for discourse is limited 
given the influencing bloggers’ backgrounds, which is vastly different from the 
population. We cannot hope to discuss how the internet contributes to 
democratization without looking at who gets heard online to truly assess the 
scope it can and does play.  
To achieve plurality, a public space for discourse needs to have a diversity 
of topics and content makers, which stopped being true for blogs in Egypt after 
they had been mainstreamed in media and politics in the months following 
January 25th.  This is largely due to the lack of diversity in online content, the 
elite nature of bloggers, the polarization of the online sphere that is dominated 
by a select few who speak to the unheard many and the lack of inclusivity, 
disregard to status, liberal exchange of ideas and independence from state and 
economy. 
While blogs used to discuss a diverse range of topics before the uprising, 
including philosophy, literature, politics and economics, the only topics 
discussed after it were political, due to the state of the country at the time, 
showing a lack of content diversity. The findings point to the more prominent 
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bloggers possibly being more concerned with more elite topics than the 
majority of the public prioritizes. The blogosphere was also shown to be 
disengaged from the general public, which is evident in this research’s analysis 
of blog content. While workers and mid-level employees were protesting and 
striking for things like minimum wages, the blogosphere at the time was 
buzzing with discussions about freedom of expression and democracy.  
Despite the increasing internet penetration in the years following 2011, 
making the blogosphere and social media platforms potentially more inclusive, 
in practice, the situation was different. Less prominent bloggers reported 
struggling to get their voices across as the internet that became overloaded with 
content. While most voices got diluted and struggled to find an audience, the 
prominent bloggers’ followership kept increasing as they were covered by 
mainstream media and then started writing for popular newspapers, gaining 
more prominence. Taki’s research on Syrian and Lebanese bloggers show that 
the primary motivation her respondents gave for blogging is to get others to 
read their ideas and thoughts (2010, p.147). It is natural, therefore, that they 
might be willing to sacrifice some of the freedom they hold over their content 
to maximize the number of people who read those ideas and thoughts and thus 
moved to mainstream media. 
Bloggers’ haughty attitudes towards the new-comers online not only 
hindered the inclusivity of the online sphere, but also the disregard to status 
factor necessary for a plural public space for discourse. This attitude was also 
reflected in their relationship with followers, which became a one-way 
communication rather than an exchange of ideas. This particular finding is 
strikingly different from El-Nawawy and Khamis’ research on five blog posts. 
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Those posts were studied a year and a half before the uprising and eight 
months after it, leading El-Nawawy and Khamis to conclude that blogs allow 
for “electronic debate and virtual democracy,” through engaging in fruitful 
discussions (2014). Indeed the present research shows a dramatic change to the 
blogosphere and micro-blogging platforms between 2010 and 2015. The online 
sphere was therefore seen to be becoming a one-way conversation dominated 
by a select few who agreed with their immediate circles’ views and only 
interacted within them. 
The polarization and domination of the few over the online sphere is 
further strengthened with the increasing information overflow and social media 
popularity, which means that users tend to follow social media makers 
suggested by Twitter, which are those with the most followers in the user’s 
country of origin, or those whose names are familiar to them from their media 
appearances. They would also follow those familiar to their own circles; so 
Brotherhood supporters would automatically be more familiar with, and so 
follow, Brotherhood micro-bloggers and bloggers whereas those who are more 
left-leaning would follow leftist bloggers.  
The online sphere is now dominated by a group of elite voices in privileged 
positions as speakers, even though its popularity is widening. The majority of 
users, however are either only heard by a small number of friends and family 
who would listen as they struggle to reach others or remain passive receivers of 
the information set by those prominent social-media makers and bloggers.   
This is not to say that the internet has no role in democratization as it 
has proven an effective tool in forming the opinion of several strata of society, 
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but we have to remember that this role is limited by the discourse presented 
online, which is turn is limited by those running and producing it. 
8.4. The need for a different narrative on blogs, micro-blogs and 
democracy 
 
It is important to put the study of the internet in a historical context because, 
much like other media platforms, it can and was commercialized, 
mainstreamed and neutralized through consensus of the free market dynamics, 
and not necessarily coercion as the literature on Arab bloggers suggest. If we 
look at the history of labor press, for instance, we can trace a similar story; 
while state crackdowns proved ineffective in censoring labor newspapers, free 
market dynamics ultimately lead to the labor press demise in light of their 
failure to attract advertisers or achieve other sustainable financial models as 
advertisers favored capitalist-oriented newspapers. 
 Similarly, bloggers grew older and more career-oriented, and so needed 
financially sustainability and self-achievement, this then pushed them into 
mainstream media or politics and away from blogs. Not only so, but 
mainstream media excessive attention on a handful of bloggers and social 
media makers while it ignored the rest has proven a far stronger tool than state 
coercion. The state often cracked down on activists and controlled the media 
through censorship, confiscations, cracking down on investors and raising 
court cases against media platforms. In Egypt, hegemony was often coerced 
and not co-opted with the absence of an ideology to legitimize hegemony. This 
coercion was seen not only in the form of the state cracking down on activists 
but also in controlling state as well as private media through censorship, 
confiscations, cracking down on investors and raising court cases against 
media platforms. So political and economic coercion (in the form of 
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threatening investors to exercise censorship over the media they owned) was 
exerted to force the public and the cultural institutions, including the media, 
into hegemony. Because coercion alone is not sufficient to suppress revolts and 
maintain the status quo, ultimately activists, who also include bloggers – 
started calling for changes in the status quo, eventually leading to a revolt 
against the ruling class. After the uprising, bloggers continued facing efforts of 
coercion from the state, they had been subjected to arrests and crackdowns 
from authorities. However, what was more efficient in mellowing bloggers’ 
voices down, or hushing some of them in the process of reproducing 
hegemony, has been mainstream media co-opting prominent bloggers. Similar 
to the shift Eley (1992) describes happened in France, England and Germany 
with the formation of the bourgeois public sphere, there was a shift from the 
repressive mode of domination to a hegemonic one that is based primarily on 
consent that is also supplemented with a degree of repression. Yes, they still 
remain opposition voices, but their new roles affect their personalities, content 
and severity and direction of their voices as a result. This is also more apparent 
with prominent bloggers who received more opportunities to become 
institutionalized than the less prominent ones. So whereas their arrests caused 
uproar among activists online and offline, thus not achieving the hegemony 
hoped for, co-opting them proved more successful in Egypt. This is not to say, 
however, that coercion efforts have failed. Some bloggers have reported 
mellowing down their voices to be able to continue publishing in mainstream 
media and reach a wide audience. Others said they feared for their security and 
so some stopped blogging altogether, like the case of less-prominent bloggers, 
while others mellowed their voices down to avoid being legally prosecuted. 
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However, most of them reported altering their voices to fit mainstream far 
more often than they have reported altering it to avoid being fired, censored or 
arrested.  
 The effects of their mainstreaming were reflected on their content and 
presence online and offline, as blogs and social media transition from 
platforms read by a few and operating largely safely and independently from 
state and economy pressures to platforms widely followed by mainstream 
media, general public and the state. While bloggers may not post an 
advertisement on their blog that would subject them to pressures of the media 
economics, they are still influenced by political economies of the media as they 
join mainstream media and become aware of those pressures and thus alter 
their content on social media platforms and blogs accordingly, as interviews 
have shown. Bloggers often expressed wanting to reach out to the largest 
number of readers and altering their content to achieve that.  
Looking at the frames used with bloggers, we can instantly see that 
bloggers, especially prominent ones, were often framed to represent the 
revolution and the youth. They were often asked to analyse and comment not 
as individual activists, but rather as representatives of the revolution itself. This 
means that the interests they represent, although not necessarily in-line with the 
previous regime’s interests, were framed as the general interests of the public. 
The priorities they present, like democracy and elections, were presented as 
priorities of the public even if protests and strikes were taking place throughout 
the country calling for minimum wage, a priority the working class seemed to 
hold above holding elections. Because prominent bloggers came to be 
portrayed as representing the general good and the general interest, one can see 
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why their mainstreaming and co-opting or institutionalization would be 
problematic, as their voices get mellowed down due to their interests colliding 
with that of the mainstream media.  
8.5. Switch to social media in the international context 
 
The switch to social media is not specific to Egypt as studies, including one 
done by Neiman Lab in December 2014, show a similar move in the US. 
Veteran blogger Jason Kottke predicted the death of blogs as online users 
adopt social media platforms and added that 30% of traffic to his website 
comes from social media and that marketeers are urging him to promote their 
products on social media channels rather than his blog (2013). PewResearch 
Center indicated in 2010 that the number of teenagers working on their own 
blogs had halved since 2006 whereas the rate of blogging among adults 
increased from 11% of those aged 30 and above in 2008 to 14% in 2010. In the 
Egyptian context, those bloggers who constituted most of the blogosphere were 
adults who then grew more interested in their careers than in blogging.  
Nielsen, a market research company, also found that while traffic to blog 
hosting sites like Blogger and WordPress stagnated in 2009, traffic to 
Facebook grew by 66% and to Twitter by 57% (The Economist, 2010). The 
data resonates with the findings from this research, indicating that the bloggers 
themselves moved to micro-blogging platforms. Others argue, however, that 
blogs are not dying but morphed into mature parts of the publishing 
ecosystems and social networks (Dean, 2010 and Kabadayi, 2014). Kabadayi 
argues that the loss of casual bloggers has shaken things out, with more 
committed and skilled writers “sticking it out” (2014). Kabadayi argues that 
the decreasing number of active blogs is actually increasing the quality of the 
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blogosphere as a whole. He adds that publishers also took notice, adopting 
blogs and launching content aggregating platforms. This, Kabadayi says, 
creates an opportunity for bloggers to monetize their blogs and get advertising 
revenue they were not able to get before. “We have arrived at the essence of 
the blog – a highlight trafficked, commercially appealing platform whose best 
years are ahead of it,” (Kabadayi, 2014). Leading blogger Andrew Sullivan 
agrees with Kabadayi in a post he wrote arguing against the death of blogs. 
Sullivan wrote that blogs are not dead, but they have rather evolved “What 
began as one person being mean to Maureen Dowd around 12.30 am every 
night is now an organism in which my colleagues and I try to construct both a 
personal and yet also diverse conversation in real time,” he wrote about his 
aggregated blog. “But that doesn’t mean the individual blogger – small or large 
– is disappearing.” 
Yet the situation in Egypt is not exactly comparable with that in the 
U.S. or Europe. Although it remains true that the abundance of blogs that was 
seen around 2007 has decreased worldwide in favor of the increasing 
popularity of social media, other aspects of this trend have not been replicated 
in Egypt. The model of aggregated, more structured blogs, has not been 
replicated in Egypt – with the exception of a handful of blogs. In Egypt, 
instead of publishers adopting blogs and providing content aggregating 
platforms for leading bloggers, they have recruited them to work on their own 
platforms. There has also been no interest from advertisers in bloggers and it is 
not true that the leading bloggers who provide quality content are those who 
survived in the past years because these have apparently turned to mainstream 
media, as this research indicates. It remains to be seen whether the blogosphere 
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in Egypt will evolve the same way they have in the U.S. and Europe.  But 
unless bloggers move back to their blogging platforms, or a new wave of 
bloggers replaces them and finds more sustainable models, there is little 
indication that blogs in Egypt will evolve the same way they have in the U.S. 
and Europe. 
8.6. Areas for further research 
 
The findings point towards several possible areas for future research to explore 
but two questions seem nagging to explore.  
Whether a new wave of bloggers might form a revival of the Egyptian 
blogosphere through finding ways to make blogging sustainable. But is also 
viable to look at an alternative hypothesis that blogs and social media are there 
to stay, even if never made financially sustainable, but the players will keep 
changing as their needs change. This is to say that financial sustainability 
would not lead to the demise of the blogosphere, but that one needs to accept 
that the blogosphere will always be dominated by a certain, younger age group 
that is not career-oriented yet and can afford dedicating hours to blog and 
micro-blog without expecting financial or moral reward. That means that the 
current state of the Egyptian blogs is simply a transitional one waiting for 
another wave of young bloggers to dominate the blogosphere and eventually 
fade out in favour for the next wave. 
 Also, assessing the bloggers’ status after June 30th as the media 
changes its attitude towards them once more and where that leaves them is an 
important question. This means looking at whether bloggers will continue 
writing for mainstream media, even though their agendas might not necessarily 
align anymore, further mellowing down their voices as they reported doing? 
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And if they do not, might they revert back to posting on their blogs? Exploring 
the sustainability of bloggers’ newfound media eliteness has implications on 
how malleable they are willing to make their voices to maintain their status in 
prestigious media establishments and whether they or others might fill the 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR BLOGGERS	
This interview is for academic purposes. The results will be used as part of a 
doctoral thesis on the plurality the blogosphere adds to the public discourse in 
Egypt.  
- The interview should start off by explaining who I am, the institution I 
belong to and that the findings are for academic purposes. It should also 
state that I am interviewing political bloggers, not any activists, and the 
questions posed only have to do with their identities as bloggers and 
their activity on social media and blogs. This is basically to separate 
between activists and political bloggers who are also active on the 
ground.  
- Questions 1 to 6 serve to understand bloggers’ backgrounds and 
whether or not they come from certain elites or upper classes and how, 
in turn, this affected their status as bloggers (as shown from the framing 
and quantitative content analysis conducted). 
- Questions 7 to 16 help understand how the media’s relationship with 
bloggers changed post-January 25th from the bloggers’ own point of 
view and how this affects them. (This is then compared to findings 
from framing and quantitative content analysis). 
- After question 16, this segment of the interview was dedicated to 
finding out how the nature of issues discussed pre and post January 
25th, especially in the periods analyzed, changed. Using the laptop 
available on the interview, the blogger walks me through the posts 
covered in October 2010 and October 2011. This section will be 
tailored to each blogger. 
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- Questions 17 to 30 serve to determine whether the blogger has 
generated a revenue stream or not and the implication on content, 
length and frequency of posts. 
 
I want to start off by asking you a few questions about your background, 
your family and how they feel about what you do. 
1. Tell me a bit about your background; where you went to school, 
university and your current/former occupation. (This is to know 
whether they went to private/public schools and universities as well as 
whether they were or are holding prestigious/modest posts or modest 
ones in local/multinational companies. It also serves to let them tell me 
whether their current livelihood is related to blogging or the media 
without my having to ask and I can then prove further without 
sensitivities). 
2. What about your family? Do they have a political or journalism 
background? (This is to probe further into parents’ occupation, 
background and involvement in politics or the media). 
3. What was their reaction when you took up political blogging? (This 
serves to understand how relevant the parents’ backgrounds were to 
bloggers’ choices and whether the theory that people born to power 
elites possess the tools to become elites of their own holds true. I will 
then probe further into how they affected his activity, in terms of 
whether they supported it and how). 
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The next three questions are going to be about the technical side of blogging. 
(The below three questions aim to determine the tools available to them and 
how this impact their activity). 
4. Tell me a bit more about the logistics of blogging. Where would you 
say you do most of your blogging, posting on Facebook and Tweeting? 
From your home or elsewhere? 
5. And what are the devices you use most to blog and Tweet; a desktop, a 
laptop or a smart phone? 
6. Technology-wise, do you find it easy to post videos, for instance, at 
home and on the streets? Does your phone or Wi-Fi/telephone plan 
support this?  
I want to ask you a little bit about your relationship with mainstream 
media, in terms of coverage, for instance, whether or not your collaborate 
with them and so on. 
7. Before January 25th, how did the mainstream media cover you and 
other bloggers? Was there any sort of coverage at all and if so, would 
you say it was favorable or not? (I will probe here further for specific 
incidence based on individual bloggers being interviewed). 
8. How would you assess the mainstream media coverage of bloggers 
after January 25th? Is it any different or more or less the same?  (I will 
probe further about whether certain media platforms stood out as any 
different than others if the blogger doesn’t single ones out). 
9. Before January 25th, did you ever collaborate with the media, be it in 
the form of interviews, for instance, or syndicating some of your 
content for them? 
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10. And did that change after January 25th?   
11. Have you tried, for instance, reaching out to producers or editors to 
voice a certain opinion on a show or a newspaper, or to tell your 
account of a specific incident you witnessed? (Will further probe on the 
reaction from the newspaper or show and how this compares between 
before and after January 25th). 
12. What was the reaction of your followers when you were hosted/quoted 
on such and such? (This question will be asked to the five prominent 
bloggers with specific examples) 
13. You’ve been covered several times in the media after January 25th, so 
how has your followership changed after January 25th? Are you getting 
more followers? What kind of followers are you getting now that you 
weren’t getting before January 25th? (This question will be asked to the 
five prominent bloggers only and I will probe further with specific 
examples on whether specific appearances and how and whether they 
have increased their followership right after the show). 
14. Blogging carries a lot of similarities to traditional journalism. Did you 
ever consider contributing columns or articles to a newspaper? (Will 
further probe on why yes or why not and specific incidents). 
15. So how different did you find writing columns is from blogging? 
(Posed only to bloggers who have answered yes to the above. I will 
then probe further on censorship, editorial policies and tweaking 
content for mainstream media, depending on the blogger’s answer).  
16. The media has hosted and covered you after January 25th, do you feel 
any pressures now that you haven’t felt before January 25th? Are you 
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more conscious of the types of issues you cover, for instance, or the 
language you use than you had been before? (This question is mainly 
for prominent bloggers, for non-prominent ones, I will ask whether they 
feel free to post whatever they want because of the anonymity 
blogosphere presents. I probe further on whether they have been 
receiving more criticism from audience, for instance, than they had 
before and what does being on the spotlight mean for their own safety). 
I want us to go through the posts you have posted on October 2010 and 
October 2011 and I want you to walk me through why you’ve chosen to cover 
these specific issues over others. 
(Based on each blogger and guided by posts from his own blog, I pose 
questions on the nature of issues covered, how it changed post-January 25th, 
whether they faced any criticism or pressure over a certain issue they covered 
and why they chose certain issues to cover over others mainstream media 
studied was covering in the same period). 
The next few questions are related to how financially sustainable blogging is 
and whether or not you face any difficulties finding the time to post and Tweet. 
17. How much time do you roughly dedicate to posting on Twitter, 
Facebook and your blog?  
18. Are you now posting more or less than before January 25th? (Will probe 
further based on results from content analysis of his blog as well as 
whether he had a full-time job before January 25th and now doesn’t). 
19. When are you most active on social media and your blog? Is it before 
work or after or during breaks at work? (This will only be posed to 
bloggers who reported working full time earlier, for others who don’t 
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have full-time jobs I will ask them when they used to post when they 
were working and when they are posting most now). 
20. How easy is it to find the time to post on your own blog? And how does 
Twitter and Facebook compare to blogging in terms of ease of posting 
and time and effort you put into the posts?  
21. Since the introduction of Twitter, have you been as active on your 
blog? (Will probe further here on whether they find it easier to Tweet as 
opposed to writing long posts on their blogs). 
22. Do you know of bloggers who were successful in generating revenue 
form their blogs through ads, sponsorships or party-backing? (Probe 
further on income generated from those ads and whether there are 
certain terms they have to follow with regards to language or content). 
23. And how do you, personally, feel about posting ads or sponsoring your 
blog? (Probe further on why he/she feels that way based on analysis of 
their blogs and the lack or existence of ads). 
24. How do you feel about bloggers syndicating their content to 
mainstream media or joining mainstream media as freelance or full-
time journalists? 
25. Have you, personally, ever been approached by mainstream media for a 
job or even a freelance gig? (Probe with specific examples as well as 
pressures or censorship they encountered if they have). 
26. We have been seeing many activists quitting their jobs after January 
25th to dedicate themselves to the causes of the revolution. Many of 
those activists are prominent bloggers as well. How sustainable do you 
think this is across the board on the longer run? (Further probe on his 
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specific case to learn whether he receives financial support from his 
family, for instance). 
27. How would you say blogging stands in terms of your priorities; is it a 
hobby, an activity, a duty, a job, a passion? How do you place it in 
terms of how important it is compared to other occupations in your life, 
like you job, for instance? 
28. On the longer-run, how sustainable do you think the hours you put into 
social media and blogging are?  
29. We see many professional bloggers in Europe and the US who were 
successful in maintaining their passion and yes generate revenue to 
make it sustainable. Do you think we have that model here?  
30. What are the most difficulties you would say you are facing as a 
blogger? 
31. How do you feel about paid TV appearances? 
32. Do you feel all bloggers’ cases get as much support and pressure, be 
they popular and known ones or not? 
33. Would you mind suggesting financially-sustainable bloggers and non-









APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR MEDIA PEOPLE 
General questions: 
- Before January 25th, how often did you cover the news of bloggers or 
quoting them? 
- Before January 25th, did you ever check social media for story ideas or 
used it for reporting? 
- How would you say the way you dealt with bloggers and social media 
changed after January 25th? 
- Did you start using social media for reporting or otherwise? 
- And how would you say the frequency and nature of your coverage of 
blogs changed? 
- How did you use social media in reporting and writing articles after 
January 25th? 
- When it happened, why did you quote or cover bloggers, meaning did 
you use them to ask them their opinions about certain issues, to cover 
their news or otherwise? 
- On what basis did you decide which sections bloggers’ news or 
interviews went in (front page, politics, news, crime section)?  (FOR 
PRINT) 
- On what basis did you decide whether the headline included the 
bloggers’ name or identity? (FOR PRINT) 
-  On what basis did you decide whether to include his photo? (FOR 
PRINT) 
- On what basis did you decide whether to interview the blogger over the 
phone or host him in the studio?  (BROADCAST) 
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- Why did you introduce some bloggers as bloggers at times and at others 
as activists or party members or other ids?  What defines how they are 
identified and which identity prevails? 
- In some incidents you called bloggers “hadretak” and generally adopted a 
familiar tone with them while other incidents you were more formal. 
Why do you think that is? And how does that compare to your other 
guests? (BROADCAST) 
- Do you feel a blogger’s opinion represents only his own or do you 
interview bloggers to get a feel of the revolutionary youth’s opinion or 
the street’s opinion? Is that the same for all kinds of bloggers or only 
the more prominent ones?  
Questions for Al-Masry Al-Youm: 
- Before January 25th, how often did you cover the news of bloggers or 
quoting them? 
- Before January 25th, did you ever check social media for story ideas or 
used it for reporting? 
- How would you say the way you dealt with bloggers and social media 
changed after January 25th? 
- Did you start using social media for reporting or otherwise? 
- And how would you say the frequency and nature of your coverage of 
blogs changed? 
- How did you use social media in reporting and writing articles after 
January 25th? 
- When it happened, why did you quote or cover bloggers, meaning did 
you use them to ask them their opinions about certain issues, to cover 
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their news or otherwise? 
- On what basis did you decide which sections bloggers’ news or 
interviews went in (front page, politics, news, crime section)?  
- On what basis did you decide whether the headline included the 
bloggers’ name or identity?  
-  On what basis did you decide whether to include his photo?  
- Why did you introduce some bloggers as bloggers at times and at others 
as activists or party members or other ids?  What defines how they are 
identified and which identity prevails? 
- Do you feel a blogger’s opinion represents only his own or do you 
interview bloggers to get a feel of the revolutionary youth’s opinion or 
the street’s opinion? Is that the same for all kinds of bloggers or only 
the more prominent ones?  
- In coverage of Mina Daniel, Al Masry Al Youm used the most emotional 
tone, why do you that is so? 
 
 
The space results were skewed, however, due to six articles covering social 
media reactions to current issues vaguely calling all social media users online 
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activists. Users quoted were often not bloggers at all, but rather casual social 
media users.  
Bloggers framed as revolutionary youth representatives and political analysts 
in the print issues studied were prominent bloggers like Alaa Abdel Fattah, 
Esraa Abel Fattah and Maher. Non-star bloggers like Tarek El Khouly were 
framed as eyewitnesses. Out of the 27 martyrs of the Maspero events, Mina 
Daniel was the one often mentioned.  
Maikel Nabil was framed as a defendant in two articles, a blogger in three, a 
criminal in two and a victim in two.  
Questions for the Daily News Egypt: 
- Before January 25th, how often did you cover the news of bloggers or 
quoting them? 
- Before January 25th, did you ever check social media for story ideas or 
used it for reporting? 
- How would you say the way you dealt with bloggers and social media 
changed after January 25th? 
- Did you start using social media for reporting or otherwise? 
- And how would you say the frequency and nature of your coverage of 
blogs changed? 
- How did you use social media in reporting and writing articles after 
January 25th? 
- When it happened, why did you quote or cover bloggers, meaning did 
you use them to ask them their opinions about certain issues, to cover 
their news or otherwise? 
- On what basis did you decide which sections bloggers’ news or 
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interviews went in (front page, politics, news, crime section)?  
- On what basis did you decide whether the headline included the 
bloggers’ name or identity?  
-  On what basis did you decide whether to include his photo? 
- Why did you introduce some bloggers as bloggers at times and at others 
as activists or party members or other ids?  What defines how they are 
identified and which identity prevails? 
- Do you feel a blogger’s opinion represents only his own or do you 
interview bloggers to get a feel of the revolutionary youth’s opinion or 
the street’s opinion? Is that the same for all kinds of bloggers or only 
the more prominent ones?  
- Did you use Arabic-language and English-language bloggers equally? 
Does your staff all speak and read Arabic? 
 
 
DNE was also the only newspaper to cover and quote less prominent bloggers 
like Lilian Wagdy and Evronia Azer. DNE also quoted and covered bridge 
bloggers like Sandmonkey and Gigi Ibrahim who blogged mainly in English 
while other newspapers opted for star bloggers who blogged in Arabic. 
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Obvious sympathy towards bloggers and focus on human rights issues. 
Only DNE covered Dalia Ziada and Dahshan winning the Anna Lindh 
Journalist award. Ziada worked at Al-Ahram for two years and tweets and 
blogs in Arabic.  
DNE was the only newspaper to use social media for reporting in 2010 and use 
prominent bloggers as eyewitnesses before the trend caught on in 2011.  
Questions for Ten PM: 
- Before January 25th, how often did you cover the news of bloggers or 
quoting them? 
- Before January 25th, did you ever check social media for story ideas or 
used it for reporting? 
- How would you say the way you dealt with bloggers and social media 
changed after January 25th? 
- Did you start using social media for reporting or otherwise? 
- And how would you say the frequency and nature of your coverage of 
blogs changed? 
- How did you use social media in reporting and writing articles after 
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January 25th? 
- When it happened, why did you quote or cover bloggers, meaning did 
you use them to ask them their opinions about certain issues, to cover 
their news or otherwise? 
- On what basis did you decide whether to interview the blogger over the 
phone or host him in the studio?   
- Why did you introduce some bloggers as bloggers at times and at others 
as activists or party members or other ids?  What defines how they are 
identified and which identity prevails? 
- In some incidents you called bloggers “hadretak” and generally adopted a 
familiar tone with them while other incidents you were more formal. 
Why do you think that is? And how does that compare to your other 
guests?  
- Do you feel a blogger’s opinion represents only his own or do you 
interview bloggers to get a feel of the revolutionary youth’s opinion or 
the street’s opinion? Is that the same for all kinds of bloggers or only 




Ten PM also had a weekly segment dedicated to the Internet in 2010. But the 
two mentions of bloggers were inside a documentary about neighborhood 
channels. 
Ten PM covered issues like the death of Mina Daniel and Abdel Fattah and 
Michael Adel’s arrest, although Abdel Fattah’s arrest didn’t take up nearly as 
much space as it did with Baladna Bel Masry. While Baladna Bel Masry had 
16 mentions of Abdel Fattah, Ten PM only had 3 in a total of 1:50 minutes, 
compared to 66:16 in Baladna Bel Masry. They mentioned Malek Mostafa’s 
injury only 2 times (compared to 6 in Baladna Bel Masry) but didn’t interview 
him.  
The show included bloggers at more length but less frequently than Baladna 
bel Masry whereas they rarely did phone interviews with bloggers. 
Ten PM were less concerned with human rights of bloggers and more with 
political analysis and current events. 
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While Abdel Fattah was framed once as a defendant and once as a victim, 
Michael Adel was framed as a defendant in the same segment. 
Ya 3am with Kassas and a motherly and joking tone with Naggar. 
She frames Kassas severely as youth rep.  
Questions for Baladna Bel Masry: 
- Before January 25th, how often did you cover the news of bloggers or 
quoting them? 
- Before January 25th, did you ever check social media for story ideas or 
used it for reporting? 
- How would you say the way you dealt with bloggers and social media 
changed after January 25th? 
- Did you start using social media for reporting or otherwise? 
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- And how would you say the frequency and nature of your coverage of 
blogs changed? 
- How did you use social media in reporting and writing articles after 
January 25th? 
- When it happened, why did you quote or cover bloggers, meaning did 
you use them to ask them their opinions about certain issues, to cover 
their news or otherwise? 
- On what basis did you decide whether to interview the blogger over the 
phone or host him in the studio?   
- Why did you introduce some bloggers as bloggers at times and at others 
as activists or party members or other ids?  What defines how they are 
identified and which identity prevails? 
- In some incidents you called bloggers “hadretak” and generally adopted a 
familiar tone with them while other incidents you were more formal. 
Why do you think that is? And how does that compare to your other 
guests?  
- Do you feel a blogger’s opinion represents only his own or do you 
interview bloggers to get a feel of the revolutionary youth’s opinion or 
the street’s opinion? Is that the same for all kinds of bloggers or only 




Baladna covered news of Alaa Abdel Fattah intensively (16 times in 
November 2011 in a total of 66:16 minutes). Malek Mostafa was also covered 
intensively (mentioned 6 times and interviewed over the telephone in a total of 
10:29 minutes) and Maikel Nabil’s case remained a prominent part of the 
media of bloggers in November 2011, although not as extensive as in October. 
Mina Daniel was also mentioned several times in the show.  
The show hosted bloggers more frequently than Ten PM but gave each less 
time than Ten PM and they also did much more phone interviews with them. 





Magued never referred to Alaa Abdel Fattah, Nabil or Bahaa Saber as 
defendant, even when reading out their charges, but always as bloggers or 
activists.  
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Wael Khalil was framed once to present a personal opinion and another 
revolutionary youth’s opinion. Abdel Rahman Fares was framed to represent 
the voice of the street. Bassem Fathy, Mohamed Marei and Lobna Darwish are 
all lesser-known bloggers, and were all framed as eyewitnesses rather than 
political analysts.  
Magued also adopted a formal tone only Malek Adly, Mostafa El Naggar and 
Mohamed Marei. The formal tone adopted with blogger and then-
parliamentary member El Naggar came in a segment about new members’ 
opinions of the new cabinet of ministers. He is hosted alongside other 
parliamentary members. He is identified as a member of the parliament and 
member of Al Adl Party. She addresses him as Dr. Mostafa and only asks him 
about his own, personal opinion. He is never asked about the youth, the 
demonstrators or similar questions often posed to activists.  
Magued often introduces Alaa Abdel Fattah as the activist Alaa Abdel 
Fattah but doesn’t mention any background on his case or arrest when 
discussing updates.  
When blogger and activist Mona Seif was featured for an interview in a 
conference, producers chose to identify her as Alaa Abdel Fattah’s sister.  
Magued also covered Abdel Fattah’s news much more intensively than any 
other media outlet, dedicating three segments solely to Abdel Fattah’s case.  
Magued tells Fares: “There is a responsibility that falls on those who made 
this revolution happen and your fate is that you are the youth of the revolution 
and it is as if you are the only party who made this revolution. […] You are 
now criticized of [being] dictatorial […] how will you overcome this?”  
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Magued calls the newborn the youngest revolutionary in Egypt and a 
“revolutionary by birth like his father, grandfather, mother and aunt” and 
comes from solid roots. She dubs Khaled and his parents “more famous than 
fire on a flag,” and goes on to say how unfairly his father is being detained and 
how his family members are all freedom fighters that even his aunt, Mona Seif, 
was born to an imprisoned father “paying the price of his freedom and 
resilience.” She concludes saying “Alaa made us all proud and to all those who 
deprived Alaa to look at his son’s face when he is opening his eyes to the 
world and deprived Khaled to open his eyes and see his father: Let the flowers 
flourish.”  
A segment titled “The Rights of those Like Alaa Abdel Fattah to Vote” 
is dedicated to using Abdel Fattah as a case study of the rights of those 
detained without verdict in voting. 12,000 being military tried.  
 More than 40 were arrested during the Maspero events, only Alaa Abdel 
Fattah’s arrest took the spotlight. In the same events 27 died, but only Mina 
Daniel’s death was publicized. In Maspero, 800 were injured and 10 were 
killed, only Malek Mostafa, Ahmed Harara and an Al-Masry Al-Youm 
photographer were intensively covered and mentioned by name. 
Questions for Al-Ahram: 
- Before January 25th, how often did you cover the news of bloggers or 
quoting them? 
- Before January 25th, did you ever check social media for story ideas or 
used it for reporting? 
- How would you say the way you dealt with bloggers and social media 
changed after January 25th? 
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- Did you start using social media for reporting or otherwise? 
- And how would you say the frequency and nature of your coverage of 
blogs changed? 
- How did you use social media in reporting and writing articles after 
January 25th? 
- When it happened, why did you quote or cover bloggers, meaning did 
you use them to ask them their opinions about certain issues, to cover 
their news or otherwise? 
- On what basis did you decide which sections bloggers’ news or 
interviews went in (front page, politics, news, crime section)?   
- On what basis did you decide whether the headline included the 
bloggers’ name or identity? 
-  On what basis did you decide whether to include his photo?  
- Why did you introduce some bloggers as bloggers at times and at others 
as activists or party members or other ids?  What defines how they are 
identified and which identity prevails? 
- Do you feel a blogger’s opinion represents only his own or do you 
interview bloggers to get a feel of the revolutionary youth’s opinion or 
the street’s opinion? Is that the same for all kinds of bloggers or only 





Ahram Online covered issues, like Mina Daniel’s death, that weren’t in the 
print edition of the same day. A news article on Maikel Nabil’s referral to the 
mental health hospital was covered in the first edition of Al-Ahram but was 
replaced with an article about the Muslim Brotherhood in the second edition of 
the newspaper.  
 
Those framed as criminals were Maikel Nabil (framed 4 times as a 
criminal), Ayman Mansour and Asmsaa Mahfouz. While Nabil and Mansour 
are of much lesser prominence than other bloggers, Mahfouz, a star blogger, 
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was framed only once as a criminal (revolutionary and role model 
disappointingly gone astray) and another as a hero in the 3 times she was 
mentioned that month.  























APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS OF MARKETEERS 
1. The internet penetration in Egypt has exponentially increased after January 
25th, but through your work, have you noticed a correlating change in the 
online advertising market?  
 
2. Have you seen advertisers dedicating bigger percentages of their 
marketing budgets towards online marketing?  
 
3. If advertisers are showing a growing interest in online advertising, what 
platforms are they looking at? In other words, are they looking at newspapers 
portals, lifestyle magazines' websites, social media or other form of portals and 
would you kindly provide a few examples of popular portals for online ads?  
 
4. Have you noticed any interest from advertisers in bloggers, be it political 
bloggers, fashion bloggers or otherwise? Interest here can be interest in 
collaborating on certain campaigns, on placing ads on their blogs or sponsoring 
them or even in inviting them to cover events or product launches.  
 


















APPENDIX D: LIST OF PERSONAL INTERVIEWS 
ABDEL FATTAH, E. June 2014. Prestige Restaurant, Cairo. 
 
ABO-ELGHEIT, M. 2014. July 2014. Beanos Coffeeshop, Cairo. 
 
BADAWY, A. July 2014. The Egyptian Democratic Academy, Cairo. 
 
EFFAT, S. December 2014.  Fortune Promo7 Office, Cairo. 
 
EL MALKY, R. August 2014. Cilantro Coffeeshop, Cairo. 
 
EL MEHAIRY, M. December 2014. Connect Ads Office, Cairo. 
 
El NAGGAR, M. July 2014. El Naggar’s Dental Clinic, Cairo. 
 
EL SHERBINY, N. December 2014. L’Oreal Egypt Office, Cairo. 
 
El ZELAKY, E.  August 2014. Al-Masry Al-Youm Office, Cairo. 
 
EZZAT, A. August 2014. Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights Office, Cairo. 
 
FATHY, B. June 2014. Beano’s Coffeeshop, Cairo. 
 
HISHAM, A. August 2014. Cilantro Coffeeshop, Cairo. 
MAGUED, R. August 2014. ONA Academy, Cairo. 
 
MAHFOUZ, A. July 2014. Mahfouz’s Home, Cairo. 
 
NAGATI, L. July 2014. Nagati’s Office, Cairo. 
ROSTOM, S. August 2014. Dream TV’s Studios, Cairo. 
 
SABER, M. July 2014. Diwan Bookstore, Cairo.  	
SANDMONKEY. July 2014. Sandmonkey’s Office, Cairo. 	
SHERIEF, M. August 2014. L’Aroma Coffeeshop, Cairo. 









APPENDIX E: LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
ANHRI: Arabic Network for Human Rights Information 
CAPMAS: The Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics  
DNE: Daily News Egypt newspaper 
EIPR: Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights 
ERTU: Egyptian Radio and Television Union 
NDP: National Democratic Party 
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
SCAF: Supreme Council of Armed Forces 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
